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FOREWORD 
 
 
Thousands of vessels cross EU waters and hundreds enter into EU ports every day, generating an 
overwhelming amount of tracking data and reports that make it possible to disguise illegal operations. 
Detecting steadily changing deceptive behaviours at sea is becoming like trying to find a needle in a 
haystack and calls for advanced automatic and adaptive tools to discover useful information from the 
data. 
Data mining, information fusion and visual analytics are becoming central to the discovery of 
knowledge from the increasingly available information on vessels and their movements (e.g. Automatic 
Identification System - AIS, Long Range Identification and Tracking - LRIT, radar tracks, Earth 
Observation) at global scale. This enables the automatic detection of structured anomalies, the prediction 
of vessel routes up to a few days in advance, the behavioural characterisation of vessels, the 
understanding and mapping of activities at sea and the analysis of their trends over time. Such 
knowledge provides a new set of possibilities for improving Maritime Situational Awareness and safety 
of navigation, understanding what is happening and might be happening at sea. 
This event brought together technology and research providers (academia, industry) and users 
(operational authorities) in the field of Maritime Knowledge Discovery to identify current capability 
gaps and highlight the most promising research strands.  
Authorities set the scene either through presentations (Section I), speeches and live demos introducing 
the current operational capabilities. This was followed up by industry (Section II), showing the latest 
state-of-the-art on big data services in the maritime domain. Finally, academia and research centres 
introduced the latest research efforts and methods to improve knowledge discovery in the maritime 
domain (Section III). 
A final round-table discussion helped collecting suggestions from authorities and industry to highlight 
the most promising and relevant areas of research and identified, together with research providers, 
possible solutions. This is summarized in the Conclusions and Remarks Section. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In a six year research collaboration between authorities, 
academy and industry, a module for anomaly detection has 
been developed, the SADV module, which is since 2016 in 
operation in the maritime surveillance system SjöBASIS 
used by Swedish authorities. The SADV module detects 
anomalies in the maritime situational awareness picture, 
which increases the maritime authorities capacity to 
discover, react and prevent risks at sea.  
 The module is generic, in the sense that it can be adapted 
for several maritime surveillance systems, and it can be 
extended with new statistical, rule based, or hybrid anomaly 
detection capabilities. Currently implemented anomaly 
detection functions include detection of unusual movement 
patterns, meetings at sea, and risk of grounding. The 
interface between the anomaly detection module and the 
surveillance system is thin to make adaptation easy. 
 
 
Index Terms— Maritime surveillance, Anomaly 
detection, Movement pattern, Meetings at sea, Risk of 
grounding 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
Maritime traffic is constantly increasing, and is expected to 
continue to grow. Only around the coasts of Sweden there 
are around 8000 maritime vessels at any instant. It is a 
demanding task for the maritime surveillance operators to 
monitor all these vessels and find those that are involved in 
incidents, hazardous behaviour, or illegal activities.   The 
purpose of the six year research collaboration SADV, 
“Statistical Anomaly Detection and Visualization for 
Maritime Domain Awareness”, has been to develop a tool 
that can support the operators by finding and highlighting 
vessels with anomalous or suspicious behaviour. To solve 
this, a module for anomaly detection for use within maritime 
surveillance platforms was developed. The project was 
jointly lead by the Swedish Coast Guard responsible for 
development of SjöBASIS, HiQ that implements and 
maintains the SjöBASIS system, and the computer science 
research institute SICS with over 15 years experience of 
developing and applying methods for anomaly detection. 
Other participants were the Swedish Customs Service, the 
Swedish Armed Forces, Saab AB, the Swedish Space 
Company, and Blekinge University.  
 
2. SADV MODULE ARCHITECTURE 
 
The SADV module is designed to be highly generic, in the 
sense that it can be adapted for several maritime 
surveillance systems, and it can be extended with several 
different anomaly detection capabilities. To make it easy to 
adapt to different surveillance systems, the module 
communicates via a restful web interface, which is kept 
minimal for simplicity: In essence, maritime situational data 
is fed from the surveillance system to the module, which 
analyses it and sends back generated alarms for presentation 
in the surveillance system. It is also possible to configure 
the module via the interface, to control which kind of 
detection is activated and with what parameters.  
 There are different approaches for anomaly detection. 
They can essentially be divided in three classes: Statistical 
methods, in which a statistical or data driven model is build 
up of the ``normal'' behaviour, and a new situation is 
compared to this model; Rule based methods, where 
conditions are formulated that describes the 
 
Figure 1 Internal Architecture of the Anomaly aspects in 
the SADV module. 
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anomalous situations of interest; and Model based methods, 
in which a physical model or simulator is created to mimic 
the real system, and when the real system diverges from the 
simulation there is an anomaly. The most common approach 
in maritime surveillance has been rule based, i.e conditions 
can be formulated for ships to detect. When statistical 
methods are used they are often quite simple, such as 
focusing on momentary speed and direction. The goal in the 
SADV project has been to create a framework that can 
handle all the approaches [1] and to significantly advance 
the use of statistical anomaly detection.  
 There are different ways for a vessel to be anomalous. 
Which anomalies that are found by a specific detector 
depend on which features in the data that are considered. 
The SADV module uses the concept of Anomaly Aspects, 
each of which focuses on a specific type of anomaly, i.e. 
checks for anomalies with respect to a certain set of 
features, using one or a combination of the anomaly 
detection approaches. Figure 1 shows the internal structure 
of an Aspect. The most critical part of an Aspect for what 
anomalies are found is the Transformer, which converts the 
stream of raw situational data into the relevant high level 
features. The Anomaly calculator assesses the anomaly 
score based on those features, and the Presentation guide 
maintains a set of anomaly indications based on those 
scores.   
 
3. IMPLEMENTED ANOMALY DETECTORS 
 
Currently there are three Anomaly Aspects implemented 
and used in operation today. They are described here. The 
SADV module is designed to make it easy to add new 
aspects in the future. 
 
 
3.1 Movement pattern 
 
The Movement pattern aspect is a statistical anomaly 
detector. Rather than focusing on momentary speed and 
course, it characterises a vessel in terms of how many stops 
and turns it performs during a journey. The idea is that each 
vessel type has a certain probability of performing different 
movements at any instant, and the movements will give 
some indication of the activities of the vessel. Based on 
previously reported data there is an estimation of an 
expected number of movements, during a certain period of 
time, connected to a certain type of vessel. If the number of 
movements exceeds the accepted statistical variation, this is 
considered an anomaly that could be worth checking 
manually. The aspect takes into consideration various 
movements typical of standard vessels, such as speed 
changes, stopping, waiting still, turnings and rotation, and 
also whether the movement was performed close to the 
shore or in open sea. The aspect uses the ISC framework for 
statistical anomaly detection [2], based on parametric 
models and Bayesian statistics.   
 When a ship starts to move in an uncharacteristic way, 
e.g. turns unexpectedly or stops too many times, the alarm 
will go off. One example is a container ship which in 
October 2015 was en route from Poland to Ystad in the 
south of Sweden in rough weather. The system detected that 
the ship had lost the ability to steer and started to drift, due 
to its irregular movements. 
 Patterns of movement that does not match the boat type 
can also reveal that the ship is doing something illegal, such 
as a recreational boat who behaves like a fishing boat can 
try to escape the fishing quotas.       
 
3.2 Meetings at sea 
 
When two boats meet at sea, it may be indicative of 
fraudulent activity.  It may be smuggling, attempted piracy, 
or unloading the catches to avoid fishing quotas. Another 
kind of meeting is two boats running in parallel, which may 
indicate trawling, which is not permitted everywhere.   
 Most surveillance systems offer the opportunity to check 
for meetings with an in advance specified vessel. However, 
the Meeting aspect is a rule based detector which employs 
an indexing scheme to be able to quickly detect meetings 
between any two vessels not of a type that are expected to 
meet. Especially interesting are meetings when one of the 
vessels is lacking any transponder signal such as AIS.  
 
3.2 Risk of grounding 
 
The Grounding aspects is a combination between a rule 
based and statistical detector which tries to predict if there is 
a risk of running aground.  A vessel that moves off the 
fairway and approaches waters shallower than the draught of 
the vessel will generate an alarm. The rule based part 
compares the draught with the depth ahead of the vessel 
according the sea chart. The statistical part compares the 
vessels position and course with how other vessels have 
moved to see if it is significantly different.  
 A grounding alarm is generated about 3 minutes before 
the grounding will happen, which will give the vessel time 
to react and steer away. Since the grounding of tankers is 
one of the most serious threats to our oceans, the possibility 
of real-time monitoring of grounding risk is an important 
functionality.   
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
The SADV module is used in operation since January 2016 
at the Swedish Coast Guard. The basic principles are based 
in more than 15 years research. Yet it is a major endeavour 
to actually make these methods work in practice.   
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 First, of course, real world data is never clean. There are 
missing data, noisy data, and even deliberate misinformation 
in the data, all of which must be handled. This requires 
robust methods that do not rely on perfect data. Unrealistic 
or improbable sensor readings, such as rapidly fluctuating 
speeds or positions, should be filtered out. It is otherwise a 
common phenomenon that issues with the data quality will 
give rise to false alarms, i.e. the vessel is quite normal but 
noise in the data make it appear strange (like rapidly 
jumping between two distant locations).    
 Much work has been done to minimise the number of 
false alarms. A system that gives too many false alarms is 
not trusted by the operators and will soon be ignored. 
Therefore, the goal has been that the number of false alarms 
must be in the same order as the number of real interesting 
events. This is a very high ambition in fact, as the number of 
interesting events is so much smaller than the number of 
evaluated events, and there are so many artifacts in the data 
that may give rise to false alarms.    
 The sampling frequency differs much between different 
sources. Some sources are sampled in the order of once 
every ten seconds, whereas others are only sampled once 
every six minutes. To be able to detect the risk of grounding 
with three minutes margin, or detect vessels that are drifting 
by noting their irregular movements, six minutes is clearly 
too long. Furthermore, data from some sources are delayed, 
sometimes up to 20 minutes, before they reach the 
surveillance system, which poses a similar problem. When 
designing future surveillance systems this should be kept in 
mind.   
 Many surveillance systems offer the possibility for the 
operators to design rules for what to detect. One experience 
from this project is that designing a useful detection rule 
takes considerable effort, and knowledge both of the 
maritime surveillance domain and of anomaly detection 
methodology. Fine tuning the rule to avoid false alarms take 
even longer. It is not feasible to assume that the operators 
can spend their time to design such rules. Useful rules need 
to be provided for the operators by the system.    
 There is currently a strong demand for tools and decision 
support in surveillance and monitoring, and development 
within statistical machine learning and anomaly detection is 
very rapid. There will be many more systems appearing for 
maritime anomaly detection in the near future. No doubt 
there is much more to do, but the SADV project has given 
many valuable insights and experiences in this process. 
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PORTUGUESE NAVY PERSPECTIVE IN MARITIME SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS – THE ANOMALY DETECTION 
 
LCDR Pedro Serafim 
Portuguese Navy 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last few years, a significant increase in marine 
traffic has been registered in the Portuguese Sea Lines of 
Communication. A 65%-fold increase
1
 in Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) contacts alone has been 
reported. This kind of heavy traffic brings a whole new 
challenge in the management and tracking of the full 
spectrum of marine activity. An increased flow in activity 
brings an increased number of subsequent illegal 
activities.   To face this situation, the Portuguese Navy 
is committed in the development of its maritime systems, 
preparing itself to face new challenges in the maritime 
security domain, in order to control, protect and act in its 
areas of interest. Portugal has a large maritime area of 
responsibility and therefore a high effectiveness is 
required to the Portuguese Navy, in terms of surveillance. 
The Portuguese Navy Maritime Operations Centre 
(COMAR) performs an important role in this regard, in 
order to develop a full Maritime Situational Awareness. 
 In terms of law enforcement, the Portuguese Navy 
major tasks range from patrol and surveillance of 
maritime activities, to direct combat of illicit activities 
(such as illegal fishing, drug trafficking, illegal 
immigration or piracy) never forgetting the sustainability 
of the ocean and its resources. 
 
2. COMAR AND THE MARITIME SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS 
 
COMAR was created in June of 2008, under the 
Portuguese Navy’s Command Fleet structure. The Centre 
is co-located with the Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Centre Lisboa. The mission of COMAR is to support 
the operations of the Portuguese Navy, the Maritime 
Authority activities and the Hydrographic Institute in 
conducting operations, exercises and other activities at 
sea, in order to ensure the freedom of navigation and 
protection of the sea lines of communication as well as a 
more effective and efficient  
                                                 
1
2014 – 198 028 AIS Contacts 
   2015 – 305 690 AIS Contacts 
 
 
State Authority in the areas under national sovereignty 
and jurisdiction. 
 On the other hand, COMAR is also responsible for 
collecting, processing and sharing the information 
required for the acquisition and maintenance of a 
maritime situational awareness in the Portuguese State 
area of interest, in coordination with the Joint HQ 
(EMGFA) and other national and international operational 
centers.  
 To accomplish its mission, COMAR has a diverse 
array of technological systems (military and civilian) and 
the necessary human resources and organization. The 
centre is equipped with many information systems that 
can be divided in two broad categories: 
Coastal Systems: A network of Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) Support Structures, Vessel Monitoring 
System (VMS), Vessel Traffic Services (with Coastal 
Radars), Integrated Maritime Data Environment 
(IMDatE) from EMSA; 
Offshore Systems: Which include Satellite AIS (SAT 
AIS), the Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) 
the VRMTC coordinated by Italian Navy, and NATO 
Military Systems (MCCIS, C2PC, and MMHS).Both of 
those systems rely heavily on the information and 
validation gathered by the Navy and Air Force assets. The 
management of all the information in a coherent decision 
making support structure is crucial. Therefore, all the 
processes ranging from analysis to validation, contribute 
cumulatively to the overall superiority of information for 
decision making, in all three levels of operational activity 
(tactical, operational and strategic). This constitutes the 
main mission and purpose of COMAR: to provide a 
coherent and integrated support for decision making. 
 In terms of human resources, the complement of the 
Centre is comprised of teams of 7 people in 12-hour 
shifts, on a 24/7 basis. The modular arrangement of the 
centre allows the installment of several extra 
workstations, which upgrade the planning and execution 
capacity for a large spectrum of operations and other 
actions at sea. 
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2.1. The anomaly detection 
 
Since 2012, COMAR use a system developed by 
Portuguese Navy and the National Company Critical 
Software, OVERSEE.  
 OVERSEE is a system of systems that provides a geo-
referenced display of traffic information (AIS, SAT AIS 
and VMS), Global Maritime Distress System (GMDSS) 
distress alerts (COSPAS - SARSAT) and Meteorological 
information, all spread out in cartographic and 
hydrographic layers, available in a single screen. This 
system is based on three pillars: Law Enforcement, 
Search and Rescue and Environmental Protection. 
 To support the Law Enforcement, the system creates 
and manages different alarms, based on parameters such 
as vessel characteristics, position and status, cartographic 
elements such as Economic Exclusive Zone, Search and 
Rescue Area, Territorial Waters, or a specific area defined 
by the operator. This tool, allows operators to set up 
alarms to trigger when the system detects a vessel-related 
event based on a set of conditions: 
Listed vessels enters area: will trigger an alarm whenever 
one of the vessels specified on a list enters one of the 
specified areas (e.g. whenever vessels X,W or Z enter the 
Portuguese EEZ). 
Vessel with set of characteristics enters area: will trigger 
an alarm whenever a vessel with one of the specified set 
of characteristics (Type, Subtype, Flag, Length, Breadth, 
Deadweight, or Gross Tonnage) enters one of the 
specified areas (e.g. whenever a non-national fishing 
vessel enters the Portuguese EEZ). 
 To Analyse Track Records, it’s possible to view the 
historical positions of a vessel, and navigational data, 
from the last 12 hours (past data ranging up until a 6 
month period).The system also has a Time Machine Tool, 
that allows operators to navigate back and forth in time on 
the Maritime Picture, for instance to review the past 
position and movement of vessels and other objects on the 
map or to preview the weather conditions in the near 
future. 
 To support Search and Rescue Operations, the system, 
provides an estimate of the risk of the vessel being 
overdue, using an algorithm that assesses if the vessel is 
taking unusually long time to report its position, by taking 
into account the time of the last position report received, 
the distance to the coastline and other factors. 
 OVERSEE automatically creates an alert when a 
COSPAS- SARSAT distress alert is received in the 
Centre, showing the position, the details and the casualty 
of the distressed vessel. 
 The Time Machine Tool is also very valuable in 
Environmental Protection scenarios. In most cases, 
EMSA broadcasts a notification, regarding pollution spots 
(detected in CLEANSEANET). The Time Machine Tool 
is then used to investigate and correlate the spot with a 
specific contact. 
 
2.2. Fusing and mining vessel traffic data 
 
With so many Information Systems, the eyes of operators 
are no longer enough, and that is the reason why navies 
are actually developing systems capable to integrate 
multiple sources. 
COMAR explores actually two systems with data fusion: 
VTS and OVERSEE. 
The VTS, provided by the Directorate General for 
Natural Resources Safety and Maritime Services (DGRM) 
fuses the information of Coastal Radars and AIS, and 
offers an integrated Picture of all the Portuguese Coast. 
The OVERSEE, fuses the information of Maritime 
Traffic Systems (AIS, AIS (S) and VMS) and integrates 
several sources of information into a aggregate product 
with cartography, emergency alerting system, weather and 
oceanographic data. In the near future this system will 
receive LRIT Data and Radar Information (currently 
being developed through a partnership between Navy and 
Maritime Authority). 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
The solution found by the Portuguese Navy, to fulfill its 
mission, and the national commitments assumed by 
Portugal under the framework of the International 
Maritime Organization results from a systemic approach, 
and can be translated in an effective gain of efficiency in 
the State action in the areas under the national sovereignty 
and jurisdiction. 
 Conceptually, COMAR is a Maritime Operations 
Centre which is also a Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Centre, that produces Maritime Situational Awareness 
and is able to command and control Naval Operations and 
to plan and coordinate Maritime Security Operations, in 
close support to external Agencies, if required. 
 Since 2013, COMAR has been using successfully the 
OVERSEE system to promote anomaly detection in 
support of military and non-military operations 
(operations planning, abnormal behaviour detection and 
operations conduction). 
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AUTOMATED BEHAVIOUR MONITORING (ABM) ALGORITHMS – 
OPERATIONAL USE AT EMSA 
 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The European Maritime Safety Agency’s (EMSA) 
Automated Behaviour Monitoring (ABM) tool is a 
computer rule-based system analysing vessel positions 
(approximately 18 million daily) for the detection and 
alerting of abnormal and/or user specific vessel 
behaviours. The aim of the ABMs is to support Integrated 
Maritime Service users in their maritime surveillance 
functions, by providing an enhanced situational awareness 
picture in real-time. Currently the set of abnormal and/or 
user specific behaviours includes: entering an area, 
encounters at sea, close approach to shore or an area, 
sudden changes in heading, speed or reporting frequency; 
are operationally used. When specific, user-defined 
criteria are met, operators can be automatically alerted via 
warnings in the graphical interface, e-mails or S2S 
connections. With the growing number of ABM users and 
the operational experience gathered within the context of 
EMSA’s Integrated Maritime Services (IMS), a number 
of challenges and requirements for new user defined 
abnormal/specific vessel behaviours have been identified. 
These include: detection of transponders switched-off or 
vessels deviating from the usual routes, especially in the 
remote areas. Fake position or fake identity reports are 
also difficult to discover. Use of the Earth Observation 
(EO) based (Vessel Detection System - VDS) 
technologies as well as the operational use of the 
statistically aggregated position reports may be worth 
exploring for further enhancements of the ABM services. 
 
Index Terms— Maritime surveillance, Anomaly 
detection 
 
1. EMSA 
 
The idea of a European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
originated in the late 1990s along with a number of other 
important European maritime safety initiatives (‘Erika’ 
package). EMSA was set up as the regulatory agency that 
provides support to the European Commission (EC) and 
the EU Member States (MS) in the field of maritime 
safety and prevention of pollution from ships. EMSA was 
established by Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 and 
subsequent amendments. Among other tasks, EMSA 
facilitates the technical cooperation between EU Member 
States and the EC for the exchange of EU vessel traffic 
information, the long-range identification and tracking of 
vessels and to support EU operational reporting services. 
Consequently, EMSA operates and manages a suite of 
maritime applications which receive, process, and 
distribute information on, inter-alia, vessel traffic reports 
(LRIT, SafeSeaNet), Earth Observation (EO) satellite 
monitoring (CleanSeaNet), and Port State Control 
(THETIS). The services provided by these maritime 
applications are shared with EU Member States the EC, 
and other EU Bodies.  
 EMSA has also developed a platform to guarantee the 
performance, availability and reliability of all the 
maritime information systems it hosts. This platform 
integrates and correlates different types of data, including 
data provided by the end-users, to produce customised 
services tailored to specific requirements. These services 
are called Integrated Maritime Services (IMS), and are 
used by MS authorities to obtain the most complete 
maritime situational awareness, building a common 
picture across EU maritime interests. A high-level 
description of the IMS datasets is presented in the Figure 
1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1 Integrated Maritime Services – capability to 
integrate data from different sources 
 
In this paper we describe a tool available within the IMS - 
Automated Behaviour Monitoring (ABM) algorithms. 
The ABM is a computer, rule-based system analysing 
vessel positions for the detection of specific events. The 
objective of the ABMs is to support the maritime 
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surveillance operators, by automatically analysing 
position reports and alerting upon detection of abnormal 
events. 
 
2. AUTOMATED BEHAVIOUR MONITORING 
(ABM) ALGORITHMS IN IMS 
 
As previously stated, ABMs are a functionality  of IMS 
which analyses real time vessel position reports provided 
for a specific time period and area of interest (AOI), as 
defined by the users. The system focuses on the detection 
of specific events, and therefore may be categorized as 
‘event’ based. Table 1 summarizes the current 
technologies in terms of vessel position reports available 
in IMS and ABMs. 
 
Position type Description Data volume  
Terrestrial based 
Automatic 
Identification 
System (AIS) 
T-AIS position reports, 
transmitted from ships to 
the shore-based stations of 
the EU member states 
(MS) and later relayed to 
EMSA for sharing with 
other MS. Position reports 
from the equipment of the 
class A and B are used. As 
far as the vessels tracking 
is concerned, this 
technology has all the 
limits of the VHF band, 
meaning that it depends 
on the availability of the 
shore-based component, 
height of the antennas of 
the transmitter and 
receiver and other factors. 
Typical volume of 
this data reaches 
daily 10,000,000 
positions and the 
frequency of these 
reports is, as 
agreed with the 
stakeholders, 
downsampled to 6 
minutes in EMSA 
hosted systems. 
Position type Description Data volume  
Satellite-AIS S-AIS are the same 
position reports 
transmitted by the ships, 
but they received by the 
satellites. In terms of 
limitations, the technology 
is linked to the availability 
of the satellite segment. 
Due to the applicable 
SOTDMA (Self-
Organized Time Division 
Multiple Access) 
technology, which 
requires slot assignment 
and time synchronization, 
there are also issues 
related to the collisions of 
the position reports 
received by satellites. The 
Satellite AIS services are 
also described by the 
following elements: 
average target detection 
probability and the target 
timeliness (delivery of the 
latest positon report to the 
end user). 
The daily average 
rate at EMSA is 
around 7,000,000 
positions and the 
frequency depends 
on the service 
provider, but in 
average does not 
surpass 1 hour. 
Long Range 
Identification and 
Tracking 
LRIT is based on the 
satellite communication 
satellites (mainly Inmarsat 
C and Iridium). It has a 
global coverage and its 
basic frequency is 6 hours, 
but can be increased up to 
15 minutes. The LRIT 
offers a global coverage 
and the position reports 
are not broadcasted to all 
ships but delivered to 
specific ground-based or 
shore-based nodes. LRIT 
covers only specific 
position reports without 
additional elements, like 
e.g. voyage data 
(destination, time of 
arrival). The LRIT 
position reports are owned 
by EU Member States and 
their distribution and 
access at EU level is 
managed via the EU LRIT 
Cooperative Data Centre 
(CDC). There are different 
access policies, set by the 
legal basis and their 
owners, and they vary 
from: national flags, 
coastal and port users to 
the unlimited access for 
SAR purposes. 
Around 30,000 
position messages 
are processed daily 
in the EU LRIT 
CDC. 
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Position type Description Data volume  
Vessel Monitoring 
System 
VMS uses similar 
satellite-based 
communication 
technology as LRIT, 
presenting similar 
limitations in terms of 
availability and frequency. 
Its basic frequency is 2 
hours, but can be 
increased up to 15 
minutes. VMS is limited 
to fishing vessels (or 
vessels involved in the 
fishing operations) only. 
In EU, these position 
reports are made available 
to the flag states and 
shared, as decided by each 
member state, based on 
the cooperation between 
European Fisheries 
Control Agency (EFCA) 
and EMSA. The 
information is usually 
made available only to the 
flag users. 
EMSA processes 
around 5,000 VMS 
messages daily.  
 
Table 1 - Position reports in the EMSA hosted systems 
 
4. ABM TYPES 
 
The ‘event’ based ABM technology currently used 
obliges the user to select the type of event to be detected, 
in addition to the AOI and time definition. Patterns, such 
as entering an area of interest, encounters at sea, approach 
to shore or ports, changes in the heading, speed and 
reporting frequency, and others, are analysed and 
detected. Table 2 illustrates the available ABMs and 
provides a concise description of the events detected. 
 
ABM Type – description which events 
are automatically detected  
ABM name 
Entry of a particular vessel(s) to an area 
of interest 
InArea 
Passage of a vessel close to the shore  DistanceToShore  
Vessels entering or leaving ports  AtPortAtSea 
Anchored vessels  Anchorage  
Frequency of vessels’ position reports 
higher or lower than expected  
UnderOverReporting  
Vessels approaching one another closer 
than an indicated distance, with a speed 
below defined threshold 
AtSeaEncounter  
Change of heading higher than a 
threshold (e.g. more than 20 deg.)  
SuddenChangeOfHeading 
Sudden change of speed SuddenChangeOfSpeed 
Change of speed above or below a limit 
set  
SpeedAnomallyOverPeriod 
Passage of a vessel  close to an area of 
interest  
DistancetoArea 
Vessels entering a closed area at a 
specific time 
TimeAndPeriodOfDay 
 
Table 2 - ABMs available to users via EMSA’s 
interfaces, June 2016 
 
5. ALERTING TECHNIQUES 
 
Following the detection of particular events, end-users are 
automatically alerted. One of the advantages of the ABM 
related functionalities is that the system distributes the 
alerts in different forms: 
 
• By email or via system-to-system (S2S) 
interface, to the off-line users;  
• Via alerts (visual and audio) to online users of 
the IMS graphical interface (GI).  
 
The operational experience proves that the alerts are 
produced and delivered to the users via the 
aforementioned interfaces rapidly – the minimum time for 
the delivery is ≤ 2 minutes in case of non-complex events 
and maximum time is ≥ 1 hour for the very complex 
algorithms or in case of delayed position reports.    
 As previously mentioned, the detection of the specific 
events, as well as the related alerting, depends on the 
presence and timeliness of the position reports and the 
complexity of the algorithms applied. For example, in 
remote areas where only infrequent LRIT or S-AIS 
reports are available, the related detection and reporting 
may require more time in comparison to the areas of high 
traffic density and proximity of the receivers (i.e. shore-
based stations – like AIS stations). Additionally, detection 
of a single position report in a small area of interest is less 
computationally intensive than the analysis of multiple 
positions for the ‘close encounters’ or ‘drifting’ in large 
areas. 
 
6. ABM OPERATIONAL USE CASES 
 
As of June 2016 there are 56 different ABM instances 
actively running for users within the EU Member States 
and the EU Bodies. Due to the positive feedback from the 
operational users, as well as the validation in the real case 
scenarios, EMSA noted an increasing interest of the EU 
Member States and EU Bodies in the use of the ABMs. 
Some use cases of their operational application by 
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different user communities are presented further below 
(see also the reference made to the ABM types listed in 
Table 2). It is important to underline that the definition of 
communities is linked with the functional approach (it is 
independent of the governmental department/authority in 
which users are based) and is used by the authors for 
illustrating the use cases only.  
 
6.1. Security community 
 
‘Security communities’ dealing, for example, with the 
tobacco smuggling, drug trafficking, or population mass 
movements may be concerned about vessels that approach 
one another and remain at a close distance for a period of 
time. Such behaviour may indicate routine ship-to-ship 
operations (transhipment of goods or fuel) which are 
normally reported in advance to the shore-based 
authorities. Unreported encounters at sea may however 
suggest some illicit activities. Security communities profit 
from using the AtSeaEncounter ABM for the automatic 
detection of these events. In this context it is important to 
exclude the port areas from the analysis, in order to avoid 
the detection and reporting on the routine arrivals or 
departures, which in turn may be detected by other, 
existing ABM type (AtPortAtSea). 
 
6.1. Safety community 
 
Typical use case scenario for the maritime ‘safety 
community’ may be related to the monitoring of the areas 
of interest, like: sensitive or protected areas, vulnerable 
ecosystems or its own flag ships. In such cases, operations 
of vessels may be restricted or regulated by the 
responsible authorities. ABMs support the related 
monitoring activities, for example, by providing alerting 
for ships passing at a specific distance (DistanceToShore; 
DistancetoArea) or simply entering the area (InArea). 
Additional factors may be considered in the automatic 
analysis, such as: entries to the areas temporarily closed 
for navigation (TimeAndPeriodOfDay) or decrease or 
increase of the position reporting frequencies 
(UnderOverReporting).     
 
6.2. Traffic monitoring community 
 
For the 'traffic monitoring' communities which are, for 
example, engaged in the management of the Mandatory 
Reporting Systems (MRS), recommended sea routes or 
traffic separation schemes (TSS) ABMs may offer 
detection of the events related to: sudden change of 
heading (SuddenChangeOfHeading), anchoring in non-
designated places or locations of the underwater 
infrastructure (Anchorage). As for the 'safety community' 
mentioned before, the authorities responsible for the 
traffic monitoring also profit from the simple detection of 
the position reports (InArea) applying specific filters per 
ship types (e.g. verifying only tankers) or flag of the ship 
(by monitoring its own fleet or fleets flying the ‘high risk’ 
flags). 
 
6.2. Fisheries 
 
The 'fisheries' communities may, for example, focus on 
specific vessels or specific types. Using the InArea ABMs 
combined with filters, on geographical area and vessel 
types, it is possible to effectively monitor presence of the 
specific fishing gears or activities in the fishing grounds. 
The ‘fisheries’ communities may be also interested in 
detecting specific behaviours that may indicate launching 
of the fishing gears (SuddenChangeOfSpeed, 
SpeedAnomallyOverPeriod). 
 
7. NEW REQUIREMENTS 
 
Recent developments linked with the operational 
experience gained by the users have led to the definition 
of new requirements. These reflect new situations 
encountered or the development of new types of activities 
at sea. They can be divided into two main groups: the first 
one expanding the existing, ‘event’ based ABMs and the 
second one applying a new, ‘statistical’ based approach. 
For the latter one, specific behaviours could be modelled 
based on the statistical data and later used as a reference 
(e.g. model usual routes, behaviours for specific ships).  
The following requirements were noted, during a dialogue 
conducted by EMSA with users, at various forums. 
 
I - Expanding the ‘event’ based ABMs  
• Use of the Earth Observation (EO) data for the 
detection of vessels with inactive identification 
transponders; 
• Detection of vessels spoofing (deliberately 
altering) their position reports or identification. 
•  
II- Applying the ‘statistical’ based approach   
• Reproduction of the routes and behaviours, per 
type of ship, destination or cargo carried on-
board and a detection of a deviation from the 
usual route; 
• Modelling of the impact of meteorological 
conditions on the ship behaviour or routes; 
• Profiling of the vessels (e.g. vessels prone to 
specific incidents) based on the past safety or 
security record or other available, reference data. 
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8. WHAT’S NEXT? 
 
The precondition for the effective ABM operations is the 
availability of the ship detection techniques (using active 
detection sensors like radars, or passive ones like 
cameras); tracking data (use of the active identification 
transponders); as well as the additional, reference data 
sets (e.g. statistical record of the trading areas, cargoes 
carried, incidents or accidents, security issues) for the 
analysis and detection of specific events.  
As the use of the ABM aims at easing the work of the 
maritime surveillance operators, and supporting an early, 
automatic detection of specific events, other aspects have 
to be considered for the future developments. These are 
related to the capability of processing large sets of 
information. There are around 90,000 vessels engaged in 
the international trade worldwide (out of which around 
20,000 at any given time around Europe) and 
approximately another 100,000 equipped with the active 
AIS transponders. This results in over 17,000,000 AIS 
position reports detected/ processed on a daily basis.  
Consequently, ABMs should be capable of rapidly 
analysing big data sets, in order to detect events and 
notify end-users in a timely manner. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
NATO Maritime situation awareness is defined as the 
enabling capability which seeks to deliver the required 
information superiority in the maritime environment, to 
achieve a common understanding of the maritime 
situation, in order to increase effectiveness in the planning 
and conduct of the operations. NATO MSA is based on 
MSA Concept development plan issued in 2008 and, 
since then, it is drastically evolving along with technology 
evolution. Although MSA was initially focused on 
specific areas of interest, the CD plan has recognized it as 
a global challenge, requiring a good engagement among 
national, international, industry and academy players. 
Many coastal nations are, indeed, developing their 
national MSA plans, to satisfy their operational needs and 
positively contribute to alliance’s MSA.  
NATO MARCOM MSA is currently based on AIS, LRIT 
and the contribution from assets under NATO or national 
operational control. A key role is played by the satellite 
based AIS: companies are improving both satellite and 
ground based networks in order to reduce data latency, 
revisit time and increase satellite detection capability. 
Both incumbents and newcomer companies declare they 
will have the new network fully operational by 2nd to 4th 
quarter 2017. By that time the quality of S/AIS is 
expected to be closer to T/AIS one.  Being AIS (as well as 
LRIT and VMS) a cooperative source it is assessed not to 
have the highest level of confidence among sources. AIS 
data should be correlated with non-cooperative sources 
such as satellite radar or electro-optical, in order to be 
validated. Satellite network provided with radar and 
electro-optical sensors would greatly improve data 
confidence level.  
A third source, the most reliable, being non cooperative 
and non-sensor based, is the one provided by the assets in 
the area which can visually confirm the accuracy of data 
received by sensors. 
 
Index Terms— Maritime surveillance, Anomaly 
detection, Movement pattern, Meetings at sea, Risk of 
grounding 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although NATO is by definition focused on North 
Atlantic, NATO MSA is of course a global challenge. 
Indeed vessels sail at increasingly faster speeds 
throughout the oceans often changing flag, name and, 
most importantly, owners and operators; therefore no 
MSA can ever be effective if not under a global 
perspective.  
 According to a study conducted by a commercial 
company, 27% of vessels provided with class A AIS do 
not transmit for at least the 10% of their activity and 19% 
of ships “going dark” are involved in some sort of illicit 
activity or activities which might potentially include 
threats to freedom of navigation and to security of 
navigation or ways for funding criminal or even terrorist 
organizations. 
 Of course, most of those vessels involved in illicit 
activities are not even provided with transceivers, being 
below the 300 GT threshold and many other vessels 
purposely alter their transmissions not to be detectable or  
recognizable. Therefore a sensor based non cooperative 
MSA or even specific assets (aircraft, surface or 
submarine) might be required. 
 Shipping is assessed being composed by nearly 
150.000 class A AIS units plus other classes, not to 
mention the so called “small vessels”, for which each 
country develop a specific strategies (e.g. the SMSS small 
vessel security strategy in the US, estimating nearly 20 
million vessels smaller than 300 GT all over the country) 
to prevent, disrupt and prosecute illicit activities 
perpetrated with small vessels (let’s just think about 
smuggling or migrant trafficking). 
 NATO MSA doesn’t aim to know everything about 
each and every single civilian vessel but to build 
awareness by knowing general trends for merchant 
vessels as well as for fishing and leisure vessels. This 
would help understanding maritime patterns and the 
relevance of each pattern on global economy, to assess the 
impact of maritime security related threats on maritime 
activities.  
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2. NATO MARITIME SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS 
 
NATO MSA is defined as the Enabling capability … to 
deliver the required information superiority in the 
marine environment, to achieve a common 
understanding of the maritime situation, in order to 
increase effectiveness in the planning and conduct of 
operations.  
 In its role as primary advisor to merchant shipping 
regarding potential risks and possible interference with 
maritime operations NATO Shipping Centre role builds, 
maintains and analyses the “white” portion of MSA, 
composed generically of all civilian vessels, craft and 
boats sailing through the oceans. This way NSC also 
supports NATO Operations (OCEAN SHIELD and 
ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR) as well as national and 
multinational operations and exercises.  
White MSA is delivered by processing sensor based data, 
non-sensor based data, network information and reports 
from assets.  
 Sensor based data represent the main pillar of white 
shipping MSA and can be classified as either cooperative 
or non-cooperative, depending whether any form of 
cooperation from target is needed (AIS, LRIT, VMS etc.) 
or not (e.g. radar etc.). Additionally NATO Shipping 
Centre relies on assets which can provide both sensor and 
non-sensor based data. 
In general terms, sensor based MSA requires: 
 a sensor (and multi-sensor)based network, 
adequate to maintain the appropriate level of 
awareness linked to a constantly updated and 
reliable database 
 a proper database of usual patterns of behaviors 
(often referred to as patterns of life – POL). This 
is essential to recognize, based on specific areas 
and seasons, what should be considered “usual”, 
what “unusual” and what “suspect” 
 an analysis tool capable to process, identify and 
classify those “anomalous” behaviors, 
considered relevant for the specific needs 
 a list of tailored maritime situational indicators 
to recognize suspicious behaviors within their 
areas of interest. 
The main sources of data NATO Shipping Centre uses for 
building and managing the white shipping picture are: 
 
 
 
 
2.1 AIS 
 
Terrestrial AIS provides a fairly homogeneous coverage, 
limited to roughly 50 nm from the coast, extended to all 
AIS classes and with a virtually unlimited capability. 
Each coastal nation has its own official network, mostly 
used for traffic monitoring, collision avoidance and MSA 
purposes. Although nations are not commercially 
marketing their data, those are shared within international 
community to participate in data sharing initiatives and 
experimentations. VOLPE MSSIS is an important 
example of data sharing: it is based on agreements 
between the fusing center and each single nation. The 
level of contribution is measurable to assess its quality 
and each contributor is also requested to provide stations 
lists to understand the coverage. 
Additionally several private companies have established 
terrestrial AIS networks by means of owned stations and / 
or data purchased from other station owners. Most 
terrestrial AIS providers fuse their data with satellite AIS 
providers to offer more commercially valuable monitoring 
services on the market. 
Being NATO Shipping Centre focused on broad portions 
of high seas, the recent developments of Satellite AIS are 
closely monitored to understand the level of improvement 
providers are achieving with regards to satellite networks, 
orbits and ground based stations in order to  
 reduce latency to minimum 
 reduce data rejection  
 improve satellite passages 
To achieve the required level of MSA, NATO Maritime 
Command receives AIS satellite and terrestrial data from 
commercial satellite AIS providers and from national and 
commercial terrestrial AIS providers. 
The main concern MARCOM faces regarding AIS data is 
about confidentiality assessment as it requires a deep 
knowledge of stations’ distribution along the coastline, 
signals’ quality, coverage and status of transmission. On 
the other hand, as satellite AIS providers have developed 
their networks improvement plans, MSA team in 
MARCOM is constantly assessing data quality 
improvements in terms of latency, satellite revisiting time, 
orbits and passages. Still about satellite AIS, a critical 
issue is sensor’s capacity limits with regards to the risk 
for it to get crammed and to start rejecting new data. 
The combination of delays related to latency, satellite 
passages and messages rejections affect satellite AIS 
network reliability. However all providers MARCOM 
deals with (ORBCOMM, EXACTEARTH, SPIRE) state 
network improvements should see the light within 2017, 
when the quality gap between terrestrial and satellite AIS 
is expected to be significantly reduced. 
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Lastly, satellite AIS is only limited to class A and class 
B/SO messages, therefore its contribution to MSA is 
somehow limited, although MARCOM is following the 
development of new commercial products such as 
EXACTEARTH ABSEA allowing to track also vessels 
smaller than 300 GT. 
 
2.2 LRIT 
 
For operation Ocean Shield NATO gets LRIT data from 
compliant nations. Such data are cross-examined with 
other data and information available to improve data 
confidentiality. As expected, the correlation of two 
sensors based, cooperative data has marginally improved 
white shipping picture’s quality.  
 
2.3 Satellite radar (used for experimentation purposes) 
 
Correlation of AIS and/ or LRIT with satellite radar is 
very effective in improving MSA and white picture 
compilation. Satellite radar is indeed a powerful system 
for non-shiners detection and target recognition even with 
some caveats: marine target recognition from satellite 
indeed could be more difficult than ground one. While 
ground targets (vehicles) are represented only on two 
dimensions, targets at sea are often represented on three 
dimensions being third dimension the vessels’ height, 
which is affected (in imagery capturing) by pitch, yaw 
and roll. Vessels wakes as detected from satellite can also 
reveal much information about vessels’ movements and 
conditions. 
 
2.4 Assets as non-sensor based data 
 
The trend in NATO MSA is of course a shift from 
platform (assets) to sensor based MSA, this implies a 
decrease in assets centrality for MSA building. 
Nevertheless, when enhanced posture is required, the use 
of assets becomes central to validate anomalies. NATO 
assets are indeed deployed on areas of operations and 
areas of interest in order to support operations and are 
sometime determinant in anomalies validation processes.  
 
 
3. MARITIME ALLIED COMMAND MSA 
DOCTRINE – THE WAY AHEAD 
 
 
Technology achievements have determined NATO 
Maritime Command to reconsider its MSA doctrine. 
Although the new MSA has not been published yet, the 
new approach to global MSA is likely going to split the 
maritime domain in three postures:  
 a general one based mostly on sensor cooperative 
data 
 two enhanced postures for smaller areas, in 
which a deeper level of MSA is required. 
The lowest posture is likely going to rely mostly on AIS 
while posture two and three request a variable level of 
awareness based on data correlation, networking 
information and even reports from assets. 
In general terms the correlation of sensor-based 
cooperative with sensor-based non cooperative data (e.g. 
terrestrial and satellite AIS with terrestrial or satellite 
radar), is a form of multisensory data fusion, allowing 
performing inferences not achievable from a single sensor 
alone to enhance knowledge over surveillance areas, 
enabling the detection, tracking and identification of a 
target including target identity, activities and history. 
The highest posture should be focused on even smaller 
areas and involves the use of assets (ships, maritime 
patrol aircraft, AWACS) to achieve a deep knowledge of 
the traffic over the area and being able to detect those 
behaviors considered relevant for the situation. 
 
4. THE ANALYSIS TOOLS: BRITE and TRITON. 
CMRE SUPPORT 
 
4.1 NATO 
 
NATO has developed its own analysis tool, the BRITE 
(baseline for rapid iterative transformational 
experimentation), a dedicated software created by ACT. 
The concentration of data in some areas might saturate the 
fusion software; to prevent this MARCOM sometimes 
requires the capability to throttle data refresh time. Under 
an operational point to view, indeed, there is no need for a 
real-time data refreshing. The system is capable of 
processing (correlating and fusing) multiple data format 
to compile the white shipping picture to fulfill NATO 
MARCOM operational requirements. The picture is then 
analyzed by means of smart agents to detect anomalies to 
expected patterns of behavior. Such agents can detect 
static anomalies -by comparing displayed data with 
available database- as well as dynamic ones –such as 
destination inconsistencies-.  
BRITE’s advantages consist in being the software fully in 
house built; this allows tailoring fusing criteria and smart 
agents on specific operational needs.  
 
4.2 TRITON 
 
 
The alliance is developing a new comprehensive MSA 
tool, including all display and analysis functionalities. 
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The project, named TRITON, is still under development 
and will see the light in 3 to 4 years; it is based on open 
architecture and will incorporate the broad experience 
collected into BRITE as well as many functionalities. To 
system implementation NATO will outsource most of 
system development. 
4.3 CMRE SUPPORT 
 
A key role in the development of baseline analysis is 
played by NATO CMRE based in La Spezia. Its support 
consists in developing pattern of life analysis tools 
considered extremely valuable under both an operational 
and an experimentation point to view. Particularly the 
port analysis and the TREAD (traffic route extraction and 
anomaly detection) acquire and process info and 
positional data defining the traffic paths, creating density 
maps, analyzing routes in support to operational planning 
and execution. Such background information are 
moreover useful for detecting the anomalies. 
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SECTION II: PRIVATE SECTOR   
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ABSTRACT 
 
During the last decade, CLS, the operator of the ARGOS 
positioning and data collection system, has developed 
several tools to analyze the trajectories of satellite-tracked 
vessels to add value to the information provided by 
ARGOS but also other positioning systems (AIS/SAT-
AIS, LRIT ...). In 2010, CLS started to work, as a 
contractor for the European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA), on an Integrated Maritime Data Environment 
(IMDatE) and specifically on a module dedicated to run 
different algorithms to identify patterns, generate alerts, 
and ultimately support the maritime surveillance missions 
of the European Member States. Through this project and 
in close cooperation with EMSA, CLS has developed and 
continues to develop services driven by new regulations, 
and user communities relying on IMDatE. During the 
same period, CLS also collaborated with research 
laboratories to develop fishing vessel trajectory analysis 
tools designed to support fisheries monitoring and 
management activities. These tools focus on the 
identification of the different behaviours displayed by 
fishing vessels at sea (cruising, tracking fish, fishing, 
resting...). A clear-cut identification of these different 
activities, allows a precise estimation of the spatial and 
temporal distribution of the fishing effort, a main input in 
fish stock assessment model.  Clear identification of the 
different activities carried at sea by fishing vessels also 
allows the detection of illegal activities (such as fishing in 
protected areas) or frauds (such as using prohibited or not 
properly licensed fishing gears). Results obtained for 
different fisheries management organisations will be 
presented here. 
 
Index Terms— Automatic Identification system 
(AIS), Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), behavior 
analysis, anomaly detection. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last decade, CLS has developed several tools 
to analyze the trajectories of satellite-tracked vessels to 
add value to the information provided by ARGOS but 
also other positioning systems (AIS/SAT-AIS, LRIT ...).  
Vessel trajectory analysis can serve multiple purposes. 
Here we concentrate on two major domains: maritime 
surveillance and fisheries management. 
 
2. MARITIME SURVEILLANCE 
 
The detection of abnormal behavior is a permanent 
demand of the administrations in charge of the Maritime 
Domain Awareness, with the following main concerns: 
 Prevent accidents that could occur on ships 
carrying hazardous material or polluting cargo; 
 Detect oil spills and generate alert for agencies in 
charge of oil spill operations; 
 Support anti-piracy operations; 
 Monitor maritime borders; 
 Monitor fishery and detect Illegal, Unregulated 
and Unreported (IUU) fishing activity; 
 Detect illegal trafficking and smuggling; 
 Support authorities in Search and Rescue 
operations. 
 
For these purposes, CLS implemented a set a algorithms 
operating in EMSA’s IMDatE. Inputs of these algorithms 
are AIS, SAT-AIS, VMS and LRIT messages but also 
satellite images (optical and Synthetic Aperture Radar). 
These algorithms are designed to detect the following 
events: 
 
a) Vessel entering or leaving a specific area (marine 
protected area, military area, piracy high risk 
area…); 
b) At sea encounter of 2 vessels (indication of 
possible transhipment or pirate attack); 
c) Drastic change in ETA; 
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d) Vessel off track with regard to declared voyage; 
e) Under or over reporting of positions with 
mandatory terminals (e.g. LRIT); 
f) Sudden change of speed; 
g) Sudden change of heading; 
h) Sudden change of port of destination; 
i) Vessels in harbors: entering, at anchor or 
leaving.  
 These algorithms are currently used for day-to-day 
operations by EMSA. The parameters of each algorithm 
can be tuned by the user to account for the type of vessels 
monitored or the specific targeted event.Different alert 
broadcast strategies can be specified depending on the 
detected event. Alerts can be issued: “at start”, “at start 
and at end” or “at each occurrence” of an event. 
 
3. FISHERIES MANAGEMENT  
 
Satellite-tracking of fishing vessels was originally 
imposed, in the nineties, to verify that fishing activities 
were carried out only during the period and within the 
geographic areas where they were permitted. But fisheries 
scientists soon recognized that fishing vessel trajectories 
were actually providing more information about the 
fishing activity than simply the area and period of fishing 
[1, 2].  
 A major goal is to precisely identify whether a fishing 
vessel is cruising or fishing. At first sight, this can be 
done using a simple speed filter (low speed = fishing; 
high speed = cruising). This simple approach has been 
extensively used, in particular for analyzing the activity of 
trawlers [3].  
 Unfortunately, this method provides rather inaccurate 
estimates of the fishing effort for most fishing gears. For 
example, Bertrand et al. [4] report that the speed-
threshold method tends to overestimate the number of 
fishing sets by as much as 182 % in Peruvian purse 
seiners targeting anchovy. This overestimation is due to 
similarities in vessel speeds when fishing, drifting and 
searching. Several more elaborate methods have then 
been developed to refine the detection of the fishing 
activities with different fishing gears. Neural networks 
and Hidden Markov Models (HMM) have been used in 
various situations [2, 4]. More recently, Hidden semi-
Markov models (HSMM), random forests (RF) and 
Support Vector Machines (SVM) have been successfully 
used, allowing identification of the various fishing 
activities with relative errors in the range 10-30 % [5]. 
Such levels of error can only be reached with supervised 
learning but obtaining learning data sets is difficult in 
many fisheries where very few fishing cruises are 
documented by on-board observers. Systematic 
deployment of Electronic Reporting Systems (ERS) shall 
help reduce this problem.  
 The low sampling rate of most VMS systems is 
another issue. With a typical 1-hour sampling period, 
various fishing actions are inevitably undetected or 
“aliased” in VMS data. The use of high-frequency AIS 
data will undoubtedly help improve the situation.  
 Another potential use of VMS data is the detection of 
quite subtle frauds such as a false declaration of the used 
fishing gear. We recently reported results on this topic 
[6]. Using VMS data from the Indonesian Ministry of 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), we used various data 
mining techniques for the automated recognition of the 
used fishing gear (trawl, pole and line, purse seine or 
longline). The different tested methods provided high 
rates (95 to 97.5 %) of correct classification. Interestingly 
a small number (near 4%) of vessels systematically 
displayed high misclassification rates. Such cases were 
further scrutinized.  In some instances, the origin of the 
misclassification was related to discrepancies between the 
VMS and registration databases. In other cases, visual 
analysis of recorded trajectories strongly suggests an 
erroneous gear declaration.  
 Further work dedicated to the analysis of the 
longliners’ activity is on-going and preliminary results 
will be shown. Pelagic longliners operate in all oceans. 
They are responsible for over 10 % of the worldwide tuna 
catches. Still, their VMS tracks have, so far, been little 
investigated and used for the management and control of 
their fishing activity. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Today, most of the operational “abnormal behaviour” 
detection algorithms primarily operate kinematic rules on 
the vessel tracks provided by the AIS [1], [2], [3]. To be 
more effective, they must be associated to additional 
“context data”, however insuring this data access is today a 
challenge, due to the disparity of registers and the 
fragmentation of actors… For example, detecting suspicious 
“associations of ships” requires already a complex data 
mining to detect indirect common ownership through the 
myriad of cascaded legal entities used for formal ownership 
and registration; as another example, maritime security 
actors know the importance of environmental factors (sea 
state, fog, clouds, moon etc) when assessing the risk of 
illegal passages or piracy attacks at night – but gathering the 
right local weather forecast data in association with 
abnormal behaviour detection algorithms for maritime radar 
systems is also a challenge. 
 While many more data and metadata should be browsed 
from all the existing maritime reporting systems and data 
repositories to cross-check systematically the declared 
versus actual behaviour of commercial, fishing and leisure 
ships, we shall start developing a new data access thinking 
to benefit from the progressive deployment of the EU-wide 
CISE which is approaching its pre-operational validation 
milestone and should be largely mature by 2020, 
materializing a break-through in terms of data access for the 
maritime security communities. In parallel, another key 
enabler is the capacity to collect the “local picture” gathered 
by genuinely cooperating shipping (sightings and nav radar) 
with the “big picture” (VMS, AIS, S-AIS, LRIT, satellite 
imaging…). The VDES will provide a very effective data 
uplink as an alternative to broadband maritime SatComs at 
the same 2020 horizon. Other planned technological gap-
fillers deserve to be integrated in future data processing 
strategies: new space projects aim at solving the data 
synchronicity challenge by co-locating SAR, S-AIS and 
VDES payloads for specialized maritime surveillance 
constellations; EDRS allows downloading LEO maritime 
surveillance data streams in near real-time from anywhere 
on Earth; smart and fast embarked data processing will 
downsize the “rising tide” of data, extracting and tagging 
straight away the mere fraction of data requiring prompt 
human attention… 
 This paper will aim at delivering a sort of “wake-up call” 
to integrate this new data access paradigm in the current 
research on maritime knowledge discovery associated to the 
detection of safety and security threats: 2020 is tomorrow, 
we shall think, develop and test our toolbox at the whole 
scale of this “Big Data”. 
Index Terms— Maritime surveillance, early detection, 
heterogeneous correlation, CISE, weak signals analysis 
 
1. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 
 
While maritime surveillance has been radically transformed 
by the introduction of the Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) in 2002 through the IMO SOLAS Agreement – 
suddenly populating the screen of the vessel traffic 
management systems (VTMS) well beyond the range of the 
coastal radars, the operational maritime surveillance 
capabilities have not much evolved since. Voluntary 
reporting systems (mainly AIS, VMS for fishery vessels and 
LRIT in distant sea lanes) remain the essential source of 
vessel monitoring, leaving in the shade the smaller boats… 
and the deliberately cheating ones. Furthermore, non-
cooperative ship detection provided by maritime radars (on 
board ships and on the coast) is now automatically fused 
with AIS, no more supported by additional VHF voice 
contact and binoculars to confirm the vessel identity and its 
planned route.  
 The recent development of commercial satellite payloads 
designed to collect AIS signals from ships well beyond 
coastal VHF horizon (S-AIS) is a welcomed “plus” to 
overcome the deficient cover of coastal AIS receivers in 
some regions, but remains overall a moderate contribution 
to the VTMS operation as S-AIS largely recoups LRIT.  
 International cooperation has become routine, but again 
most if not all maritime traffic data exchange agreements 
relate to the data of these voluntary reporting systems; as 
they are often faulty and sometimes cheated, this means 
building the common operational maritime traffic picture on 
sand! 
 Space observation systems have been promoted as a new 
way to ascertain the maritime traffic data. Indeed, medium 
and high resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) on low 
Earth orbit (LEO) satellites provide a theoretical capability 
of ship detection anywhere in high seas, but its use as a 
daily maritime traffic monitoring tool remains problematic 
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(no persistence, limited refresh, significant cost, latency of 
several hours). It is technically impossible to acquire 
synchronously SAR radar and S-AIS, rendering the 
correlation of these data tedious and often uncertain. As a 
consequence, its operational use is limited to specific fishing 
grounds and trafficking areas (where and what to look are 
known ahead of data collection and processing). 
 With these limitations, the blue borders remain largely 
porous to all sorts of trafficking (drugs, arms, migrants…) 
while endangered fishing species are still poached at high 
scale (IUU fishing remains as high as 25 to 30% of all 
catches).   
 In the field of Defence, Intelligence Agencies are 
actively seeking for illegal arms trade, intrusions in 
territorial waters and security threats of all sorts; however 
cross-border information exchanges (e.g. under the auspices 
of NATO) are most often limited to share a “list of usual 
suspects” designating about 2000 vessels of specific interest 
to be jointly monitored. In parallel, anti-drug operations are 
also most of the time driven by human intelligence 
(HUMINT), leaving 90% of the traffic undetected. In short, 
the challenge relate to the large number of “unknown 
unknown” threats. 
 To overcome the incapacity of the current state-of-play 
to anticipate the creativity and flexibility of criminal 
schemes, there is a clear need for changing the maritime 
surveillance paradigm: monitoring ship tracks on big 
screens is not enough!  
 
2. LOOKING FOR WEAK SIGNALS 
 
Time is long gone where seas appeared as the ultimate area 
of freedom, where the Master was invested of every 
power… after God. All maritime activities are today 
explicitly regulated, even in High Seas, as a result of 
international treaties and agreements (IMO…), regional 
agreements (Baltic…), national and local regulations. The 
respective authority of Flag States, Port States, Coastal 
States etc. is internationally agreed and results into massive 
data collection from all operators: every ship voyage 
generates dozens of massive files on the ship itself, the 
voyage, the cargo and the people on board.  
 Each of these files is directed to a particular Maritime 
Authority which screens the documents, clears the 
corresponding ship operation and triggers possible controls. 
 Criminal gangs are thus used to provide “clean” 
documents to avoid controls, e.g. cargo or fish catch 
declarations that will look “business as usual” for the 
custom officer or fishery inspector respectively. In the same 
time, these data are not today available in parallel to the 
serious crime investigators that could detect inconsistencies 
or possible correlations with their own investigations. 
 This “fragmentation” of the State controls of maritime 
activities is inherited from the absence of an holistic vision 
of the maritime economy common to almost all States: a 
comprehensive survey undertaken by DG Mare confirmed a 
split of the maritime authority prerogatives between more 
than 10 different administrations all across the 21 EU 
maritime nations, with many different Ministries involved 
(Transport, Energy, Environment, Agriculture, Interior, 
Economy, Defence…). Furthermore, this organizational mix 
differs significantly form a country to the next, with hardly a 
cross-border match between mandates and legal 
prerogatives, hence making inter-administration cooperation 
furthermore complex. This results into what is usually called 
“data silos”, each of them only exploited under a single 
angle. 
 In essence, maritime surveillance operations are not 
distinct from any business, and the general approach of 
“Strategic Early Warning Systems” theorized from 1975 ref 
[4, 5] to provide on-time strategic reaction capabilities is 
perfectly applicable. The central element is that disruptions 
do not emerge without warning, however these warnings 
remain most often undetected as they don’t come from the 
expected channels of business information. These warning 
signs are described as "weak signals" [4], a concept aimed at 
early detection of those signals which could lead to strategic 
surprises -- events which have the potential to jeopardise an 
organization’s strategy. Brison and Wybo [6] represent the 
life cycle of weak signals as four successive steps associated 
with barriers that the weak signal has to overcome. These 
four steps are: Detection, Interpretation, Transmission and 
Priority setting. The extraction of such weak signals from 
the massive data and meta-data collected on Internet by the 
GAFA turns to be potentially extremely profitable – 
currently turning as the 21th century gold rush… Everyone 
has experienced already how effectively e-advertising can 
be targeted by processing the heterogeneous navigation data 
and metadata of your internet browser. 
There are already demonstrative contributions of Open 
Source data mining and weak signals analysis in the 
maritime security domain, such as the ConTraffic web-
service of the JRC able to alert Custom Authorities on 
particular containers associated with “abnormal” voyage 
histories (https://contraffic.jrc.ec.europa.eu/).  
The largest potential relate to the application of weak 
signals detection over widely heterogeneous data possibly 
correlated. Ref [7] proposes an interesting application of this 
approach to the detection of cyber-intrusions, which is not 
dissimilar to our own preoccupation. Proper “Features 
Detection” comes as a cornerstone of efficient 
heterogeneous correlation. 
(http://journalofbigdata.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s
40537-015-0013-4 ). 
As another inspiring example, heterogeneous 
correlation will soon offer a totally secure substitute to 
traditional passwords: a very clear signal has been given by 
Google at its annual I/O conference 2016, announcing the 
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availability of a “Authentication APS developer kit” by the 
end of 2016 based upon “behavioural biometrics” (Abacus 
project). This component of Chrome will allow elaborating 
a “trust score” to enable the user login, achieving its 
authentication through a comprehensive pattern of 
behavioural features currently captured by the smartphone 
own sensors: how you type, where you are, how fast you 
move, your voice intonations etc. - none of them “mediated” 
by an explicit identification request 
(https://www.newscientist.com/article/2091203-google-
plans-to-replace-smartphone-passwords-with-trust-scores/ ).  
The transposition of these advanced IT concepts to 
cross-correlate the data respectively collected by Port 
Authorities, Customs, VTMS, fishery control agencies, 
Defence, Law enforcement agencies etc. seems 
straightforward: this shall allow directing the operator’s 
focus on few “abnormal/suspicious” seafarers trying to hide 
in the global maritime traffic while clearing without any 
further investigation most of the tracked vessels. 
 
3. THE REVOLUTION TO COME: EASING DATA 
ACCESS 
 
The key point to enable weak signal analysis is to access as 
many data as possible without any prior selection: searching 
the “unknown unknown” means that the data owner has no 
clues to pre-select what is worth being shared with its 
partnering maritime authorities – so it is a totally distinct 
approach from current “need to know” (and even the 
emerging “dare to share”) the data he has already identified 
as suspicious. 
The second characteristic of this activity is to process 
all sorts of data collected in the global framework of 
“maritime management”, including the associated meta-
data. This is totally distinct from building a “common 
maritime picture” by fusing all the ship tracks collected 
across the community of maritime administrations: instead 
of aggregating every possible data of the same nature (ship 
tracks), the purpose is to browse with pre-determined search 
strategies (e.g. to build a confidence index) all possible 
layers of data (e.g. ship owner, previous ports of call, 
container numbers, crew list, average speed, mix of cargo, 
berthing records, occurrence of encountering with ship Y etc 
etc) 
The conjunction of the total dematerialization of all the 
shipping documents (e-maritime, single national window…) 
and of the go-ahead for the Common Information Sharing 
Environment (CISE) is creating the framework of a massive 
“maritime Big Data” which is the pre-requisite for 
deploying advanced data mining tools underlying the weak 
signal analysis approach. 
This requires however building effectively a CISE with 
all the features of the original vision of DG Mare in terms of 
seamless access to all relevant national/sectoral data 
repositories.  
Fig.1 is a familiar conceptual view of CISE (excerpt 
from the Deloitte report ref [8]) showing the various “User 
Community Layers” expected to rally the common 
exchange environment. On this graphic, developing 
heterogeneous correlations would come as achieving a 
seamless permeability between any layers, to conduct the 
correlation by picking data of all 7 colours and detect 
anomalies that no layer would ever suspect.  
Figure 1 “CISE Landscape”, from ref [8] p.189 
There is currently a risk that a number of User 
Communities (UCs) still consider the horizontal 
permeability as the principal scope for CISE, materializing 
into a collection of “common sectoral operational picture” 
built from the data considered by each data owner as 
“interesting to share” within the same UC for improving 
cross-border cooperation. At a time where the Pre-
Operational Validation project CISE-2020 is launching the 
procurement of critical IT software bricks of the future 
CISE, opening this discussion seems critical. 
 
4. THE VDES OPPORTUNITY 
 
The AIS is currently under revision at international level 
(IALA, IMO) to incorporate the capability of broadband 
data transfer (Very high frequency Data Exchange System, 
VDES) while improving as well the capture of AIS signals 
by satellites (S-AIS). 
Planned to enter into service by 2020, as for CISE, the 
VDES will provide all reporting vessels with a capability to 
contribute to the global maritime surveillance picture. It 
shall be seen having the potential of a Copernican 
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revolution: moving from the era of unilateral reporting 
toward VTMS operators with little if no feedback, ship 
masters will be able to exchange all sorts of maritime safety 
and security notices with the neighbouring ships (via VHF) 
and with the whole community (via S-AIS) at no cost 
(compared to the SatCom broadband links currently 
needed). EU Maritime Authorities should monitor more 
closely and possibly influence the current phase of standard 
VDES messaging definition to secure the effective 
contribution of every cooperative ship to report its local 
environment as a contribution to the grand picture currently 
compiled by National Authorities, Regional Commissions, 
EMSA and NATO. Early reporting of the sighting by a 
cargo or a ferry of “strange” ships around her (fishing 
vessels out of fishing grounds, old cargo much too low over 
the water, towed pateras or RHIBs, unusual routes, apparent 
rendez-vous at sea, low flying plane etc) could help 
directing patrols well before incidents might trigger alerts. 
VDES has the potential to turn every cooperative ship as an 
“in-situ” maritime surveillance sensor, able to transmit 
messages, pictures, radar screenshots, open comments etc. 
 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Maritime authorities will not transform their data sharing 
and data access policies overnight. In the same time, major 
enablers of a new way to think the maritime surveillance 
data analysis are at stake now depending on short term 
decisions at EU level (CISE) or UN/IMO (VDES) to freeze 
the technical requirements of these new systems. 
Our R&D community has the duty to launch now very 
imaginative and convincing “vertical” data mining 
experiments (wrt Fig.1) to demonstrate the power of weak 
signal analysis, the way to build unprecedented “trust 
scores” and the consequence of this transformation of the 
notion of “abnormal behaviour detection” on the 
requirements (including at some stage underlying legal 
agreements) of both CISE and VDES. Without offering 
attractive use-cases, we might miss this challenging 2020 
milestone, with the risk of not meeting again before long 
such opportunity. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Detailed real-time analysis of a large-scale (continental-
scale) operational maritime pictures can nowadays be 
achieved via commercial-off-the-shelf hardware and 
software components with minimal investment in both time 
and engineering effort. However, establishing the de facto 
relationships between the entities present in the scenario and 
deriving meaningful information from them so that it can be 
used in operational contexts such as route risk assessment 
and mission planning and forecasting requires both the 
evaluation of the instant maritime picture and its correlation 
with past events and movement patterns. 
 The research herein presented used latest-generation big 
data processing and automated deep learning techniques to 
analyze 5 years’ worth of terrestrial AIS (Automatic 
Identification System) movement data and derive 
meaningful information in an experimental information 
system that continuously evaluates the current maritime 
picture against historical trends, matching relevant events 
and allowing a trained operator (either automated or in real 
time) to further interrogate the system for deeper extraction 
of both past trends and future probabilistic evaluations. The 
research is being pursued under Inovaworks Command and 
Control’s private R&D center, and preliminarily 
demonstrates how historical information consulted and 
further enriched in real-time provides predictive value to a 
mission-planning system and is crucial for meaningful data 
analytics. The work presented also provides insights into the 
best direction for future work in this area. 
 
Index Terms— Maritime Traffic, Anomaly detection, 
risk assessment 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Performing mission planning and risk assessment activities 
in large-scale, complex endeavors over vast geographical 
territories implicitly inhibits human-scale situational 
awareness analysis, while at the same time greatly 
amplifying the margin for error of most uncorrected 
automated analytics approaches. Crucial to creating a 
reliable, self-validating Consolidated Operational Picture is 
the reliance on multi-method validation of both input data 
and consolidated picture results, and in the correct 
identification of anomaly events and their significance for a 
decision maker’s sense making.  
 As unassisted construction of a Consolidated 
Operational Picture is paramount for the establishment of 
valid Situational Awareness, so is unassisted detection of 
any given environment’s abnormal vessel behaviors. 
Nonetheless, a major challenge in detecting automated 
anomalous vessel behavior in is the high rate of false alarms 
(due to the use of mainly geospatial – implicitly kinetical – 
information from indirect vessel data acquisition).  
 However, manually modeling what is and is not 
abnormal in a large-scale scenario with dozens of thousands 
of moving entities is not only humanly impossible but also 
heavily limiting, as the derived heuristics would only cover 
a subset of the potential real-world use cases.  
 For such purpose, we started exploring using vessel 
traffic history information as a training baseline for deriving 
abnormal cases and then using the trained system to detect 
vessel traffic anomalies on a control set. Moreover, such 
history traffic information could be used to derive and 
establish the de facto relationships between vessels present 
in a given scenario and deriving meaningful information 
from them so that it can be used in operational contexts such 
as association assessment for risk and mission planning. 
 
 
2. INPUT DATA SET 
 
In order to support the algorithms being developed, we used 
a large data set containing 5 years’ worth of terrestrial AIS 
traffic around the European maritime shores for 2011 to 
2015. This data set included non-downsampled AIS data 
frames in approximately 6 minute intervals per vessel. 
These data packets identity their target vessel via the ITU’s 
Vessel MMSI number. 
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 As such, and to additionally be able to further infer 
anomalies based on the vessel’s own context and physical 
features (and not exclusively on movement data), IMO-
provided data for a vessel’s particulars (DWT, GT, Service 
Speed, MCR, etc.) was fused into the AIS traffic as it was 
loaded onto the system via our own internal systems Fusion 
and sense making capabilities: 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The Data Ingestion pipeline on the left 
 
 
The system received every AIS movement data tick and 
processed it against well-known databased for IMO Number 
– MMSI Number mapping, as well as third-party vessel 
particulars enrichment sources. Then, each movement was 
stored in a fourth-dimensional spatiotemporal database for 
later retrieval and calculation. 
 In total, the data set is comprised of 10.929.973.310 
vessel AIS movement data points, of which we correctly 
attributed 7.196.639.922 to valid IMO numbers that 
correspond to 78.055 distinct MMSI vessels. This averages 
to just under 6 million AIS movement data points per day of 
consolidated Situational Awareness data. 
 The data set was split in two: odd years 
(2011/2013/2015) for training, even years (2012, 2014) for 
validation. 
 
 
2. ANOMALIES AND CLASSIFICATION 
 
Shipping vessels involved in commercial business tend to 
follow set patterns of behavior depending on the activities in 
which they are engaged. If a vessel exhibits anomalous 
behavior, this could indicate it is being used for abnormal 
and/or illicit activities. With the wide availability of 
automatic identification system (AIS) data it is possible to 
systematically search and detect some of these behavioral 
patterns using algorithms appropriate for the target detection 
problem.  
In [1], then further consolidated in [2], an Anomaly 
Taxonomy is suggested for maritime events derived from 
movement (kinetic) observations. Based on either Motion or 
Location information, it classifies maritime anomalies based 
on the evaluation of motion against its speed and track, and, 
based on its Location, it suggests classifications evaluation 
the vessels’ data against history information, specific 
geospatial areas, or other vessels.  
 
 
Figure 2Anomaly Taxonomy [1] 
 
 
In our research, we focused of first-order and second-order 
events that could be directly or indirectly derived from the 
vessel’s Speed or Location. 
 For each of the focus areas, a modified machine learning 
detection algorithm was developed; for each potential 
detection, we determine the probability that it is indeed 
anomalous; finally, for complex events the probabilities are 
combined using a Bayesian network to calculate the 
aggregated probability for the event.  
 We then use elastic, big data processing techniques to 
process the input data set and try to derive meaningful 
information in an experimental information system that 
continuously evaluates the current maritime picture against 
historical trends, matching relevant events (candidate 
abnormalities) and allowing for a trained operator (either 
automated or in real time) to further interrogate the system 
for deeper extraction of the probabilistic evaluation. 
 
 
5. RESULTS AND ONGOING WORK 
 
Work is still ongoing regarding long-term insights to be 
taken from the input data being processed with the system 
presented herein. Still, can preliminarily demonstrate how 
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historical information consulted and further enriched in real-
time provides predictive value for mission-planners and is 
crucial for meaningful large-scale data analytics. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Inovaworks’ running prototype 
 
In our running prototype, the system is now configured to 
detect and validate:  
 
 Unusual unexplained high speed 
 Unusual unexplained slow speed 
 Unusual unexplained turn 
 Unusual course region 
 Vessel Loitering  
 Vessel outside historical route 
 Vessel outside traffic lanes 
 High-seas Vessel Rendezvous 
 Littoral proximity Rendezvous 
 Recurrent proximity with other Vessel(s) 
 
 
6. FUTURE WORK 
 
Inovaworks is now working on second-level inferences 
regarding vessel kinematic information that will further 
deepen the analysis possibilities for the dataset provided, 
which should be further enriched accordingly with 
correlatable data to allow for such questioning.  
 As an example, such analysis will allow for our 
technology to answer complex, derived questions such as 
“which distinct-type vessels came together for near littoral 
Rendezvous and are for whom the Captains were already 
previously part of the same crew?” 
 Also, our team will be complementing the system’s 
probabilistic capabilities in order to allow of questioning 
regarding the probability of a future event (e.g., a piracy act) 
to occur for a given cargo on a given route, based not only 
on history movements, but more so on the association of 
historic data with concrete contributive vessels on the give 
route’s area at the projected timeframe. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The first charts showing information on surface oceanic 
currents were based on logs of both military and 
merchant ships. At the time, ships navigated through dead 
reckoning. Once or twice a day, a ship noted its 
position based on celestial navigation, and recorded its 
speed, and compass direction. If currents are 
present, they will likely push the ship off course and alter its 
speed. One can estimate the direction and 
speed of these currents by subtracting the predicted vector 
based on dead reckoning from the vector 
representing the ships actual speed and direction. Now, 
merchant ships transmit the position, the 
compass direction and the speed through AIS (Automatic 
Identification System) messages. 
Therefore it is potentially possible to compute surface 
current at finer scales. Preliminary 
experiments show that this approach is able to reveal 
mesoscale structures as eddies or filaments that can 
escape to satellite altimetry techniques. This paper aims to 
provide an overview of results in the Mediterranean area, 
showing the good correlation between AIS surface currents 
and chlorophyll concentration. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Near-surface ocean currents play a variety of roles in the 
marine environment and are considered as a key parameter 
for many applications. Search and rescue, ship routing, 
global warming analysis: all these domains and many others 
require to get information related to ocean surface currents.  
Therefore, complex and heavy systems are deployed to 
measure or estimate currents in coastal areas and high sea 
regions. Unfortunately, conventional methods for measuring 
near-surface currents may be subject to problems. While a 
surface drifter is uncontrollable in its spatial and temporal 
coverage, making such a system difficult to use to 
caracterize the ocean circulation in wide areas, especially in 
convergent and divergent flow regimes, HF radars are very 
complex systems which require substantial maintenance 
work to estimate ocean surface currents in coastal zones 
only and in small areas (up to 200 km² for the more efficient 
systems). Other conventional techniques such as Vessel 
Mounted Adcp and gliders have also limitations related to 
their deployment and maintenance complexity, spatial 
coverage and service life. Altimetry satellites such as the 
Jason series can also be used to approximate geostrophic 
currents at global scales. However, a limitation of the nadir 
altimetry from space, is the 200- to 300-kilometer spacing 
between satellite orbital tracks, which is unable to resolve 
small-scale features in oceanography.  
From an historical point of view the first charts showing 
information on surface oceanic currents were based on logs 
of both military and merchant ships. At the time, ships 
navigated through dead reckoning. Once or twice a day, a 
ship noted its position based on celestial navigation, and 
recorded its speed, and compass direction. If currents are 
present, they will likely push the ship off course and alter its 
speed. One can estimate the direction and speed of these 
currents by subtracting the predicted vector based on dead 
reckoning from the vector representing the ships actual 
speed and direction. Nowadays, merchant ships transmit the 
position, the compass direction and the speed through AIS 
(Automatic Identification System) messages. Therefore 
taking advantage of the data about ship navigation of the 
AIS system an innovative algorithm called e-Motion has 
been developed by e-Odyn to derive surface currents. Our 
preliminary experiments [1] shew that this approach is able 
to reveal mesoscale structures as eddies or filaments that can 
escape the altimetry techniques. 
AIS[2] is a communication system based on a protocol 
using the VHF maritime mobile band, for the exchange of 
navigation data. AIS uses an open protocol and is not 
intended for secure communications. It enables the 
automatic exchange of shipboard information from the 
vessels' sensors (dynamic data), as well as manually entered 
static and voyage related data, between one vessel and 
another or a shore station. AIS devices are required 
internationally on most commercial vessels as identified by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the Safety 
of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), Chapter V. [3] 
AIS receivers are subject to line-of-sight limitations 
where range is depending on height of the antenna. In 
normal weather conditions, one can expect to collect AIS 
messages transmitted from ship located about 40 Nm from 
the receiver , while sometimes, due to duct effects , the 
range can  increase  up to several hundreds of Nm. 
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The subject of this study starts with the observation of 
meso-scale and sub-mesocale features along the south and 
east coast of Sicily by using AIS data processed using the e-
Motion algorithm. The position and the size and of these 
observed features are compared, from a qualitative point of 
view only, with one satellite observation dataset used as 
surface tracers : Aqua/Modis Chlorophyll concentration. 
Moreover, the analysis of the bathymetry in the area reveals 
other particulars of the surface circulation which can be 
related to e-Motion surface currents. 
 
2. STUDY AREA 
 
 
Figure 1 A simplified vue of the summer circulation in the 
Sicily Chanel (SC) Omrani et al. 2016. The main features 
are represented : Atlantic Ionian Stream (AIS), Adventure 
Bank Vortex (ABV), Maltese Channel Crest (MCC), Ionian 
Shelf Break Vortex (ISV) , Medina Gear (MG), Messina 
Rise Vortex (MRV), Ionian Front (IF). 
The proposed method used to calculate ocean surface 
currents using AIS messages could be used in any area 
where ships are navigating, including areas where the tide 
effect is important. However, tide currents are nowadays 
well known and numerical models are quite efficient to 
restitute the currents in regions where this type of signal is 
prominent. Moreover, preliminary results from e-Odyn 
already shown the relevance of e-Motion to estimate tidal 
ocean surface currents [1]. Therefore, it is more interesting 
to analyze the method by comparing our results with other 
datasets, especially in micro-tidal area and where altimetry 
satellites fail in detecting eddies (near the coast for 
instance). This type of area can illustrate the potential of the 
proposed method as a complement to other techniques to 
observe ocean surface currents at a global scale. 
The study area is mainly located south and east to the 
Sicily and is represented on figure 1. It was chosen mainly 
because of the great variety of circulation features. From a 
marine traffic point of view, the Sicily Channel (SC) is an 
intensively used area  and the main gateway for ships which 
are navigating between the strait of Gibraltar and the Suez 
Canal. That area is then very valuable to analyze the 
currents estimated from AIS data using e-Motion. The SC 
connects the Mediterranean's eastern and western sub-
bassins and represents a key area for the general 
Mediterranean sea circulation. This strait has a very 
irregular bottom topography characterized in the southwest 
by the Tunisian continental shelf and in the northeast by the 
Sicilian shelf. The circulation in the area is governed by 
density gradients [4]. An eastward surface flow if formed by 
the Algerian current [5]. This flow is modulated by 
permanent mesoscale features, which could be related, 
amongst other, to bathymetry effects, upwellings and 
baroclinic instabilities [6].  Along the southeastern Sicilian 
Coast, on the downstream of the Malta plateau is an 
upwelling site. Due to the AIS vein a mesoscale anticyclonic 
eddy (Maltese Channel Crest - MCC) formation can come 
into action and tends to reverse the flow to a North-West 
direction closer to the coast.[7] 
 
3. DATA AND METHOD 
 
 
Figure 2 Density plot showing the number of ships per cell 
used during the 10 days period of the study to calculate 
ocean surface currents with e-Motion. The main ship routes 
can be observed (red) and correspond to the area with the 
highest number of gathered AIS messages. 
 
The AIS data used in this study were gathered by e-Odyn in 
April 2016, using several AIS receivers located along the 
Sicily south and east coastline. Figure 2 presents the traffic 
density in the area and an overview of the range of the AIS 
receivers. These data were gathered at a one minute 
sampling rate. For the study, we selected AIS messages of 
merchant ships with a speed over ground superior to 6 knots 
in order to exclude the impact of voluntary ship maneuvers 
on our results, taking into account that voluntary ships 
maneuvers change in speed and heading create strong bias 
in e-Motion results. 
Maritime Knowledge Discovery and Anomaly Detection Workshop, 5-6 July 2016 
33 
 
 We gathered ships AIS messages during 10 days starting 
from 10th, April 2016 to 19th, April 2016. This period of 
time corresponds to good VHF signal propagation 
conditions, allowing us to collect a maximum of AIS 
messages in the area of the study despite low performance 
AIS receivers.  
 Ocean surface currents calculated along each ship tracks 
using e-Motion have been bin averaged (0,05x0,05 degrees). 
No other processing technique has been used to enhance the 
results as horizontal non-divergence of surface flux. The 
implicit only one assumption derive from the time window 
of 10 days: we focus on persistent mesoscale structures at 
this time scale. The following figures only present raw 
ocean surface currents binned means. 
 
Figure 3 Modis/Aqua chlorophyll concentration from 
Copernicus (8 days mean – 14th, April 2016). CHL 
concentrations used as surface tracers reveal different types 
of features: a north/south stream (A), an envelop which 
could be related to eddies (B), an upwelling (C) and an eddy 
(D). Some of these features can also be linked to the 
simplified circulation shown on figure 1. Upwelling regions 
are characterized by high chlorophyll concentrations (>0.15 
mg.m- 3) found along the coast, along the Malta shelf-break, 
and at the boundaries of MRV. 
Since surface currents interact with waters rich in 
chlorophyll provoking the detachment of filaments useful 
for identifying the coastal circulation, the other used 
material is an optical satellite image derived from MODIS 
(Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) and 
provided by Copernicus: Aqua dataset-oc-med-chl-modis_a-
l4-chl_1km_8days-rt-v01_1464718499335 was selected for 
this study to visualize the chlorophyll gradients and e-
Motion outputs at the same date. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Near-surface mesoscale eddies having a diameter down-to 
100 km can be observed using altimetry techniques. 
However, altimetry often fail in detecting smaller 
features and have difficulties to detect turbulences located 
close to the coast : difficulties in estimating the mean sea 
level around the shelf break and issues of land 
contamination in the altimeter and radiometer footprints are 
the main encountered problems [8]. Nonetheless, eddies 
with horizontal scales below 50 km can be observed from 
space using optical sensors. [9] 
The CHL map presented on figure 3 and derived from the 
Modis dataset shows coherent features that are easily 
regognizable. A very well delimited eddy can be observed 
north-east to the Sicilian coast (D, figure 3). This eddy is 
known as the Messina Rise Vortex (MRV). The Meanders 
(C, figure 3) centered at about (15.25°E, 36.5°N) matches 
the southward flow of the Malta plateau. They indicate the 
core of an offshore directed filament transporting water 
away from the coast also related to the bottom topography 
and Ionian slope. These visible meanders are related to 
upwelling signals which are easily recognizable in terms of 
the color anomalies since these features results in a high 
level of nutrients, due to the decomposition of sinking 
organic matter brought to the surface and utilized by 
phytoplankton. These meanders and upwelling are known as 
Ionian shelf break vortex (ISV) and Ionian front (IF). A 
north/south oriented filament (A, figure 3) can be observed 
at about (15.25°E, 36.5°N) which is the west boundary of a 
low concentration chlorophyll patch (B, figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 4 e-Motion streamlines computed using 10 days of 
AIS data from 10th, April 2016 to 19th April 2016, 
superimposed on Aqua/Modis chlorophyll concentration. 
Purple arrows are plotted to provide information related to 
intensity and direction of the e-Motion observed features. 
The main meanders, eddies and jets observed may be related 
to the synoptic description of the circulation shown on 
figure 1: A/AIS (reversed), C/ABV, D/MCC, E/MG, F/IF, 
G/MRV. 
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We superimposed e-Motion ocean surface current 
streamlines with CHL (figure 4) in the same area. 5 eddies 
(B, C, D, E, G figure 4) can be clearly derived with e-
Motion algorithm. One cyclonic eddy (C) and one 
anticylonic (B) are facing and conforming to the shape of 
the bathymetry is this area (figure 1). The position of the 
front (H, figure 4) between these two eddies closely 
resembles that of the CHL filament (A , figure 3). The flow 
direction observed both by CHL concentration repartition 
and e-Motion streamlines is mainly north/south. This 
mushroom feature with 2 facing eddies (B, C figure 4) and 
located west of Malta can be related to the pathways and 
transformations of the main water masses described by 
Lermusiaux et al [10]. 
 A third eddy (D) is centered at (36.5° N, 15.4° E). The 
total envelop of eddies (C) and (D) is also conforming to the 
shape delimited by CHL gradients (B, figure 3). In this 
situation, by only observing the CHL concentration 
gradients, one can miss this 2 facing eddies feature. e-
Motion allows to visualize the internal structure of this CHL 
patch (B, figure 3, C and D figure 4). Figure 6 shows e-
Motion results at higher resolution. 
 
 
Figure 5 e-Motion streamlines (black) and vector field 
(purple) computed using 10 days of AIS data from 10th, 
April 2016 to 19th April 2016, superimposed on bathymetry 
contours (green). 
All along the Ionian slope and on the western side of Malta 
plateau, the flow exhibits a component (figure 5 and F, 
figure 4) parallel to bathymetry contours and CHL gradients. 
The position of the front is closely relatedthe 500misobaths 
of figure 5. An anti-cyclonically rotating eddy to the north-
east of Sicily (G, figure 4) is in agreement with the shape of 
a patch of plankton-rich waters (D, figure 3). This eddy can 
be clearly related to MRV. 
 
 
Figure 6 High resolution image showing e-Motion 
streamlines computed using 10 days of AIS data from 10th, 
April 2016 to 19th April 2016, superimposed on 
Aqua/Modis chlorophyll concentration. Purple arrows are 
plotted to provide informations related to intensity and 
direction of the e-Motion observed features. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
The e-Motion outputs and their comparison to CHL 
concentration and bottom topography have revealed several 
features, which were expected from previous knowledge.  
The Messina Rise Vortex (MRV) for example is clearly 
revealed by e-Motion, as well as meanders observed along 
the Ionian slope. Some other high resolution features are 
also revealed, that appear to be unfamiliar or subject to 
seasonal variability. They deserve to be discussed in this 
study and will be analyzed later from a seasonal point of 
view by creating e-Motion climatologies.  
 The preliminary results shown here suggest that the 
spatial coverage and high temporal resolution of the AIS 
data now allows a unique and detailed characterization of 
the surface circulation along the coastline of many countries 
worldwide. Previous results from e-Odyn [1] in the Iroise 
sea, France where the tide can produce predominant surface 
currents, completed with the results in the Sicily Channel 
now show the relevance of the method to analyze and 
characterize different type of ocean dynamics. 
 More results will be published in a near future, showing 
the added value of e-Motion coupled with classic techniques 
such as HF radars, buoys and drifters or altimetry satellites. 
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Those studies will include quantitative information and error 
estimations related to e-Motion outputs. The relevance of 
using satellite AIS data to calculate ocean surface currents 
and provide information at a global scale will be also 
demonstrated. 
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7. DISCLAIMER 
 
All findings of this paper are based on the analysis of a 
single AIS data set collected in April 2016. The situation 
described is only representative for this month of that 
particular year and it is not claimed that it represents any 
“mean” or “seasonal” situation of this region. 
 
 REFERENCES 
 
[1] Guichoux, Y., Ocean dynamics 2.0 poster, EURASC symposium, 
October 2015. 
[2] Recommendation, I.T.U. RM. 1371‐4. Technical characteristics for 
an automatic identification system using time‐division multiple 
access in the VHF maritime mobile, 2010. 
[3]International Maritime Organization (IMO), "International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)", Retrieved 6 
April 2013. 
[4] Molcard, A., Gervasio, L., Griffa, A., Gasparini, G. P., Mortier, L., 
& Özgökmen, T. M., “Numerical investigation of the Sicily 
Channel dynamics: density currents and watermass advection”. 
Journal of Marine Systems, 36(3), 219-238, 2002. 
[5] Millot, C., “Some features of the algerian current”, Journal of 
Geophysical Research 90, 7169–7176,  1985. 
[6] Omrani, H., Arsouze, T., Béranger, K., Boukthir, M., Drobinski, P., 
Lebeaupin-Brossier, C., & Mairech, H. “Sensitivity of the sea 
circulation to the atmospheric forcing in the Sicily Channel.” 
Progress in Oceanography, 140, 54-68, 2016. 
[7] Drago, A., Azzopardi, J., Gauci, A., Tarasova, R., Ciraolo, G., 
Capodici, F., & Gacic, M. Sea surface currents by HF radar in the 
Malta channel. Rapp. Comm. Int. Mer Medit, 40, 144, 2013. 
[8] Vignudelli, S., Snaith, H. M., Cipollini, P., Venuti, F., Lyard, F., 
Cretaux, J. F., ... & Ginzburg, A. “Extending the use of satellite 
altimetry for coastal applications: the alticore project.” 
[9] Alpers, W., Brandt, P., Lazar, A., Dagorne, D., Sow, B., Faye, S., 
...& Brehmer, P. . “A small-scale oceanic eddy off the coast of 
West Africa studied by multi-sensor satellite and surface drifter 
data.” Remote Sensing of Environment, 129, 132-143, 2013. 
[10] Lermusiaux, P. F. J., & Robinson, A. R. “Features of dominant 
mesoscale variability, circulation patterns and dynamics in the 
Strait of Sicily”. Deep Sea Research Part I: Oceanographic 
Research Papers, 48(9), 1953-1997, 2001. 
 
 
  
Maritime Knowledge Discovery and Anomaly Detection Workshop, 5-6 July 2016 
36 
 
DETECTING ANOMALIES IN STREAMS OF AIS VESSEL DATA 
 
DimitriosZissis
1,2
 
1
Dept. Product & Systems Design Engineering, 
University of the Aegean 
Greece 
2
MarineTraffic.com 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Current state of the art techniques and technologies are 
struggling with the growing volumes of high-speed, loosely 
structured, spatiotemporal data streams, such as those 
produced by the vessel tracking Automatic Identification 
system (AIS). So as to generate actionable intelligence from 
these streams of data, systems are required to face 
challenges at a variety of levels, including fusion, 
processing and storage. In this paper, we report on our 
recent work regarding learning a vessel’s “normal” 
behavior, so as to support situational assessment by 
indicating dangerous deviations from this in the future. 
Within this context, we report on early results, that validate 
the potential of a novel solution leveraging the architectural 
characteristics of edge (or fog) computing and employs 
Support Vector Machines (SVM) on the perimeter of the 
system, to perform low footprint unsupervised learning and 
analysis of sensor data for anomaly detection purposes. 
 
Index Terms—fog computing, AIS anomaly detection, 
1-SVM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) requires 
that all vessels over 299 Gross Tones carry an Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) transponder on board, which 
transmits data regarding their position, speed and course, 
amongst other static information (such as a vessel’s name, 
dimensions, voyage details and other). Networks of coastal 
and satellite receivers are capable of receiving such 
broadcasted messages. A combination of AIS data and other 
spatial information can produce interactive map mashups 
which attempt to provide a depiction of the state at sea for 
port authorities, coast guards, vessel tracking services and 
other interested parties. For example, ‘MarineTraffic.com’ 
which is one of the most popular vessel trackers, is at any 
time tracking more than 80,000 vessels, while data is 
collected from a network of over 1,800 coastal AIS stations, 
located in 140 countries around the world.  
 Unfortunately, vessel tracking systems are vulnerable to 
a number of malicious attacks, as they were not originally 
designed with security in mind. Balduzzi presented a 
method of spoofing a vessel by injected invalid data into 
AIS gateways [1]. Ship spoofing involves creating a 
nonexistent vessel, assigning it all the information relevant 
to AIS (MMSI and call sign), and then transmitting 
messages as if valid, e.g. changing position, speed etc. [2]. 
By implementing this technique, malicious attackers, were 
able to trigger fake collision warning alerts, which could 
potentially make surrounding vessels alter their course. 
Another attack includes AIS hijacking, by which attackers 
can maliciously modify information provided by the AIS 
base station, eavesdropping on all transmissions (i.e. man-
in-the-middle) or modifying data. This method makes it 
possible for attackers to alter any information broadcast by 
existing AIS stations regarding real vessel data (e.g., cargo, 
speed, location, and country). AIS transponders are also 
susceptible to “insider attacks”, as in some occasions vessels 
have been reported hacking their own AIS responder. 
Recently an Iranian tanker was intendedly disguising itself 
as a smaller capacity vessel to avoid been identified [3].  
Erroneous and malicious data needs to be filtered out 
prior to entering the database, so as not to affect data 
accuracy and business intelligence. In many cases, one can 
employ traditional approaches to filter out the data outliers 
in batch mode, when the data has already entered the 
database. But for a website such as MarineTraffic, which 
receives thousands of streams of vessel data, with an 
increase rate of approximately 5GB per day and over 1 
million events triggered  (port calls, collision detections etc.) 
it is almost impossible. In this short paper, we report on 
early results that validate the potential of a novel solution, 
which leverages the architectural characteristics of edge (or 
fog) computing and employs Support Vector Machines 
(SVM) on the perimeter of the system, to perform low 
footprint unsupervised learning and analysis of sensor data 
for anomaly detection purposes. 
 
2. SECURITY ON THE PERIMETER OF THE 
SYSTEM 
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For streaming data, of such volume and variety, novel 
approaches are required for processing and storage. It is 
necessary to delegate an increasing number of processes to 
the IS itself, increasing its autonomy, while leveraging 
administrators and stakeholders from repetitive low level 
and complex intensive tasks. With the rise of the Internet of 
Things combined with Big Data, we are in urgent need of 
intelligent security mechanisms capable of anticipating, 
detecting, identifying, and protecting the systems 
autonomously. Artificial intelligence techniques have been 
employed in security for some time now.  
An IDS is a defense system which is capable of 
monitoring and detecting hostile activities either across a 
network (Network based IDS) or on a host system (Host 
based IDS). In “big data” conditions a centralized IDS 
system would be flooded by too much data, ultimately 
missing hidden trends in the data. For such purposes, 
detection components of the IDS can be moved to the 
periphery of the system, delegating them with monitoring 
their local surrounding, while moving centralized decisions 
to the coordinating authority higher up in the hierarchy. Fog 
computing architectures, a.k.a, edge computing have 
recently emerged as an extension of cloud computing, 
offering services including storage and processing, closer to 
the end user, directly at the edge of the network [4]. It is a 
highly virtualized environment located on devices at the 
periphery of the network (e.g. access points), positioned for 
real time analytics, supporting densely distributed data 
collection points, low latency interactions and high 
geographical distribution [5]. From its infancy, researchers 
identified the potential benefits edge computing could bring 
to security in IOT and cloud environments [6]. In our work, 
we leverage the fog, to architect and develop a hierarchy of 
intelligent anomaly detection systems for IOT 
environments.  
 
3. SELF-PROTECTING AIS RECEIVER STATIONS 
 
The hypothesis of this work is that each single AIS station 
in a network can be viewed as a single fog node. Normal 
vessel traffic should be clustered around one or more 
specific clusters and any traffic representing anomalous 
behavior or suspicious behavior should potentially be 
positioned outside these clusters. Each fog node (e.g. AIS 
station), receiving only a partition of the overall dataset 
streaming into the application databases, can potentially 
learn the clusters relevant to that, which will contain clusters 
of vessel paths, types, positions, destinations and speed, in 
near or real time constraints. Any vessel data detected not 
falling within these clusters can be labelled as a potential 
anomaly, alerting a higher level centralized node, system or 
operator. As the node will be operating on a small portion of 
the overall data, only the minimum of processing and 
memory will be sufficient.  
To validate our hypothesis we developed an intelligent 
fog node IDS and deploy it on an experimental AIS receiver 
base station located in the Aegean Sea Greece. An AIS base 
station can be build using simple components such as a 
Raspberry Pi 2 board (900MHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 
CPU with 1GB RAM) and related sensors, which provide 
enough computational power and memory for successfully 
deploying Yocto Linux [7]. For the classification of 
incoming data as anomalous or not, in real time constraints, 
we implement a One-Class Support Vector Machine [8]. 
One-class SVM (1-SVM), is a one class classification 
unsupervised learning algorithm, which aims to find an 
optimal hyperplane in a feature space separating the training 
data (positive samples) from the origin (considered as 
negative samples) with maximum margin (the distance from 
the hyperplane to the origin). It essentially learns a decision 
function for novelty detection: classifying new data as 
similar or different to the training set. For training the 
machine learning algorithm, we maintain a time window of 
vessel data collected in the previous 12 hours. As our 
primary focus in this work, is to validate the architectural 
deployment and counter attacks such as spoofing a real 
vessels position data by making it to appear inland or in 
other anomalous location (an attack described in Balduzzi, 
2014), we focus on the vessels location data (Latitude and 
Longitude), while ignoring other data fields.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 1-SVM was trained on 24,285 instances (data 
received in several hours previously) on the AIS base 
receiver (Rasberry Pi 2 900MHz quad-core ARM Cortex-
A7 CPU with 1GB RAM) running Yocto Linux in several 
minutes (less than 3 minutes). During training the 1-SVM 
Figure 1 A visualization of received data from a single AIS base 
station. Each dot representing a vessel (x-axis is Latitude, while y-
axis Longitude). Centre circle, represents the learned decision 
function by the 1-SVM depicting inliers and outliers. 
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erroneously labelled 2,429 observations.  After successful 
training, the SVM was tested on real data, both regular 
observations and abnormal observation such as that injected 
by a spoofed AIS receiver. From the 5,000 regular 
observations fed to the SVM, 583 were erroneously labelled 
as potentially anomalous, while from the 500 abnormal data 
injected, all were detected as anomalies. Most importantly, 
the SVM was capable of operating in near real time 
constraints, without overburdening the AIS base receiver.  
 
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Overall, results verify that based on a multivariate statistical 
approach, the IDS is capable of detecting abnormal vessel 
movements through moving temporal window of vessel 
measurements. In a similar fashion, a machine learning 
algorithm can be fed data so as to learn the most common 
seen destinations, vessel flags, types and more complex 
behaviors.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
A conceptual framework for real time deaccessioning for 
AIS anomaly detection is presented. Inspired from airport 
electronic data real time risk assessment for resilience, a 
stream reasoning approach is introduced. Stream reasoning 
is an approach that can be used if information (in the form 
of assertions) arrives as a stream of (time stamped) inputs. 
The approach has two features that could be helpful: the 
knowledge base can be continuously updated and reasoning 
goals continuously re-evaluated as new assertions arrive, the 
reasoner considers events from a finite time window, and 
not only at a single instant 
 
Index Terms— AIS data, stream reasoning, decision 
support system 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
AIS [2,3] is now well recognized in maritime society and 
widely used as several systems, including class A for 
SOLAS vessels, class B for non-SOLAS vessels, Aids to 
Navigation (AtoN), Search and Rescue Transmitter (AIS-
SART), Application Specific Messages (ASM). The 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a mandatory piece 
of navigational equipment for automatic data exchange 
between ships and with shore-based facilities. The overall 
aim of AIS is to improve safety at sea by assisting target 
tracking, simplifying information exchange and enhancing 
collision avoidance. AIS could be exploited more efficiently 
to improve the situational awareness both on board and 
ashore as well as reduce the manual workload. 
 In the context of information fusion and maritime 
surveillance the AIS data plays a critical role. Using these 
data an indication is derived related with anomaly detection 
i.e. that deviation of vessels’ expected behavior and possibly 
further investigation is required. This is very important for 
achieving appropriate Situation Awareness. Several methods 
and algorithms [4] have been proposed to attack the issue, 
mainly correlating historical data with new data provided by 
AIS receiver. The existing methods are mainly based on 
neural networks using supervised and unsupervised learning 
or statistical/probabilistic models. 
 
 
 
 In this paper inspired by air traffic control developed in 
EU research project SERSCIS [1] a new concept of AIS 
intelligence based on complex event processing and 
particular on data stream reasoning is presented, where an 
indication of risks related with anomaly detection could be 
initially derived and the appropriate action initiated. 
 The paper is structured as follows, after the introduction 
a brief description of reasoning technology is presented then 
the proposed conceptual framework is discussed followed 
by conclusions and further research. 
 
2. STREAM REASONING TECNOLOGY 
 
Stream reasoning [5], [6] is an approach that can be used if 
information arrives as a stream of (time stamped) inputs. 
The approach has two features that could be helpful: 
• the knowledge base can be continuously updated and 
reasoning goals continuously re-evaluated as new assertions 
arrive; 
• the reasoner considers events from a finite time window, 
and not only at a single instant. 
 
Introducing stream reasoning in AIS data processing could 
therefore overcome some of the current limitations by: 
• allowing the concrete system model to be continuously 
updated, which should be faster than generating a 
completely new model each time we need an update; 
• reducing the time lag between the evolution of the real 
system and that of the concrete system model, making it 
possible to resolve recent and rapid changes in the real 
system; 
• representing protracted as well as instantaneously 
observed behaviors in the model by including information 
over an extended time window; 
• allowing reasoning algorithms to take account of system 
changes during the time window, target than only the 
instantaneous system composition and status. 
 However it is important to appreciate the research on 
stream reasoning is still in its infant. Recent research efforts 
are still in early step and focus on the investigation of 
architecture approaches to support stream reasoning. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, stream reasoning consists of four 
main processing steps: 
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Figure 1 Information processing steps in a stream reasoner 
 
 
•   Select: the first step in the stream reasoning to select 
relevant data from input streams by exploiting load-
shedding techniques by introducing sampling policies that 
probabilistically drop stream elements to deal with bursty 
streams that may have unpredictable peaks. 
• Abstract: the sampled streams are fed into the abstract 
step that generates aggregate events by enforcing 
aggregation queries continuously. Outputs of the abstract 
step are consolidated as RDF (Resource Description 
Framework) streams, an unbounded bag of pairs <ρ, τ> 
where ρ is a RDF triple and τ is the timestamp that denotes 
the logical arrival time of RDF statement. This step entails 
the development of aggregate query language and system 
for query RDF data in the form of data streams. Three recent 
independent proposals include Streaming SPARQL [11] 
Continuous SPARQL (C-SPARQL) and Time-Annotated 
SPARQL; all extend SPARQL to handle both static RDF 
graphs and transient streams of RDF triples. 
• Reason: RDF streams are injected into background 
knowledge in order to perform reasoning tasks. Given that 
the reasoning process is not aware of expiration time, the 
reasoning results remain valid until the next update. A pre-
reasoning process is used to generate the current system 
snapshot and is responsible for maintenance of incremental 
materialisation of RDF snapshots. The efficient incremental 
materialisation of RDF snapshots is a research challenge 
under investigation. Recent experimental efforts include  
• Decide: Before producing answers to reasoning tasks, 
the answering process reaches the decision step where 
quality metrics and decision criteria defined by application 
developer are used to evaluate the quality of the answer is 
good enough and otherwise adapt the behavior of each 
previous step. 
 After some consideration, we concluded that it is not 
possible to use stream reasoning in a simple way to address 
AIS real time intelligence implementation. However, the 
underlying concepts can be used to enrich the proposed run-
time architecture and to provide more flexibility  
 
3. PROPOSED REAL TIME FRAMEWORK 
 
In this subsection we briefly overview the approach taken in 
conceptual framework, This is designed to exploit semantic 
system models to enable the use of machine reasoning to 
support the end user in making and implementing decisions 
at run-time. This translates into: · creating a semantic model 
of the running system based on the available monitoring 
data and using it to reason about the status of the system,  
presenting information from this model to the user, to help 
them understand and address current situation awareness 
risks. 
 The tools developed support machine-assisted design 
time system modelling, allowing its structure and properties 
to be described before the actual system is created by 
dynamic runtime composition. This model is called an 
abstract system model since it describes the structure of the 
system but not its actual composition. The proposed 
conceptual framework which schematically is given in Fig. 
2.Then constructs a concrete system model representing a 
snapshot of the running system, based on monitoring data 
and semantic reasoning over the abstract system model. 
Avoiding further analysis which would be beyond the scope 
of this work we mention that two separate reasoning 
processes are taking place: 
1. Semantic reasoning for potential threat of anomaly 
behavior classification based on whether these are addressed 
by the controls present in the running system 
2. Bayesian inference for likelihood estimation that each 
threat is currently being carried out. 
 Within the proposed framework the user is presented 
with three types of information [9]: 
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Figure 2 A proposed conceptual framework incorporating stream reasoning concepts 
 
 
1. What are the system vulnerabilities, or what threats is the 
system unable to manage 
2. What is the current likelihood probability each threat is 
being carried out 
3. What is the threat impact on the maritime traffic. 
 Moreover that’s classified into three classes:  
Blocked threat/activity if the system has the appropriate 
control to prevent the abnormal behavior to create any 
problem Mitigated activity when the abnormal behavior 
cannot be prevented, but the system controls provide a 
response that will counteract its effect on maritime safety 
and security.  
Vulnerability meaning the system does not have any means 
to prevent the abnormal behavior or counteract its effects on 
the targeted system asset. 
The objectives of the monitoring and decision support tool 
are basically four. 
1. Risk Classification (low, medium, high according their 
potential impact and blocked, mitigated, vulnerabilities 
depending on how well are addressed by controls) 
2. Periodic assessment (the Decision Support Tool (DST) 
refreshes in a periodic fashion the model and dynamically 
reduces the involved risk factors) 
3. Threat explanations (the DST provides explanation of 
threats which is very helpful to the operator in the loop for 
understanding the system and to take appropriate actions) 
4. Propositions (the DST allows the operator to revert to 
past model versions when required allowing the user to 
make “what – if” tests on his model by adding controls and 
comparing the results with the original model). So the fault 
monitoring DST tool provides continuous feedback and 
suggests new control actions that can be useful while 
provides the capability to test their effect to “what – if“ 
scenarios. Notice that the user is presented with the three 
vulnerability classifications: the good ones are to the left 
(blocked and mitigated threats) and the most troubling 
threats (vulnerabilities) are on the right. The core semantic 
language is OWL, the Web Ontology. 
 Language meaning that the models in the DST must be 
in OWL format. The version of the OWL language is 
OWL2 [7,10]. The support tool is built on JAVA 1.6 and 
SWT 3.738. Most web semantic projects are built on JAVA 
and this is the main reason JAVA is used in systems DST. 
The reasoner has a great role in the DST. The reasoner used 
is Hermit 1.3.5 [12]. There exit also other reasoners were 
used as well { but they were unable to handle real and large 
volumes of data. Though Hermit so far manages well with 
the volume data, a new reasoned is designed in order to 
adapt reasoning to Bayes inference used in the approach,  
Conclusively semantic models have been proved very useful 
in the application area of security and risk management of 
several critical infrastructures including maritime.. The 
conceptual tool presented made this fact clear especially to 
the end users and decision makers 
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4. CONCLUSIONS – FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The concept of stream reasoning is useful for AIS data 
intelligence to improve current limitations. However there  
are still many research challenges. Some of them includes 
the improvement of Behavior Analyzer component using 
appropriate algorithms to convert raw monitoring data from  
AIS into RDF streams improving the knowledge about 
vessels adverse, the threat classifier also should be extended 
to handle different types of classifications, but still defined 
by SWRL rules and to examine the creation of specialized 
classifier that would be faster than general purpose reasoner 
and finally the Bayesian threat likelihood estimator 
implementation should be optimized to reduce processing 
time and abnormal activity hypothesis sampling should take 
account of secondary effects. The performance of the 
conceptual framework in real conditions and the 
implementation of potential improvement is among the 
objectives of future research. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Safety and security are constant concerns of maritime 
navigation, especially when considering the continuous 
growth of maritime traffic around the world and persistent 
decrease of crews on-board. This favored and led to the 
development of automated monitoring systems such as AIS 
(Automatic Identification System).Beyond its position, an 
AIS device also transmits navigation data such as ship 
identification, course, speed, and destination. However, the 
availability of this information does not by itself ensure the 
safety of the maritime traffic. Officers on the watch and 
monitoring authorities require the development of decision-
aid solutions that will take advantage of these 
communication systems. Detection and analysis of 
anomalous events occurring in movement of vessels is a 
crucial asset for improving the security of vessel traffic. 
This paper shows an example of interactive visual analysis 
in which we extract anomalous events from vessel 
trajectories and explore the spatial distribution of these 
events. 
 
Index Terms— Visual Analytics, trajectory analysis, 
event detection, maritime situational awareness, AIS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Safety and security are constant concerns of maritime 
navigation, especially when considering the continuous 
growth of maritime traffic around the world and persistent 
decrease of crews on-board.  This favored and led to the 
development of automated monitoring systems such as AIS 
(Automatic Identification System).  AIS was created in 
order to provide real-time positioning of a vessel to other 
vessels and to shore stations located in its radio range.  The 
International Maritime Organization requires AIS to be 
installed aboard international voyaging ships with gross 
tonnage of 300 or more and all passenger ships regardless of 
the size.  Beyond its position, an AIS device also transmits 
navigation data such as ship identification, course, speed, 
and destination. However, the availability of this 
information does not by itself ensure the safety of the  
 
 
maritime traffic.  Officers on the watch and monitoring 
authorities require the development of decision-aid solutions 
that will take advantage of these communication systems 
[1].  Detection and analysis of anomalous events occurring 
in movement of vessels is a crucial asset for improving the 
security of vessel traffic [2].  The range of possible events of 
interest is very large from collision at sea to illegal fishing 
and illicit activities.  This paper shows an example of 
interactive visual analysis in which we extract anomalous 
events from vessel trajectories and explore the spatial 
distribution of these events.  Our example AIS-collected 
dataset consists of 5,244 trajectories of vessels that moved 
in the bay of Brest (France) in the time period of 313 days 
from the 11th of February till 21st of December, 2009.  The 
data are available not for all days within this time period.  
Due to the large amount of data, we apply spatial 
aggregation.  We combine two approaches to spatial 
aggregation of trajectories: discrete and continuous [3].  
Continuous aggregation [4] can better preserve spatial 
patterns by avoiding indispensable position distortions due 
to space discretization.  However, discrete aggregation 
provides accurate numeric measures of aggregated 
movements. Fig. 1, left, shows the study area and the 
trajectories aggregated into a continuous density surface.  
The density is represented by color variation from light blue 
(low density) through yellow to dark red (high density).  
The expressiveness is enhanced by adding illumination 
effects (hill shading). 
 
2. ANALYSIS EXAMPLE 
 
Our analysis focuses on those vessels that moved through 
the strait (1.8 km length) either into or out of the bay. 
Using an interactive spatial filter, we select 2,411 
trajectories of these vessels. The resulting density map is 
shown on the right of Fig. 1 (the original density map has 
been automatically updated according to the current filter). 
We see that there are two nearly parallel lanes along the 
strait in which the vessels mostly move. 
 In the context of traffic safety analysis, we want to detect 
events when two vessels come too close to each other. 
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Figure 1 The study area and the density of vessel trajectories. Left: all trajectories; right: trajectories going through the strait, 
which are analyzed in the paper.
Instances of close approach may indicate near-collisions but 
also other events of interest, such as tugging, boarding, or 
smuggling. A near-location is commonly known as a 
situation in which a closest point of approach (CPA) 
between two vessels is identified or predicted. 
Different approaches have been so far developed to evaluate 
such situations such as a collision diameter [5] and critical 
situations [6]. 
 Our approach is based on a search of a spatio-temporal 
nearest neighbor for each point in the trajectory of each 
vessel: given the position 𝑝 of the vessel at moment 𝑡, the 
tool determines the positions of all other vessels within the 
time interval [𝑡 − ∆𝑡 , 𝑡 + ∆𝑡], measures the distances from p 
to all these positions, and takes the minimum of the 
distances. Here, ∆𝑡 is a temporal tolerance threshold that 
compensates for possible differences in the time references 
of the position records in different trajectories; we set it to 
30 seconds. Then, we extract those trajectory segments 
where the distance to the nearest neighbor is under 100 
meters (these temporal and spatial thresholds are relatively 
representative of aforementioned events). These extracted 
segments, treated as independent spatio-temporal objects [3, 
7], are further called near-location events. Some of the 
events occurred in the harbor or in areas outside the main 
traffic lanes. By applying spatial filtering to the events, we 
select only those that happened within or near the lanes 
(1,601 events out of 2,237). 
 
 
Figure 2 Left: The traffic through the strait at the times of 
occurrence of the near-location events. Right: The traffic in 
the remaining times. 
 In the second step, we investigate the traffic at the times 
when the near-location events happened in order to detect 
any relevant pattern. The times of event occurrences are 
dispersed over the period of almost a year. To select all time 
intervals containing near-location events and only these 
intervals, we apply a special kind of temporal filter, called 
time mask. In response, only the parts of the trajectories that 
took place within the selected 303 time intervals are 
extracted. The trajectories that happened beyond the 
selected intervals are completely filtered out. There are 681 
trajectories that fully or partly satisfy the combination of the  
spatial filter and time mask filter. The density map is 
automatically updated to show only these trajectories and 
parts (Fig. 2, left). The spatial pattern looks somewhat 
different from that of the overall traffic (Fig. 1 right). To 
better understand the differences, we invert the time mask 
filter and look also at the traffic pattern in the times when 
there were no near-location events (Fig. 2, right). 
The image in Fig. 2, left, differs from that on the right in 
relatively high density of trajectories that switched from one 
lane to another. The occurrences of near-location events 
may be related to this lane switching. 
 
 
Figure 3 Discrete aggregation of the same data subsets as in 
Fig. 2. 
 Applying discrete aggregation (Fig.3) allows us to see 
the directions of the traffic flows and obtain numeric 
information concerning the flow volumes. In Fig. 3, right, 
we see that in the times when no near-locations happened 
the total incoming and outgoing traffic flows are symmetric 
(i.e., have approximately equal volumes). At the times of 
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near-locations (Fig. 3, left), outgoing flows from the Brest 
bay exceed the incoming flows. This is coherent as ships 
often leave together, especially fishing ships, this being not 
often the case when coming back to the harbor. In the 
eastern part of the Brest harbor, we observe especially high 
asymmetry between the incoming and outgoing traffic. 
There were only 65 incoming ships and 202 outgoing, out of 
which 152 switched from the southern to the northern traffic 
lane. The arrow representing the aggregated movement of 
these 152 vessels is highlighted in black in Fig. 3, left. 
 
 
Figure 4 Density of the parts of trajectories where the 
distance to the nearest vessel is under 100 meters. 
 
 In Fig. 4, we applied a filter of trajectory segments[3] to 
select the segments of trajectories where the distances to the 
nearest neighbors were under 100 m. Such segments exist in 
504 trajectories. The density map shows us that a major part 
of these segments are related to lane switching, which 
corresponds to a common trend in maritime navigation. 
 Considering safety reasons and navigation constraints 
(sea currents and depth in the strait), vessels should 
generally move straight within the traffic lanes. To check 
whether it was so, we computed for trajectory positions the 
sinuosity within the time window of 5 minutes (the sinuosity 
is the ratio of the path length to the distance between the 
first and last points). For straight movement, the sinuosity is 
close to 1. From the movements that happened at the times 
of near-locations, we extract events of curved movement 
where the sinuosity was greater than 2. We will call them 
sinuosity events. We exclude the events that occurred within 
the harbor or away from the major traffic flows. 334 
sinuosity events from 187 trajectories occurred in or near 
the major traffic lanes, this being a bad news for traffic 
safety. In Fig. 5, the sinuosity events are represented by 
black dot symbols drawn with high transparency (97%). 
 The detected deviations from straight movement may be 
related to the earlier detected near-location events. Vessels 
might have to deviate from their course in order to avoid 
collisions with other vessels, as required by maritime  
 
Figure 5 Dots represent events of high sinuosity that 
occurred in or near the major traffic lanes. 
navigation rules. We apply filtering of related object sets[3] 
to select, first, those 504 trajectories where the near-location 
events happened and, second, the sinuosity events that 
occurred in these trajectories. We find out that 326 out of 
the 334 sinuosity events occurred in the trajectories that also 
had near-location events. 
 In Fig. 6, we again applied the trajectory segment filter 
to select the parts of the trajectories were the distances to the 
nearest vessels were under 100 meters, as in Fig. 4. For 
these trajectory parts, we have built a weighted density 
surface using the sinuosity values as the weights. This 
means that trajectory segments contribute to the calculated 
densities proportionally to their sinuosity values. We see 
that the highest density of sinuous movements is reached 
inside the strait, mostly in the northern traffic lane, and 
between the strait and the harbor in the southern lane. We 
also see a spot of relatively high density at the harbor in the 
northern lane (a port entrance of 300m width creates a 
bottleneck favoring near-location events). Judging from the 
spatial configuration of the dense area, it has also to do with 
the vessels that moved from the western part of the harbor 
and wanted to go to the southern traffic lane, as well as with 
the passenger ships that travel within the Brest bay. 
Evidently, sinuosity events occurred at the location where 
the flows coming from the western and eastern part of the 
harbor conjoin. Also, relatively high sinuosity was reached 
at the intersection of the two traffic lanes. 
 Hence, we can conclude that the anomalous events can 
be attributed to intersecting traffic flows at the times of 
increased amounts of outgoing traffic from the Brest harbor. 
 
3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Having a large temporally extended set of trajectories, we 
were interested in detecting and analyzing events of 
anomalous movement that may be potentially dangerous to 
the safety of sea traffic, as well as in identifying common 
navigation behaviors. We considered events of two types:  
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Figure 6 Weighted density of the trajectory segments where 
the distances to the nearest vessels are below 100 meters. 
Sinuosity values are used as the weights. 
vessels coming too close to one another (near-locations) and 
sinuous movements in the areas of major traffic flows. We 
applied computational tools to calculate movement 
attributes the values of which might be indicative of such 
events, namely, the distance to the nearest neighbor and the 
path sinuosity within a selected time window. Using an 
interactive query tool, we extracted the events of interest 
based on the values of these attributes. 
 To investigate where and under what traffic conditions 
the extracted events happened, we used a variety of filters 
separately and in combinations. To have an overall view of 
the spatial distribution of the movements and events of 
interest, we used visual spatial summaries (aggregations) in 
the form of continuous density maps and discrete flow 
maps. We have gained the following findings: 
 The near-location events most often occurred at the 
times when the outgoing traffic from the Brest 
harbor exceeded the incoming traffic. 
 A major part of the near-location events happened 
to vessels that moved out of the harbor in the 
southern traffic lane and then switched to the 
northern lane before entering the strait, this 
reflecting some navigation routes predefined in the 
area. 
 The sinuosity events are closely related to the near-
location events. 
 Both types of anomalous events are related to 
intersecting traffic flows between the harbour and 
the strait and, possibly, narrow space and high 
traffic density inside the strait, where the vessels 
need to go in two parallel lanes. 
In our analysis, we used the following types of filtering 
performed by means of interactive tools: 
 Spatial filtering for selecting data within an area of 
interest and for excluding analysis-irrelevant data 
(e.g., events that occurred inside the harbor). 
 Time mask filter, which selects multiple disjoint 
time intervals based on given conditions and 
excludes the remaining time intervals. We used it 
for selecting the times when near-location events 
occurred. 
 Filter of trajectory segments, which selects parts of 
trajectories based on movement attributes, either 
pre-existing or derived, such as the distance to the 
nearest neighbor and path sinuosity in a time 
window. 
 Filter of related object sets, which allowed us to 
select the trajectories in which near-location events 
happened and then the sinuosity events that 
occurred in the selected trajectories. 
This combination of computation-supported extraction of 
features of interest (events), spatial aggregation of data and 
visual representation of the spatial summaries, and 
interactive application and combination of various filters 
allowed us to detect and investigate particular anomalies in 
vessel movement. Similar approaches might be applied to 
identify other maritime navigation events of interests. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses work in progress to estimate port 
locations and operational areas in a scalable, data-driven, 
unsupervised way. Knowing the extent of port areas is an 
important component of larger maritime traffic analysis 
systems that inform stakeholders and decision makers in the 
maritime industry, governmental agencies, and international 
organizations. The proposed approach uses Kernel Density 
Estimator (KDE) and exploits the large volume of 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) data to learn the 
extent of port areas in a data-driven way. Example results 
for the port of La Spezia, Italy, demonstrate the approach for 
real data. 
 
Index Terms— KDE, port location estimation, AIS, 
map reduce, big data 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Mediterranean hosts one of the most complex and dense 
port networks in the world, a gateway to European 
commerce and industry. A recent report published by the 
European Commission calculated that 74% of goods 
imported and exported and 37% of exchanges within the 
European Union transit through the roughly 1200 seaports 
along its 70,000 km of coastline [1, 2]. Decision makers, 
policy advisors, trade partners, security experts, safety 
agencies, international organizations, and vessel operators 
are becoming more reliant on benchmark metrics of port 
activities to carry out their duties. Examples of such metrics 
include maritime and intermodal connectivity indicators, 
volume of cargo throughput, proportion of different types of 
goods transported, and fishing activity indicators. In 
addition, stakeholders are becoming more reliant on 
summary statistics and representative Patterns of Life 
(PoLS) to characterize the ports according to their local and 
regional traffic patterns and operational capabilities. 
 Generating valid and reliable measurements though, is a 
complex task. We often overlook the fact that maritime 
networks operate as “small worlds”, where content and size 
vary over space and time, under the influence of the trade 
and carrier patterns. In particular, port region, port system, 
and port range are spatial entities that evolve over time [3],  
 
 
yet their clear definitions are essential for obtaining accurate 
metrics on port activities. 
 Manually collating and curating port area definitions is 
not a realistic approach: subjective definitions of port areas 
and system maintenance costs make it unreliable and 
infeasible.  Thus, the stepping stone for any useful port 
analysis is an automatic, unsupervised, data-driven approach 
to defining seaport locations and operational boundaries. 
While in the past, sea transport surveillance had suffered 
from a lack of data, current tracking technology such as 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) [4] has transformed 
the problem into one of extracting interpretable information 
from an overabundance of maritime data. This introduces 
the additional requirement that the algorithmic approaches 
must be scalable to big data regimes. 
 The major challenge faced today, is developing the 
ability to identify patterns emerging within these huge 
datasets, fused from a variety of sources and generated from 
monitoring a large number of vessels on a day-to-day basis. 
The extraction of implicit and often unknown information 
from these datasets belongs to the field of data mining and 
data science. Progressively huge amounts of structured and 
unstructured data, tracking vessels during their voyages 
across the seas, have become available. These datasets 
provide detailed insights into the patterns vessels follow, 
while they can operate as benchmarking tools for port 
authorities regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of 
their ports. 
 To address the big data challenge in the maritime 
domain, researchers have developed computational and 
statistical approaches that rely on (AIS) data to 
automatically monitor vessel activities and extract their 
behavioral patterns [5, 6, 7, 8]. Previous work at the NATO 
Science and Technology Organization Centre for Maritime 
Research and Experimentation (STO-CMRE) has explored 
how to extract stationary areas from (AIS) data based on the 
spatial clustering algorithm DBSCAN [9, 10]. Building on 
that initial work, this paper presents work-in-progress to 
estimate port areas in a scalable, unsupervised, data-driven 
way. Instead of DBSCAN, the approach relies on the Kernel 
Density Estimator (KDE) to form density-based estimates of 
port locations and operational areas from the location and 
velocity data contained in the (AIS) messages transmitted by 
the vessels. The approach is scalable because the operations 
underlying (KDE) are decomposable into MapReduce 
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primitives [11, 12], which enables distributing the 
computational load across different computing nodes and 
across distributed storage. 
 
Figure 1 Maritime traffic in the port of La Spezia in a 24-
hour period during August 2015. The ship positions are 
received by CMRE's local AIS receiver. 
 
2. KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATION 
 
Let us assume that xi ϵ R
k
, with 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, are a set of 
observations from a probability density f. Initially 
introduced by Rosenblatt [13], a basic KDE of f has the 
form [14]: 
 
 
where Kh is the kernel function, and h denotes the 
bandwidth (or window width), which is a smoothing 
parameter. The choice of h has a strong influence on the 
estimate, because different values highlight different 
features of the data, depending on the density under 
consideration. The choice of a kernel function, on the other 
hand, is not crucial to the statistical performance, and a 
widely adopted choice is the Gaussian kernel, defined as 
below 
 
 
2.1. Convolution 
 
Apart from a scaling factor, the KDE formula (1) can also 
be seen as a convolution (which we denote with the * 
operator) between the empirical Probability Density 
Function (PDF) and the kernel function [15], that is 
 
 
where 𝜙n is the empirical PDF, expressed as a sum of n 
Dirac delta functions 𝛿(∙)centered in the data samples. A 
computationally efficient variant of this formulation bins the 
data samples into k-dimensional histograms, and convolves 
the histogram with the kernels instead of the individual delta 
functions. This variant is appealing when the data size 
increases, because it produces an essentially identical result 
at a fraction of the computational cost. 
 
2.2. Adaptive KDE 
 
Both the KDE in (1) and the KDE by convolution (3) 
employ a fixed kernel bandwidth for all the observed data 
points. An intuitive improvement is to weight observations 
non uniformly; that is, extreme observations in the tails of 
the distribution should have their mass spread in a broader 
region than those in the body of the distribution. 
Specifically, instead of having a single value for $h$, in the 
adaptive KDE approach hi, for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, is the bandwidth 
of the kernel centered in the i-th observation. 
 The first challenge is how to decide if an observation 
belongs to a region of high or low density. The adaptive 
approach [15] relies in fact on a two-stage procedure: 
combining (1) with (2), a pilot estimate is first computed to 
identify low-density regions coarsely, using a fixed 
bandwidth factor. Since only a coarse idea of how the 
density is distributed in the area of interest, here we can use 
the convolved histogram (3), which comes at a fraction of 
the computational cost required to compute (1). 
 
2.2.1. Local bandwidth factors 
 
Under the assumption that the underlying distribution is k-
variate normal, the optimum (fixed) window can be written 
as [15]: 
 
 
The local bandwidth factors𝜆𝑖, for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛are then given 
by 
 
 
 
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1is the sensitivity parameter and $g$ is the 
geometric mean of the fixed-bandwidth density estimate 
𝑓𝑛(𝒙𝑖) evaluated in the data points 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
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The adaptive KDE of f can be finally expressed as 
 
 
 
3. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS 
 
Let us indicate the full kinematic state of a vessel at a 
generic time with𝝌𝑖 =  [𝑎𝑖 , , 𝑏𝑖 , , 𝑣𝑖]
𝑇 ∈  𝑅3, where a and b 
represent the longitude and latitude coordinates, 
respectively, of the ship in a geographic coordinate system, 
and 𝑣 ≥ 0 is the instantaneous speed of the vessel. We 
introduce also a reduced vessel kinematic state that doesn't 
include the instantaneous speed 𝒙𝑖  =  [𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖] ∈ 𝑅
2.Finally, 
we observe the ship traffic in the neighborhood of a port in 
the time interval [0, 𝑇], where 𝑇 can be hours, days or even 
months, depending on the application. 
 Our objective is to determine the area of the port given 
the set AIS of observations X that can be made up either by 
the full or reduced kinematic states of the ships observed in 
the area of interest. Assuming that the samples X are drawn 
from a probability density function 𝑓, the proposed 
approach consists of applying the KDE to the data samples, 
and determining the port extent using horizontal cuts of the 
resulting estimated probability density function. 
 Unfortunately, the direct computation of the fixed KDE 
(1) is highly inefficient, especially for large or highly 
dimensional data sets. In fact several approaches have been 
proposed in the past to reduce the computational burden [16, 
17, 18]. However, as the data set size and its dimensionality 
increase, even the aforementioned approaches can easily 
become computationally prohibitive and therefore 
distributed approaches are necessary. Zheng et al. [12] have 
recently proposed randomized and deterministic distributed 
algorithms for efficient KDE with quality guarantees, 
adapting them to the popular MapReduce programming 
model. As in [12], our approach is to take advantage of the 
linearity of the KDE to distribute the computation among 
many different nodes using the MapReduce [11] distributed 
programming model. 
 For our purposes, we consider the port as the extended 
location where ships exhibit a very low speed. 
Consequently, there are two possible approaches for 
estimating the density function. The first one is to compute 
the KDE in 𝑅3at a very high computational cost using the 
complete kinematic states 𝝌𝑖 including also the ship speed, 
and then compute the spatial density estimate𝑓?̅?(𝒙)by 
marginalization of 𝑓?̅?(𝝌) 
 
where 𝑣𝑇is the speed threshold that discriminates the 
stationary ships from those under way. 
 The second approach is to form the KDE in 𝑅2 using 
only the positional information 𝒙𝑖 of the ships that can be 
considered stationary. In other words, given the set of all the 
observations, we can build a subset of the positional states 
of only those ships whose speed is below a desired 
threshold 𝑣𝑇 , and compute the KDE on this subset.This 
second approach can be also seen as an approximation to the 
first one that trades some result accuracy for a more 
affordable computational cost. 
 We applied these two approaches and the adaptive KDE 
(7) to the data set shown in Fig. 1, which is made up by all 
the AIS messages received by CMRE's local station during a 
24-hour period in August 2015. The resulting kernel density 
estimates are shown in Fig. 2, where we report: on the left 
side, the fixed-bandwidth KDE computed in𝑅3 using the 
kinematic states𝝌𝑖and marginalized on 𝑣; in the middle and 
on the right side, the fixed-bandwidth and adaptive KDE, 
respectively, both computed in𝑅2 and discarding all 
kinematic states whose instantaneous speed was greater than 
the threshold 𝑣𝑇, that was set, in all three cases, to 1 kn. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
 
Estimating port locations and operational areas is an 
essential component for achieving MSA. The large volume 
of AIS data imposes algorithmic approaches that require 
minimal human intervention and scale with the increasing 
data volumes. The KDE-based approaches presented here 
address these challenges by combining MapReduce with 
fixed or adaptive kernel bandwidths. The results presented 
on the single port of La Spezia could be extended to other 
ports worldwide, and a port analysis platform could be 
developed that learns the port areas worldwide in an 
unsupervised way. The proposed approach can be extended 
to other types of areas besides ports: off-shore platforms, 
anchorage areas, and fishing grounds can be detected 
automatically and their extent estimated in a data-driven, 
unsupervised fashion. 
(6) 
(7) 
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Figure 2 Comparison of kernel density estimates computed with different approaches: fixed bandwidth with 𝒙𝒊 ∈ 𝑹
𝟑(left) 
and 𝒙𝒊 ∈ 𝑹
𝟐 (middle), and adaptive bandwidth with𝒙𝒊 ∈ 𝑹
𝟐. The fixed 𝑹𝟑 version produces the smoothest result, but is 
unable to deal satisfactory with the low-density estimate regions, and has the highest computational cost. The fixed approach 
in 𝑹𝟐is computationally more affordable, but is equally not able to produce satisfactory results in low-density regions. 
Finally, the adaptive KDE in 𝑹𝟐on the right has a higher computational cost than the fixed KDE, but it is the only one that 
produces a spikier estimate on low-density regions. All the three estimates have been computed on the AIS messages 
received by CMRE's local base station in a 24-hour time span during August 2015, shown in Fig 1. The speed threshold that 
discriminates stationary from non-stationary targets is set to 1 knot. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
New processing techniques are being developed to extract 
and highlight anomalous maritime behaviour by leveraging 
the abundance of open source and/or commercially available 
information on a global scale. This common approach to 
data science relies on the exploitation of large datasets 
through methods such as data analytics and data mining. In 
the reverse aspect, one can instead explicitly consider the 
definition and types of anomalies that a maritime security 
operator would desire to know about to derive the quantity 
of data required to achieve a given level of confidence in 
detection. The requirements gap between the available 
information and the desired effect can be identified by 
working the problem of anomaly detection from both ends: 
exploiting the data available, and quantifying the desired 
end state. This work presents a framework for the definition 
of data requirements for a set of operationally relevant 
anomalies. By formally quantifying the data gaps, resource 
investment for additional data can be better directed in order 
to improve operational utility of the dataset. 
 
Index Terms— Maritime, Surveillance, Anomaly 
Detection, Requirements, Fusion, Information, Knowledge. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The quantification of requirements for data which may be 
used for multiple decision-making purposes is a challenging 
task, which is further complicated if there is a wide 
spectrum of available data. First, several concepts and 
definitions are required to describe and conceptualize the 
process from data to decision. This process is described 
herein as a chain of derived utility, building on lower level 
data in order to achieve higher-level awareness, and has 
been previously described using multiple models such the 
Data Fusion Information Group (DFIG) model [1], and the 
Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DIKW) model [2]. 
In this paper, the concepts of data, information, and 
knowledge from the latter model will be adopted, 
acknowledging that the specific definition of each of these 
elements often varies throughout the literature [3]. However, 
it is noted here that there is generally a difference between 
the concepts of data, information, and knowledge; wherein 
information is something of value derived from data, and 
knowledge is a yet higher level cognitive situational 
understanding.  
When considering the practical use of data, while it can 
be argued that more data and, therefore, information is 
desirable, it is not necessarily achievable if the cost to 
extract useful information from the data increases with the 
data volume faster than the actual information value of these 
data. Consideration of these diminishing returns is of crucial 
importance when resource costs are associated with data 
collection. 
Due to the volume and associated costs of both data 
acquisition and data processing, it is highly desirable to 
know what is the right amount of data that will enable 
detection of anomalies with a desired confidence. In other 
words, what is the minimum volume of data that will give 
the operators a minimum desired confidence in their 
surveillance and anomaly detection capabilities? This is the 
question that this paper strives to answer. 
The paper is organized as follows: First, the nature of 
various types of anomalies and the data types and 
information necessary to detect an anomaly are discussed in 
Section 2. Then the detection algorithms are presented in 
Section 3, followed by the description of the quantification 
of the operational requirements in Section 4. Finally, the 
methodology and results are given in Section 5, and a brief 
summary is provided in Section 6.   
 
2. TYPES OF ANOMALIES AND DATA 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
In this section, a review and description of types of 
maritime anomalies is presented with the objective of 
characterizing several fundamental properties of the 
anomalies. It is important to note here that the objective is to 
describe anomalies in the context of the ships
2
 that are being 
described by the data, and not in the data itself, i.e., 
behavioural anomalies vice data anomalies. Maritime 
anomalies are divided here into two categories: kinematic, 
                                                 
2 In the maritime environment, data are most commonly collected on 
surface ships, although data may also include submarines, aircraft, and any 
unmanned forms of the aforementioned vessel types. 
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meaning the anomaly is exhibited in the motion of a ship 
(such as unusual maneuvering); and static, meaning that the 
anomaly is exhibited by the properties of a ship (such as 
with unusual crew or cargo). For the purposes of this paper, 
the data requirements analysis will focus on the ability to 
detect kinematic-type anomalies. 
To be able to detect an anomaly, it is necessary to 
collect both positional data and classification (ship type) or 
identifying (ship name) data. Some information, if not 
directly observed, can be estimated through classical 
statistical filtering and estimation techniques, such as 
Kalman filtering [7]. Previous work on the development of 
maritime anomaly taxonomies [4]-[5], provides a foundation 
for the classification of anomalies herein. The various sub-
types of anomalies are grouped into three general categories. 
Maneuvering: Anomalies that involve the velocity 
vector of a ship, such as an unexpected change of direction, 
stopping or loitering, or travel at a speed unusual given the 
type of ship or area. This includes maneuvering such as 
change of direction inconsistent with expected pattern, or 
change or lack of change of speed (stop/resume inconsistent 
with expected pattern) over time observed. Examples of 
anomalies in maneuver are grab and dash fishing [6] or 
pickup of illicit cargo. 
Location: Anomalies related to where a ship is located, 
which include entering exclusion zones or restricted areas, 
travelling outside of vessel traffic management schemes, or 
travelling outside of normal historical routes. Governments 
can have a variety of reasons to establish restricted areas, for 
example security, environmental, or navigational concerns, 
where vessels are not allowed to enter. Some examples 
include operating: at trawling speed in a closed zone, in 
proximity to critical infrastructure, in a closed zone, in non-
navigable waters, or in a zone inconsistent with the claimed 
activity for the given ship type. 
Interaction: Anomalies related to the unusual or illicit 
interaction between ships or with other infrastructure. 
Examples could include ship rendezvous in both open-ocean 
and littoral waters. While there are potentially benign 
reasons for ships to rendezvous at sea, it is a fairly rare 
activity that could indicate illegal cross-transfer of resources 
or personnel. Requirements for detecting rendezvous could 
vary in the cluttered and more disordered littoral waters 
versus open-ocean. 
 
3. DETECTION OF ANOMALIES 
 
Since there are many techniques described in the literature 
for maritime anomaly detection [8], it is vital to consider the 
performance and efficiency of the algorithm used 
operationally. This leads to the question of where to invest 
additional resources: should one invest in improving the 
computational performance to detect anomalies using less 
data or information, or should one invest in additional 
sensors to collect more data to facilitate the anomaly 
detection. Since the objective of the framework is to be 
agnostic with regards to the type of processing that is being 
used to detect the anomaly, the description of how to detect 
the anomaly is presented from a fundamentals of detection 
perspective.   
Given a model for an anomaly one wishes to detect, 
numerous sequential testing algorithms exist in the literature 
which can be applied to test against an anomaly hypothesis. 
It has been reported that good performance for target 
maneuver detection (a type of anomaly) is achieved using 
the classical cumulative sum algorithm first described by 
Page [9], and the Shiryayev Sequential Probability Ratio 
Test algorithm [10]. 
The set of data requirements for real-time anomaly 
detection is not directly investigated in this paper. 
Nonetheless, it is expected that the requirements for real-
time detection versus batch mode will be similar but with 
added constraints due to the timeliness (latency) of the data, 
and the effect of out-of-sequence observations. 
For detections that are not time-critical, such as 
regulatory enforcement or generation of intelligence cues, a 
batch mode processing approach can be used. Some 
examples of anomalies which are suitable for batch mode 
processing include: the detection of ships which have left an 
oil slick, or detecting ships which have entered an 
environmental exclusion zone. Additionally, latency in the 
reception of the data and out-of-sequence observations have 
minimal impact on the ability to detect anomalies in batch 
mode. For each of the three main categories of anomalies 
identified in Section 2, a model is created to describe the 
kinematics of the anomaly in the following subsections.  
 
3.1. Detection of a ship stopping and loitering 
 
The model for detecting a ship which stops, loiters, and 
resumes course is illustrated in Figure 1 as model I. This 
same model can be applied to the change of course anomaly 
if the magnitude of course change is large, which is 
reasonable since a small change of course is difficult to 
declare as anomalous given that course changes are normal 
events for ships, depending on the area they are in. The 
anomalous pattern is shown in the upper set of arrows. A 
ship at point a is moving at some initial velocity vi and 
decelerates to a stop at point b. The ship loiters at point b 
for a time period tstopped, and then accelerates at aship to 
maximum velocity vmax to point c, travelling to point d at 
vmax until resuming normal speed at point e. The non-
anomalous route is shown below, where the ship moves 
from point a to e, maintaining constant velocity vi. 
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Figure 1 Diagram of model I. 
Instead of describing the ability to positively detect this 
maneuver, the approach proposed here is to identify when it 
would not be possible to detect the maneuver. The primary 
driver for non-detection is if there are no observations of the 
ship in the time between points a and e. Then, given a 
specific time between detections, one can calculate 
(assuming vi, vmax and aship) the maximum time (tstopped) 
which would not be detectable. 
 
3.2. Detection of a ship entering/crossing exclusion zone 
 
The model for detecting a ship which enters and then leaves 
an exclusion zone is illustrated in Figure 2 as model II. A 
ship starts from point a some distance di from an exclusion 
zone travelling at some initial velocity vi. The ship enters 
the exclusion zone at point b, and stops for some length of 
time (tstopped) before accelerating at aship to leave the 
exclusion zone at point c. As in the previous model, given a 
specific time between detections, one can calculate the 
maximum time which would not be detectable. 
 
Figure 2 Diagram of model II. 
3.3. Detection of the rendezvous of two ships 
 
The model for detecting a rendezvous between two ships of 
similar capability is illustrated in Figure 3 as model III. The 
anomalous pattern is shown by the interaction of the two 
arrows’ paths (non-anomalous behaviour would be for the 
two ships to continue on a straight path with no change in 
speed or proximity – not shown here). A ship at point a1 is 
moving at some initial velocity vi and decelerates to a stop 
at point b. A ship at point a2, which is moving at the same 
initial velocity vi, decelerates to a stop at the same point. 
The ships loiter at point b for a time period tstopped, and then 
accelerate at aship to maximum velocity vmax to point c, 
travelling to point d until resuming normal speed at point e.  
 
Figure 3 Diagram of model III. 
This is similar to model I, but involves the ability to detect 
two ships at the same time and confirm their proximity at 
point b. Then, given a specific time between detections, one 
can calculate (knowing vi, vmax and aship for each ship), the 
maximum tstopped which would not be detectable. 
 
4. QUANTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS 
 
This section presents the metric for ship inter-detection 
times in a data feed against which required standards of 
performance can be established. The required standards for 
this metric will be established by considering a simulated 
nominal data stream, and then evaluating these metrics 
against the models presented in Section 3. Other metrics 
which could be considered include quantity and latency.   
The concept of data quantity, as measured by the 
combination of unique vessels to be detected, and the 
number of detections achieved on each of those vessels is 
somewhat related to the inter-detection metric. Data latency 
a major concern for decision-makers as they have to be able 
to know that they are acting on up-to-date information to be 
able to form an appropriate response with the assets they 
have available. As previously mentioned in 3.1, latency 
primarily impacts real-time detection but not historical 
batch-mode.  
 
4.1. Inter-detection times 
 
The refresh rate of data on a unique vessel is defined here as 
the inter-detection time. Over the collected dataset, there is a 
distribution associated with the refresh rates for all vessels. 
For example, the probability of achieving a given inter-
detection time for satellite-based Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) dataset derived from a constellation of 8 
satellites is illustrated in Figure 4. The top figure shows a 10 
hour timespan, and the bottom shows a 300 second 
timespan.  Periodic spikes observed in the data are due to 
the fixed transmission intervals of AIS for varying ship 
maneuvering states [11]. The most common transmission 
rates are 2, 6 and 10 seconds, and so one observes 
harmonics these times, with the most prominent at 10 
second intervals. The inter-detection time envelope for this 
distribution, however, is representative of the sensor 
system’s ability to re-detect ships.  
To model the shape of this envelope, one can look 
to the theory in reliability engineering [12]. The likelihood 
of any given inter-detection time will have a non-uniform 
distribution, with a potentially long tail (increasingly long 
for low performance sensors requiring multiple looks or 
integration time), with some most likely detection time 
(approximately 6 seconds in the case of AIS). The 
probability distribution in Figure 4 for inter-detection times 
shows a good fit with a log-logistic function. Similar to 
latency, a minimum threshold value with a confidence 
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interval is necessary to ensure that the data requirements are 
being met for the majority of the data. 
A hypothetical sensor system can then be modelled using 
the log-logistic distribution by choosing the shape 
parameters such that the mean of the distribution is equal to 
some objective value. This is a straightforward task since 
the log-logistic distribution is well described in closed form. 
 
Figure 4 Log-logistic model for the inter-detection times of 
satellite-based AIS detections over two time frames. 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
The data requirements for the three types of kinematic 
anomalies are presented. Note here that the metrics have 
been applied to positional data, which are common to all 
anomaly types discussed. Also note that sensor false alarm 
rates, depending on the performance of the data fusion 
process, will also impact the data requirements. These 
results, however, are still widely applicable to maritime 
surveillance data from sources such as AIS. 
 
5.1. Detection under models I, III, and III 
 
In Figure 5, each subfigure consists of data for a total of 5 
million Monte Carlo (MC) simulation runs consisting of 
100,000 iterations for each of 50 distribution shapes chosen 
by varying the mean inter-detection time. The upper plot in 
each figure pair presents the distribution of the occurrences 
where the anomaly could not be detected (tstopped) in the y-
axis for an inter-detection time with a mean shown in the x-
axis. The lower plot presents the same information, but with 
the x-axis being the 95
th
 percentile for data in the log-
logistic sensor model inter-detection times. The curves 
represent the frequency of occurrence where the anomaly 
would not be detectable in 99.7%, 95%, on average, or in 
50% of the MC evaluations. The visible blip on the on the 
right end of the figures (most visible for the 50% line) is due 
to the relatively small quantity of runs that populated that 
region of the results.  
 
 
(a) Model I 
 
(b) Model II, di=20 nautical miles 
 
(c) Model III 
Figure 5 Plot of simulated bounds as a function of inter-
detection time distribution. 
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5.2. Joint requirements 
 
For each of the models presented in Figure 5, the maximum 
undetected time (worst case) is selected for each MC run 
and plotted in Figure 6. This represents the requirements to 
achieve detection of all three anomalies investigated. Given 
some operational requirements, such as being able to detect 
a ship which is loitering for longer than Ts hours, being able 
to detect a ship spending longer than Tz hours in an 
exclusion zone, or to detect a potential rendezvous which 
lasted longer than Tr hours, one can extract the minimum 
required inter-detection times. By choosing a desired level 
of detection, the corresponding acceptable mean and upper 
tail for a required sensor performance can be directly chosen 
(x-axes) from the upper and lower plot in the figure pair. For 
example, given an objective of the maximum Ts, Tz, or Tr 
being 1 hour, for 95% of inter-detection times, then the 
mean time between updates must be less than 28 minutes, 
and no more than 5% of updates should exceed 80 minutes. 
 
 
Figure 6 Combined simulated bounds for models I-III. 
 
6. SUMMARY 
 
A framework for quantifying data requirements based on 
operational processes has been presented. This method 
enables identification of operational requirements for data 
acquisition in a robust, objective, and repeatable manner. 
Notably, it supports the optimization of the quantity of data 
to meet operator requirements under constraints, thereby 
preventing over-expenditure in procurement costs while 
maximizing operational benefits. The results, when 
considered in comparison to the data being collected, can 
also be used to identify if there are any gaps in data 
collection, which can then be directed to the investment of 
additional data collection resources. In addition, this 
approach helps to identify the confidence level that the 
operators can achieve in the anomaly detections, and thus 
provides an indicator of the associated risks.  
Future work includes investigation of real-time 
anomaly detection requirements, and the formalization of 
the data and information requirements process which can be 
generally applied for tasks such as the procurement of data 
and information. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This work reports on the design of a Maritime Use Case in 
support to the Big Data Analytics for Time Critical Mobility 
Forecasting (datAcron) project funded by the European 
Union Horizon 2020 Programme, which aims to develop 
novel methods to detect threats and abnormal activity 
among a very large number of moving entities in large aerial 
and maritime areas. The use case aligns with the European 
Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and both 
scientists and operational partners participated in its design. 
It focuses on the monitoring of fishing activities, which 
encompass several maritime scenarios such as preventing 
environmental destruction and degradation, maritime 
accidents, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) 
fishing, Illegal migrations, as well as suspicious vessel 
tracking. 
 
Index Terms— Big spatio-temporal data, Maritime 
Moving Objects, Maritime Situational Awareness, Vessel 
Trajectories, Fishing Use case 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Reaching appropriate Maritime Situation Awareness (MSA) 
for the decision maker requires monitoring the real time 
maritime traffic and assessing it against contextual 
information such as maritime routes or loitering areas 
inferred from the analysis of historical data (e.g., [1]). This 
requires not only detecting, tracking and classifying vessels 
but also detecting, classifying and predicting their 
behaviour.  
Sensor networks mixing cooperative self-identification 
systems (e.g., Automatic Identification System - AIS) and 
non-cooperative systems (e.g., coastal radars or satellite 
imagery) provide the necessary complementarity and 
redundancy of information to help overcome signals 
deception (e.g., GPS manipulation and spoofing are frequent 
for AIS [2]) in order to increase the clarity and accuracy of 
the maritime picture. In many cases, intelligence reports or 
expert opinions can also be helpful in refining and guiding 
the search in the huge amount of data to be processed, 
filtered and analysed, as well as representing the contextual 
information for decision support systems in MSA 
applications [3]. 
Facing the huge volumeof various information with high 
velocity which often lacks veracity, a system to 
automatically process both historical and timely information 
would greatly support the Vessel Traffic System (VTS) 
operator such as the in monitoring and analysis tasks. This is 
the aim of the three-year Big Data Analytics for Time 
Critical Mobility Forecasting (datAcron) project
3
 that has 
started in January 2016 and  whose main research objectives 
address the development of highly scalable methods for 
advancing:  
Obj.1 Spatio-temporal data integration and management 
solutions;  
Obj.2 Real-time detection and forecasting accuracy of 
moving entities' trajectories; 
Obj.3 Real-time recognition and prediction of important 
events concerning these entities; 
Obj.4 General visual analytics infrastructure supporting all 
steps of the analysis through appropriate interactive 
visualisations; 
Obj.5 Producing streaming data synopses at a high-rate of 
compression. 
datAcron addresses two critical domains: maritime and 
aerial traffic, which will guide the research and development 
and will drive the assessment of the datAcron approach.   
In this paper, we present the maritime use case of 
datAcron, which describes possible operational uses of 
datAcron for Fishing Activity Monitoring focusing on 
relevant practical challenges and operational questions. It 
emphasises a human-centric automatic processing of data, 
stressing the role of the user (or decision maker) in his/her 
interaction with the system.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the 
methodology adopted to develop the use case is presented. 
In particular, the use case requirements and how the use 
case is aligned with the datAcron  objectives and challenges 
are described. In Section 3, the fishing monitoring use case 
and six operative scenarios are described, discussing the 
operational relevance of datAcron and how user and  
operative information needs are formalised through a list of 
relevant Maritime Situational Indicators (MSIs). In Section 
4, the use case driven validation and assessment of 
                                                 
3
 datAcron project website: http://www.datacron-project.eu 
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datAcronis also presented. Finally, Section 5 concludes the 
paper highlighting future directions. 
 
2. USE CASE DESIGN 
 
The methodology used to develop the use case described 
herein relies on the previous experience of some of the 
authors, where use cases were designed to support 
collaborative research project on context-based reasoning in 
high-level information fusion [4, 5], and adopts the 
definition of use case given by McBreen et al. in [6], where 
a use case describes the interaction of a user with a system 
to be designed, to achieve a specific goal or accomplish a 
specific task. The system requirements can then be derived 
enabling the user to achieve his/her objectives in different 
scenarios. The scenarios illustrate different usages of the 
system, and eventually define success (if the goal is 
achieved) or failure (if the goal is not achieved).  
The resulting use case provides a tool to address different 
aspects of a large research problem, describing users’ needs, 
operational problems and underlying challenges. Illustrating 
research findings on a common use case, sharing the same 
datasets, and utilising outputs from other teams are all 
benefits of having an integrated picture of the general 
research problem. 
As such, the datAcron use case has to satisfy the 
following requirements, which drove the design of the use 
case:  
Req.1Address challenging problems deemed of interest for 
the maritime operational community in general; 
Req.2 Be aligned with the European Union maritime 
policies and needs in particular; 
Req.3Be aligned with datAcron research objectives and 
expected outcomes such that the use case challenges the 
datAcron's technical solutions to be developed, while 
accommodating the research interests of the different 
partners;  
Req.4Describe the problem in a simple way as a kind of 
“skeleton”, flexible enough to allow further evolution and 
developments as possibly requested by partners' interests; 
Req.5Provide the necessary information to understand the 
user's goal, from which the corresponding sub-goals, 
associated levels of granularity required, the information 
needs and the desired output quality can be deduced; 
Req.6Act as an ``integrator'' for the different aspects to be 
pursued so that teams can illustrate their findings within a 
common story; 
Req.7Provide a background and support for close 
interactions between the different work packages and teams 
involved with the team in charge of the maritime use case; 
Req.8Rely on the available datasets (unclassified, shareable) 
among the teams and others of interest in the research 
community (e.g., AIS data, radar datasets, databases of past 
events, intelligence reports, etc). 
 
Figure 1 Methodology for the maritime use case 
development 
The diagram displayed in Fig. 1 illustrates the idea 
behind the methodology. The datAcron objectives (cf. Obj.1 
to Obj.5 in the previous Section) describe the general goals 
for the algorithms to be designed. They involve several 
underlying challenges and may drive specific research foci 
of interest for the project partners.  
In particular, the design of systems supporting an 
enhanced MSA needs to tackle Big Data challenges: it 
requires processing in real-time a voluminous and high  
velocity information of different nature (numerical, natural 
language statements, objective or subjective assessments, 
…), originating from a variety of sources (sensors and 
humans - hard and soft), which often lacks veracity (data are 
either uncertain, or imprecise, vague, ambiguous, 
incomplete, conflicting, incorrect).  
The datAcron Maritime Use Case comprises multiple 
scenarios that describe how actors in the use case perform a 
set of operations in order to achieve a specific goal. 
Scenarios describe the current operations that will serve as a 
basis for understanding and validating the datAcron 
technology, while demonstrating how it can be effectively 
used in the maritime domain. 
The collaboration with the operational partners ensures 
that the use case is operationally relevant. In particular, the 
use case describes the general context of use of datAcron 
algorithms. The operational information needs are captured 
by relevant Maritime Situational Indicators (MSI), which 
formalise events of interest for the operator and the 
information required to detect them (cf. Table 1 in the next 
Section). Operational performance criteria will need to be 
defined to specify user expectations and to drive the 
assessment of the datAcron prototype, closely tying the 
experimental plan to the use case development (cf. Section 
4). The use case requirements (Req.1-Req.8) may also be 
used as qualitative system performance metrics, while, at the 
implementation level, they may act as result validation 
measures. 
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3. MONITORING FISHING ACTIVITIES 
 
The datAcron Maritime Use Case focuses on fishing activity 
monitoring, which is a complex maritime surveillance 
mission that encompasses several maritime risks and 
environmental issues such as environmental destruction and 
degradation but also maritime accidents, Illegal, Unreported, 
and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and trafficking problems, 
which will be addressed in different scenarios. 
 Ensuring security and control of fishing activities is one 
of the most important aspect of the European Union 
Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) - Action Plan
4
, 
published in December 2014}, which defines several 
strategic interests for the European Union and the Member 
States in terms of maritime security. Europe, as the world's 
biggest market for seafood wants to promote better 
international governance across the world's seas and oceans 
to keep them clean, safe and secure. Since fishing is an 
activity that exploits common natural resources, it needs to 
be regulated to safeguard fair access, sustainability and 
profitability for all. 
 In particular, IUU fishing is a global threat to the marine 
environment and honest fishermen alike, whose global cost 
is estimated in about 10 Billion Euros per year. The 
European Union, in collaboration with International 
organisations, is committed to fighting IUU fishing 
worldwide.  
 Besides the detection of IUU fishing activities, another 
core issue of the EUMSS is safety. Fishing, in peace 
situation, is known as one of most dangerous activity. An 
issue here is that fishing vessels are intentionally switching 
off their AIS devices while fishing. Therefore, ensuring 
fishing safety requires processing and predicting fishing 
trajectories in real-time, detecting fishing events, identifying 
movement patterns, predicting possible collisions between 
surrounding ships, within a typical time scale of 5 to 15 
minutes.  
 datAcronwill support the European Union's control and 
enforcement strategy, providing the necessary scientific 
support for processing, analysis and visualisation of fishing 
vessels at the European scale, together with the capability of 
predicting the movement of maritime objects and the 
identification of patterns of movement and navigational 
events that shall improve existing solutions to monitor the 
compliance to the European common fisheries policy. 
 In order to support datAcron's challenges within the 
fishing monitoring use case six scenarios have been 
considered.   
                                                 
4
 EUMSS Action Plan:http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-
security/doc/20141216-action-plan_en.pdf 
All scenarios highlight the need for continuous (real-time) 
tracking of fishing vessels and surrounding traffic, as well as 
contextually enhanced offline data analytics.  They have 
been elaborated in order to stress datAcron's algorithms in 
terms of velocity, veracity, variety and volume. They should 
provide a complete support for trajectory and event 
detection, prediction and visualisation. For each scenario, 
the user information needs are expressed through a 
corresponding list of MSIs. In Table 1, scenarios are 
summarised with corresponding objectives, possible actions, 
and example MSIs.  
 
 
Figure 2 Operational flow of the Maritime Use Case 
 The MSIs defined for fishing monitoring in datAcron 
formalise the events of interest for the use case, capture the 
required information while formalising the goals of 
datAcron algorithms and driving the analysis. The list of the 
MSIs used in datAcron is extracted  from the outcomes of 
different workshops held in Sweden [7], Canada [8] and a 
recently updated NATO standard [9], abstracted to address 
datAcron needs. Specifically, the MSIs have been filtered 
out considering only (1) the MSIs thatdatAcron can provide, 
(2) the MSIs that are relevant to the fishing monitoring 
scenarios.  
 The conceptual diagram in Fig. 2 illustrates the 
operational flow and the interaction of the datAcron 
software in the fishing monitoring use case. Depending on 
the scenario, the user may accomplish different tasks (i.e., 
monitoring, detecting or preventing the events described by 
the scenario), and may express his/her information needs 
through a list of MSIs of interest at a given time. He/she 
selects the appropriate algorithms and parametrises them 
accordingly to run the analysis. He/she is able to observe 
results of the selected algorithms using the visualisation 
tools and additional visual analytics, allowing to refine the 
analysis varying the parameters of the MSIs (e.g. change the 
areas of interest, speed thresholds). 
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Table 1 Scenarios objectives, user’s role and actions, MSI
4. VALIDATION AND ASSESSMENT 
 
The quality of the maritime picture can be assessed 
according to the five criteria of Completeness (ratio of 
detected indicators), Accuracy (ratio of correctly detected or 
classified indicators), Clarity (confidence degree about the 
detection or classification of indicators), Continuity (if these 
detections or classifications are maintained in time) and 
Timeliness (time to obtain the detection or classification 
result).  Each criterion may be defined relatively to a given 
area, a given period of time, and a given MSI. Hence, for a 
given scenario, the user expects datAcron algorithms to 
provide answers to the relevant MSIs with a quality defined 
by these five dimensions. The user chooses the MSIs to 
detect the scenario-related events (collision, vessel in 
distress, smuggling, etc). Another layer of performance 
criteria is related to human factor tasks while dealing with 
scenario-events. 
 Fig. 3 illustrates the two levels of assessment of 
datAcron: the MSI level and the scenario level. The 
datAcron algorithms will be evaluated along both the 
operational and technical criteria (some may overlap). The 
data would be degraded to study the impact of the different 
Big Data dimensions on the algorithms outputs. The datasets 
would be controlled to provide some ground truth 
information to be able to assess some robustness to the  
veracity of data. The volume and velocity of data will vary to 
observe the impact on the timeliness of the algorithms. The 
variety of the data would vary depending on the sources 
selected to feed the algorithms. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, the design of the fishing activity monitoring 
use case of the H2020 project datAcronhas been presented. 
The use case addresses operative scenarios of interest for the 
European Union Maritime Security Strategy as well as Big 
Data challenges.  
The use case will be a bridge between the operational and 
the scientific communities, will facilitate collaborative 
research work among the different project partners and work 
packages, and will drive the integration the different work 
package contributions. Future work will address the design 
of the experimental, which will rely on the maritime use 
case and associated datasets to structure the assessment and 
validation of datAcron algorithms and prototype. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 (a) MSI level assessment 
 
Figure 3 (b) Scenario level assessment 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper presents a situational analysis model for maritime 
anomaly detection in which we study the role of context and 
the impact of the imperfection of information in detecting 
vessel’s deviation from destination. The focus is on the 
exploitation of non-kinematic information, contextual 
information in the form of previously extracted routes, and 
the predicted kinematic features as outputs of a vessel 
tracking algorithm. An uncertainty graphical model example 
is designed manually to represent expert knowledge and 
measurement uncertainty. The evaluation of the situation is 
performed in terms of availability and variability of 
contextual information, and in terms of reliability (i.e. 
observability and correctness) of non-kinematic information. 
The results of the analysis show benefits of using the 
position prediction algorithm, confirm the advantage of 
using routes as contextual information, and highlight the 
characteristics of AIS data in detecting the considered 
anomaly. These results facilitate the requirements and 
design specifications for the development of an efficient 
system for maritime anomaly detection. 
 
Index Terms— situation analysis, maritime anomaly 
detection, deviation from destination, AIS, uncertainty 
graphical models 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Maritime situation awareness (MSA) requires the process of 
maritime situation analysis (SA) [1] commonly by 
maintaining the recognized maritime picture (RMP), which 
is compiled at different fusion levels from data acquired 
from possibly multiple heterogeneous sources. Its 
completeness and hence the MSA depend on the 
effectiveness of the approaches used for assessing the states 
of maritime situational items and their relationships with the 
ultimate goal to alert decision makers about potential threat 
and anomalous behaviour of vessels. 
 Vessel's anomalous behaviour is often described as a 
deviation of some traffic characteristic from normal trend 
which can be short-lived and rare event. It may be 
accidental and innocuous (e.g. stopping due to vessel 
failure, sailing at low speed due to bad weather conditions) 
or deliberate and harmful (e.g. vessels' rendezvous for 
illegal trafficking, oil spilling, or sailing off-route). In [2] 
several taxonomies of maritime anomalies are presented. 
One such anomaly is the ship's deviation from destination, 
which may be an indicator of illicit activity or distress. This 
anomaly is also of interest to the marine insurance industry 
since the policies of insurance, on both vessel and its cargo, 
would be void in the case of any deviation from the direct 
course and the destination of the voyage without necessity 
[3].  
 The significant challenges for compilation of the 
complete RMP are the volume and the imperfect nature of 
data to be processed under time-critical conditions. With the 
advancement of the coastal and satellite-based AIS, the 
internationally standardized cooperative vessel self-
reporting system, there are an abundance of data to be 
processed in order to extract the knowledge about vessels' 
tracks and their behaviours, since ships using Automated 
Identification System (AIS) transponders automatically and 
continually transmit up-to-date navigational data. These 
include non-changing data such as ship's name, IMO and 
MMSI numbers, and length, which are also called “static” 
data, dynamic data such as current position, speed and 
course over ground (SOG and COG), rate of turn (ROT), 
and ”voyage-related” data, which include destination (or 
next port of call (NPOC)), estimated time of arrival (ETA) 
and draught. The dynamic data are taken from the ship's 
own data being used for navigation. Position, SOG and 
COG are commonly taken from the ship's Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNNS) such as GPS or 
GLONASS. However, despite their availability and large 
available volumes, AIS data are characterized to a great 
degree with uncertainty [4, 5]. In particular, the voyage 
related and static information may be incorrect, conflicting 
or missing due to remote spoofing or deliberate 
manipulation of the AIS unit on-board, among which 
obscuring the final destination in the AIS transmissions is 
one of the most common. With only 41% of vessels globally 
reporting their destinations, it is suggested that this lack of 
data could skew views of commodity flows worldwide [4]. 
Moreover, at open seas or at the border of exclusive 
economic zones (200nm off-shore), AIS data may be sparse 
or arrive hours after the observations due to either low 
coverage or to multi-level processing issues. Hence, crucial 
to an improved MSA is the ability of the maritime 
Maritime Knowledge Discovery and Anomaly Detection Workshop, 5-6 July 2016 
63 
 
surveillance system to compensate for poor quality of AIS 
data, their latency or variable temporal resolution by 
appropriate modelling of uncertainty. 
 Furthermore, maritime SA requires assessing and 
characterizing vessels’ states and their relationships within a 
specific context. An appropriate consideration of contextual 
information is expected to provide the maritime surveillance 
system for decision support the necessary modularity and 
flexibility to adapt to the user’s needs and limitations of 
sources. Formally, context can be defined as the events or 
circumstances that form (Context-of-X) or influence 
(Context-for-X) the environment, within which something 
exists or takes place, and where X represents any physical or 
conceptual entity and event of interest, [6]. The selection 
and representation of contextual variables at various times 
and levels of details establish the context for reasoning 
about a surveillance picture relevant to a specific decision 
maker. In the maritime domain, contextual variables may 
include physical contextual information directly related to 
the zones of interest (e.g. restricted or fishing areas, borders, 
harbours, shipping lanes), the previously identified traffic 
patterns (e.g. routes), the environmental context (e.g. sea 
conditions, weather) as well as the geopolitical context [7]. 
The estimated current or predicted future vessel kinematic 
or behavioral features provided by a model based tracking 
algorithm are also expected to be helpful. 
 
1.1. Previous Work and Contribution 
 
Previous works on extracting knowledge about motion 
patterns from the AIS data in support to maritime 
surveillance include numerous methods for supervised and 
non-supervised clustering to other data mining techniques 
[8, 9, 10]. Their use in maritime anomaly detection can be 
found, for example in [11], where they have been used as 
normalcy model, and in [12], where the extracted routes 
have been incorporated as contextual information in the 
form “context-for-X”. Here, as in [12], we make use of the 
identified traffic patterns from the historical AIS data, the 
so-called ``routes'' as the outputs of the CMRE TREAD tool 
[10] for representing the contextual information in the 
reasoning model about the considered maritime anomaly. 
However here, we focus on the “context-of-X” or the 
additional maritime situational elements in the form of 
routes which add hypotheses in the chosen uncertainty 
modelling framework. Additionally, besides kinematic AIS 
information, we make use of non-kinematic information 
from the field NPOC as well as the outputs of the tracking 
and prediction algorithm from [13] in reasoning about the 
maritime anomaly. In particular, we study the impact of the 
imperfection of information and availability and variability 
of contextual information on the reasoning under 
uncertainty in the problem of detection of a vessel's 
deviation from destination within a probabilistic graphical 
model for representing and managing uncertainty of AIS 
data. 
 
2. DETECTION OF DEVIATION FROM 
DESTINATION 
 
Graphical models for uncertainty representation and 
modelling in maritime situation analysis provide means for 
structuring knowledge and propagating new information, 
while managing the uncertainty and complexity of relations. 
This approach also facilitates the requirements and design 
specifications for the development of both an efficient 
model and data driven system for maritime anomaly 
detection by enabling inference from noisy and ambiguous 
measurements and their coherent global interpretation while 
also taking into account their spatio-temporal context, and 
domain-specific contextual knowledge. 
 In our implementation of the graphical model example 
we use a probabilistic graphical model, the Bayesian 
network. For a given area of interest (AOI) and a given time 
period of interest, it is assumed that there is a collection of 
AIS data from which we consider both kinematic and non-
kinematic (i.e. voyage-related) information from AIS class 
A unit: longitude, latitude, COG, SOG, NPOC, and ETA. 
For the considered AOI, there exist information about 
previously identified traffic patterns, the routes between 
ports. Furthermore, it is assumed that the tracking algorithm 
is part of our surveillance system which outputs the 
estimated destination ?̂? and the estimated time of arrival 
𝐸𝑇?̂? according to the specific motion model, the 
observation model, the data and the filtering algorithm from 
[13]. All these comprise the network input nodes. From all 
identified routes in the area by TREAD, we consider those 
which have the exit points (i.e. the physical ports) equal to 
the NPOC and those with the exit points equal to the 
estimated destination. The term destination may indicate 
three different entities: the NPOC field in the AIS message, 
the physical port in the area, also being the exit point of the 
route taken, and the predicted destination according to the 
vessel's kinematic features at a given time instant. 
According to the domain expert knowledge the existence of 
the considered anomaly may be influenced by several 
events: i) any inconsistency between the information in the 
NPOC field in the AIS message and the course, the sailing 
route information (i.e. the exit point of the route) and/or 
estimated destination ?̂? by the algorithm, ii) missing NPOC 
information, iii) as the increase or decrease in the sailing 
distance calculated as the difference between the destination 
location and the current location, iv) position relative to the 
route for which the exit point is the estimated destination 
(e.g. sailing along that route or not); the chosen routes may 
vary depending on the inconsistency with the NPOC and the 
route length, or predicted destination and the route length, 
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and v) the level of the course change if off or on route to 
destination. The graphical model is designed so as to capture 
and encode this knowledge within the created nodes 
Distance From Destination, Course Change, and Route To 
NPOC which are used to test the above mentioned 
inconsistencies. The time slice of the Bayesian network, 
depicted in Fig. 1, illustrates the concept for reasoning about 
the presence of deviation from destination. The possible 
states and corresponding prior conditional probability 
distributions (CPDs) for each created node are defined based 
on the expert knowledge. The node Distance From 
Destination contains the states: increasing, decreasing, not-
changing. The destination is by default taken as NPOC, 
while the predicted destination ?̂? calculated on the basis of 
the current motion features is used if NPOC information is 
missing. The node Course Change can have three states: 
small, moderate and large, while the node Route To NPOC 
has two states: onRoute and offRoute, where onRoute 
designates being on the route of which the exit point is the 
destination. The states onRoute and offRoute depend on a 
user defined distance threshold for the current position 
relative to the route. The choice of route from all the routes 
of interest may vary with respect to inconsistency with ETA 
and remaining time on the route and the predicted ETA.
 
Figure 1 The model 
Probability updating in the model is done using the chain 
rule to calculate the joint probability table of the universe 𝑈  
of variables (i.e. all node variables in BN), where d-
separation property used to avoid using the full table, i.e. 
 
for 𝐴 ∈ 𝑈, and where {𝐞1, … , 𝐞m} are findings on 𝐴, and 𝑝𝑎 
denote graphical model potentials, which in BNs are the 
CPD tables [14]. 
 
2.1. Results 
 
To evaluate the impact of contextual and non-kinematic 
information on the inference about the considered anomaly, 
the Bayesian network is implemented using GeNie
5
, the 
open source application developed by the Decision Systems 
Laboratory, University of Pittsburgh. This evaluation, for 
two time slices, is carried out with respect to the availability 
and the correctness of NPOC only (not ETA), the 
availability and the variability of route information, and the 
availability of information about the predicted destination 
by the tracking algorithm for the situation in which the 
deviation of the destination exists. We assume that there are 
two possible port destinations, Genoa (correct destination) 
and Livorno, for which the position coordinates in (lon, lat) 
are known from the World Port Index table [15]. The results 
are summarized in Table 1. The first set of results 
corresponds to the analysis with no input from the tracking 
algorithm. For example, assuming that we have the evidence 
𝑒 = {𝑁𝑃𝑂𝐶 =  𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑜, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 =  𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑎𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑎}, 𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛|𝑒) is 
calculated by marginalizing the remaining node variables 
using the variable elimination method: start with the set of 
CPD tables S, and when marginalizing a node variable 𝐴, 
select all the CPD tables with 𝐴, calculate their product, 
marginalize 𝐴 out and place the resulting table back in 𝑆. In 
the second part of the analysis, the outputs of the tracking 
algorithm are added to the inputs of the network resulting in 
improved results. In the absence of the NPOC information, 
the predicted position is used to calculate the inconsistencies 
regarding the motion features and the possible ports in the 
area alleviating the problem of having a parent node with 
unspecified probability when the data is not available. 
Another way to solve this would be to associate a so-called 
default potential with each input node (e.g. route 
information). If the route information, the predicted position 
and the correct NPOC are available then the model infers 
higher probability of anomaly while the incorrect NPOC 
increases the resulting posterior probability. The values 
𝐶1(𝑅) and 𝐶2(𝑅) denote the correct and the incorrect routes, 
respectively, where the correct route corresponds to the 
route for which NPOC is the route's exit point. If the vessel 
is sailing along the incorrect route then the probability of 
anomaly is higher. The availability of route information and 
the predicted position improve the inference in the lack of 
NPOC information.
                                                 
5
http://genie.sis.pitt.edu 
(1) 
(2) 
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Table 1 Probability of the presence of deviation from destination with respect to the availability and thevariability of route 
information, the availability and imperfection of Next Port of Call (NPOC), and availability of the predicted position ?̂?. 
 
  3. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
To demonstrate some of the issues with maritime data 
quality, particularly AIS, and to determine the requirements 
for developing a model and data driven system for maritime 
anomaly detection, we presented the uncertainty model for 
detection of deviation from the destination which considers 
context and motion prediction when non-kinematic AIS 
information are imperfect. The model is evaluated in terms 
of influence of content in the NPOC field, the availability 
and variability of contextual information as routes, and the 
availability of the predicted destination by a tracking 
algorithm on the reasoning about the anomaly. The analysis 
shows that reasoning about the presence of deviation from 
destination benefits from inclusion of both the route and the 
prediction information, and confirms the negative impact of 
the imperfection of the non-kinematic information, thereby 
suggesting introducing source quality control strategies 
together with prediction and context modules as design 
requirements for maritime surveillance systems. The model 
can be extended to include ship type or additional expert 
knowledge, while with the Markov property assumption, 
also to a full dynamic BN, where the model in Fig. 1 would 
then illustrate a single time slice without temporal links. 
Since the domain knowledge is rather relational than 
functional, the relations can be quantified with a degree of 
confidence, thus other graphical models for representing 
uncertainty will also be considered. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Spaceborne Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems have 
already proven their advantage in Maritime Situational 
Awareness applications, including such task as targeted 
vessel detection at sea. Today, involving multiple SAR 
missions, it is possible to reduce limitations related to the 
sensor’s spatial coverage as well as revisit time. 
Complementary information from the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) offers a huge benefit; regardless 
that AIS original was designed for collision avoidance only. 
In particular, it enables to identify detected targets as well as 
to perform AIS anomaly investigations. This paper describes 
completely automated processing system of deriving SAR-
AIS data fusion products developed at the Maritime Security 
Lab Neustrelitz, part of DLR’s German Remote Sensing 
Data Center (DFD). Presented technology has been 
implemented for operational use in Near Real Time (NRT) 
Applications at DLR’s Ground Station in Neustrelitz. The 
current implementation supports following SAR satellites: 
TerraSAR-X/ TanDEM-X, Radarsat-2 and Sentinel 1. The 
development is still ongoing and supported by different 
projects, to increase the overall performance and to be 
compliant to the user requirements. 
 
Index Terms— Remote sensing, Synthetic Aperture 
Radar (SAR), Automatic Identification System (AIS), data 
fusion, Maritime Surveillance, Maritime Situational 
Awareness. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The major part of global transportation of goods is held over 
the sea. Safe and secure shipping at sea is a guarantee of 
world’s sustainable development, therefore maritime 
surveillance applications are nowadays of global 
importance. 
 Remote Sensing technologies are widely used in 
different monitoring tasks including maritime situational 
awareness. A special place, among the others, holds 
Spaceborne Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems which 
capable to cover huge areas and provide full picture 
independently from time and weather conditions. Involving 
multiple SAR satellites the revisit time drops down and  
improves the efficiency of NRT-based services. 
 Depending on the resolution of the  SAR sensors it is 
possible not only to detect a target (vessel) at sea, but 
estimate such parameters as objects width, length and 
heading [1]. Integrating this information with additional 
attributes acquired from Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) opens new capabilities in the context of maritime 
surveillances such like AIS anomaly investigations or 
detection of malicious actions. 
 This paper describes the automated processing system 
for SAR target detection and identification which was 
developed and integrated for operational use at DLR’s 
Ground Station Neustrelitz.  
  
 
2. PROCESSING SYSTEM 
 
The Ground Station Neustrelitz supports data reception from 
different optical and SAR spaceborne sensors. Currently, 
operational SAR missions are: TerraSAR-X/TanDEM-X, 
Sentinel-1 and Radarsat-2.  
 The data processing starts automatically after its 
reception by the ground station. The processing chain is 
organized by means of the Processing System Management 
(PSM) [2] which schedules different processors according to 
predefined set of processing rules. Processors which inputs 
are might be independent from each other can be run in 
parallel order and wait till necessary steps are complete 
prior running the next processing action. The overall 
workflow of presenting system is illustrated on figure 1 and 
main processing steps are described in the following sub-
sections.  
 
2.1. Image Processing 
 
Once the data has been ingested in the processing 
environment, the system initialises first L0/L1b processor. 
For every satellite a special processor transforms RAW data 
into the image format, performs radiometric data calibration, 
and extracts the L1b image metadata containing geolocation 
information, imaging times, satellite positions and number 
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of different coefficients for further calibration and 
validation. For TerraSAR-X data the TerraSAR Multi Mode 
SAR Processor (TMSP) is used for this task [3]. 
 
 
Figure 1 SAR target detection and identification workflow 
 The next processing step is done by SAR Image 
Transformer which performs automatic histogram 
adjustment as well as georectification of SAR images based 
on ground control points extracted from L1b image 
metadata. The processor generates several outputs: the full 
resolution georeferenced (GeoTIFF) image in 
projected(UTM) and in geographical WGS84(EPSG:4326)  
projections. In addition, quicklook images in .png and .kmz 
format (for visualization in Google Earth) can be generated. 
 
2.2. AIS Ingestion 
 
The processor “AIS Fetcher” collects AIS data for required 
time and spatial extent in accordance to the L1b image 
metadata. It supports querying different interfaces from 
several AIS providers as well as import data in RAW 
NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association) format. 
In addition, the AIS Fetcher crosschecks every sequence of 
AIS messages with embedded AIS Plausibility Processor 
[4]and marks anomalistic messages. The AIS Plausibility 
Processor was developed inthe DLRInstitute of 
Communications and Navigation. 
 
2.3. Target detection 
 
The SAR AIS Integrated Toolbox (SAINT) [1] is used for 
SAR target detection task. The detection algorithm is based 
on constant false alarm rate (CFAR) detector and operates 
with unprojected SAR L1b image. Then, extracted points 
are geocoded with help of L1b image metadata file and 
provided with lat/lon (WGS84) coordinates. The processor 
has been developed at the Maritime Safety and Security Lab 
in Bremen, part of DLR’s Remote Sensing Technology 
Institute. 
2.4. Data fusion 
 
The next processor called by the PSM is the Ship Detection 
Value Adder (SDVA) which combines all the outputs from 
previous processing steps and generates final delivery 
products in different formats. The core function of SDVA is 
the data fusion of detected ships from SAR image with AIS 
reports.   
At initial phase SDVA filters out static objects on sea 
which appeared to be oil platforms, wind parks, buoys or 
other man-made objects. This operation is done by 
crosschecking every object if it intersects with features from 
so-called sea-signs data base (only for Germany).  
At the same time, AIS tracks are reconstructed by 
interpolating intermediate points using “dead reckoning” 
approach. The processor always tries to build a realistic 
track which would not intersect the coastline and will not 
have sharp angles on the trajectory as it shown in figure 2.  
The new attribute values are calculated by distance weighted 
interpolation.  
 
Figure 2 AIS track reconstruction 
After the track has been reconstructed, coordinates at 
imaging time are derived. Time deviations within the image 
due to possible long imaging (up to 30 second or more) are 
considered. The L1b image metadata provides necessary 
information to build a time vector within the image. As the 
result, all extracted AIS reports at imaging time may have 
different timestamps (in case if the imaging process took 
more than 1 second).   
 The known problem of moving targets on SAR images 
is their additional Doppler shift which causes object 
displacement from its actual position on the image. 
Especially this effect is visible when object’s motion 
trajectory is crossing the satellite track. This type of motion 
called across-track direction [5]. Displacement in the 
azimuth direction due to across-track motion can reach up to 
several hundred meters and depends on object’s velocity. 
Figure 3 shows an example of azimuth displacement of 
detected vessels.  
 Number of different techniques exists in the subject of 
how to compensate this effect. The most efficient 
approaches are based on utilisation of additional auxiliary 
datasets, like it was described in the paper “Towards traffic 
monitoring with TerraSAR-X” [5]. 
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Figure 3 Azimuth displacement due to across-track 
movement 
Here, the AIS dataset in combination with L1b image 
metadata provides all the necessary information to emulate 
objects azimuth displacement. With known satellite position 
at imaging time as well as vessel’s velocity and course over 
ground it is possible to project AIS reported ships positions 
as they would appear on the SAR image. This method does 
not require high computation costs and widely used (e.g. [6] 
and [7]) for SAR-AIS data fusion, a therefore was 
implemented in SDVA. 
Once prediction of azimuth displacement is done the 
data fusion process takes place. Correlation is done by 
nearest neighbour search and attributes comparison between 
SAR-derived target characteristics with AIS reported, which 
includes heading, width and length. At the end, the 
candidates with smaller differences will be merged together.  
 
 
Figure 4 KMZ product output. TerraSAR-X image with 
overplayed ship-detection point with associated AIS report 
(visualised in Google Earth software) 
 
2.5. Data dissemination 
 
The SDVA processor generates a number of different output 
formats supporting different groups of users to perform data 
analysis. In particular, the most easy-to-use format –the 
KMZ file which allows data visualisation with Google Earth 
software. It contains such layers as AIS tracks and points, 
SAR Ship detections (points with thumbnails) and quick 
look overlay as it shown on figure 4.  
Different dissemination options are supported like 
automatic ftp/sftp or e-mail delivery as well as giving access 
to the results over OGC interfaces (wms, wfs) enabling 
users to connect the data directly in GIS applications 
without having a local copy. Another user friendly option is 
web-mapping client which provides similar functionality as 
KMZ file, but requires no special software. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents completely automated solution for NRT 
maritime surveillance applications by means of data 
composition acquired from two different sources – 
spaceborne SAR sensors and AIS. Current implementation 
is done using parallel computation as much as possible and 
able to generate ship detection value added products already 
within 10-15 minutes after image have been received by 
ground station. 
Presented system already integrated for operational use 
at Ground Station Neustrelitz and able to operate with data 
received from TerraSAR-X/TanDEM-X, Sentinel-1A and 
Radarsat-2 satellites. Involving new satellites as well as new 
auxiliary data such as sea routes maps would extend 
reliability of system and is a subject for improvement. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
There is an urgent migrant crisis in much of Europe, fueled 
by conflict in the Middle East. With a rise of seaborne 
migration from Turkey to Greece and Italy, there is a need 
to save lives and secure external borders. This research sets 
out to expand the foundation of knowledge available on 
migrant vessels, and by doing so aids in the intervention of 
migrant ships adrift at sea. This is achieved by using a data 
driven approach to analyze the vessels’ AIS data in the 
eastern Mediterranean Sea. A partially unsupervised 
anomaly detection approach, affinity propagation clustering 
is first-time used to analyze the AIS data, which identifies 
the potential migrant vessels, and also identify when during 
a vessel’s voyage it may be identified as a migrant vessel.  
 
Index Terms— migrant, refugee, vessel, anomaly 
detection  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Political turmoil in parts of Africa and the Middle East, and 
particularly Syria, have caused the number of asylum 
seekers in the European Union to grow 45% from 431090 in 
2013 to 625920 in 2014 [1]. Unsurprisingly the nationality 
with the most asylum seekers within the European Union is 
Syrian with 122115 or 19.5% of all asylum seekers, 
representing a 144.3% increase from 2013 to 2014 [1]. This 
sharp increase in asylum seekers is mirrored in the number 
of illegal border crossings that have occurred. Illegal border 
crossings rose 164% from 2013 to 2014 with the largest 
increase of 277% being via the Mediterranean Sea to Italy 
and Malta [2]. 
This research aims to identify if and when migrant 
vessels may be identified during their journey using vessel-
specific summary statistics. This is aligned to one of the 
pillars of the EU Agenda on Migration on saving lives and 
securing the external borders [3]. The sooner the model is 
able to identify migrant vessels, the sooner authorities will 
be able to intervene and offer assistance.  
The datasets used in this research are GPS track data 
(i.e. position, speed and course over ground) from vessels 
carrying AIS (Automatic Identification System) and located 
in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, including the Aegean, 
Ionian, and Marmara Seas during December 2014. The 
dataset includes 5804 unique vessels and over 6.75 million 
records. Of the 5804 unique vessels, three are known to 
have trafficked migrants and refugees from Turkey to the 
EU and their track data are analyzed in this work. 
 
 
2. METHODS  
 
By using the spatio-temporal dataset of vessel 
movements, existing anomaly detection methods (see e.g. 
[4, 5]) would identify anomalous ranges of data within each 
vessel’s track; this would be considered a collective 
anomaly [6]. There are considerable strengths and 
weaknesses to this approach. The primary strength is that 
the approach may be able to identify the specific portion of 
a vessel’s track that is unusual and potentially indicative of a 
migrant vessel. This strength is, however, overshadowed by 
the weaknesses that require sequential data to identify the 
unusual subsequences and it is unable to consider the 
relationships between multiple dimensions of data. Using 
the collective anomaly approach also assumes domain 
knowledge; that is, it assumes we are experts in the field of 
migrant vessels and definitively know there is a specific, 
unique subsequence that may be identified as an anomaly. 
This is not the case. This analysis of vessel data is 
preliminary to building a foundation of migrant vessel 
knowledge, thus collective anomaly detection methods are 
better suited once a better overall understanding of migrant 
vessels exists. Instead, a dimensionally reduced point-based 
anomaly detection method is applied to summary statistic 
vessel data.  
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2.1 Variable selection 
The goal in selecting variables is to maximize the 
dissimilarities between known migrant vessels and all other 
(unknown) vessels. The correlogram in Figure 1 shows that 
for migrant vessels all variables are highly positively or 
negatively correlated, with the exception of the 0th quantile 
break and 25th quantile break. Further exploration of the 0th 
and 25th quantile breaks shows that these variables each 
have a value of zero for all known migrant vessels. Figure 1 
also shows that for most variables all other vessels are 
weakly correlated. The mean, standard deviation, and 75th 
quantile breaks SOG variables are the most highly 
correlated with all other variables for all vessels; these 
variables are omitted from further consideration. The 
remaining variables (SOG kurtosis; latitudinal range; 
longitudinal range; SOG skewness; and the 0
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 
and 100
th
 SOG quantile breaks) are also evaluated to 
determine how information rich each variable is with respect 
to the classification of migrant vessels. 
Mutual information is a calculation that determines how 
related a variable is to a label, such as migrant vessel. 
Mutual information is calculated as the difference between 
the independent entropy and conditional entropy of the 
vessel type. That is, the mutual information value for each 
variable is indicative of how much certainty is added to a 
label (migrant or unknown) if the variable is present. The 
mutual information of the remaining variables from the 
previous step maximizing dissimilarities shows that all 
variables, with the exception of the 0
th
, and 100
th
 SOG 
quantile breaks) provide equal amounts of information with 
respect to the vessel label. Only the variables with the most 
information among them will be considered further.  
The remaining variables are information rich but 
provide a set of variables that are biased towards 
representing each vessel’s SOG more than the distance 
travelled. In order to better balance the set of variables 
skewness is omitted. Skewness is chosen as the omitted 
variable due to its redundancy with the kurtosis variable. 
Longitudinal and latitudinal ranges are also redundant with 
respect to the other variables but removing either spatial 
variable would once again bias the analysis towards 
assuming that the SOG derived variables are more important 
to the identification of migrant vessels. The latitudinal and 
longitudinal ranges derived from the original latitude and 
longitude variables as well as the kurtosis, 25th quantile 
break, and 50th quantile break derived from the original 
SOG variable represent a well-rounded selection of 
information rich variables to be used in identifying migrant 
vessels. 
Figure 1 Correlation of variables 
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2.2  Affinity propagation clustering 
As an alternative to the commonly used K-means clustering 
methods in which the user must define K number of clusters, 
affinity propagation clustering requires no parameter 
determination on the part of the user. The affinity 
propagation algorithm has a number of advantages over K-
means methods: it is not sensitive to initial randomly 
selected centroids or to the order of data, the user does not 
determine the number of partitions in the data, and it is 
generally robust with respect to noise and outliers.  Affinity 
propagation starts by considering all points as centroids, or 
exemplars as they are called by this method; this is designed 
to intentionally avoid the random start issues commonly 
witnessed in K-means methods. Affinity propagation works 
by using pairwise similarities to exchange responsibility and 
availability messages between nodes (points) in a network, 
these messages are used by points to essentially vote for 
which point will be the exemplar. This data driven method 
of determining the appropriate number of clusters and 
cluster membership does not require manual input of 
parameters. Instead the user of this algorithm must only first  
create the similarity matrix from which points will be 
associated.  
The method used to calculate pairwise similarities is the 
negative squared Euclidean distance, a standard method for 
most algorithms that require similarity values between 
points [7]. The matrix of similarities and the point data are 
the only required input for the affinity propagation model. 
Other parameters may be set by the user, such as maximum 
number of iterations, but these are not required and the 
default values have been shown to produce results more 
accurately than alternative K-means methods [4]. The 
default parameters and their values are: a maximum number 
of iterations equal to 1000, and the number of iterations 
required without cluster changes to terminate with 
convergence equal to 100. If the algorithm returns an error, 
that the model has not converged within 1000 iterations, 
then these values will be revisited and adjusted accordingly. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Potential migrant vessels, December 2014 
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As stated previously, it is imperative that migrant vessels 
be identified as soon as possible in order to intervene and 
provide assistance to possibly stranded migrants and 
refugees upon drifting ships. To achieve this, the original 
spatio-temporal data is first manipulated to remove portions 
of the migrant vessel trajectory before rebuilding the point 
data structure with the updated speed and locational 
statistics. This process is completed 31 times for each 
known migrant vessel for a total of 93 times. The three 
known migrant vessels are necessarily considered separately 
such that the remaining two migrant vessels may serve as 
anchors in the migrant vessel cluster.   
This results of this method show at which point (percent 
journey data) all three known migrant vessels are clustered 
together, and display how the known migrant vessels change 
clusters through space-time. 
 
  
 
Figure 4 Change in migrant vessel clusters over time 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3 Portion of migrant vessel voyages clustered together 
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3. RESULTS 
 
The affinity propagation model converged with the data 
partitioned into 76 clusters. The three migrant vessels are 
clustered together with 40 other vessels, as seen in Figure 2. 
There are 28 clusters that have only one vessel. This means 
that while we may be able to claim that migrant vessels are 
capable of being identified in the same cluster, it cannot be 
said that they are considered anomalies with the variables 
used.  
The three known migrant vessels are clustered together 
beginning when approximately 96 percent of their 
respective December 2014 data is considered. The 
corresponding locations may be seen in Figure 3. Figure 4 
shows that the known migrant vessels do not share a 
common cluster history before converging into the same 
cluster. These results show that it may be possible to further 
identify potential migrant vessels while they are at sea. The 
verification of additional potential migrant vessels in this 
cluster is not practical and highlights a major limitation of 
this research. 
The Central, Eastern and Western Mediterranean Sea 
feature different types of migration flows, with modi 
operandi of smugglers that change in time. The 
methodology presented could be implemented to adaptively 
detect vessels of migrants at sea. In addition, the same 
approach can be used on radar tracks of smaller vessels that 
are not broadcasting AIS messages and that are commonly 
used by smugglers. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Automatic Identification System is an electronic system 
enabling vessels to send localization messages. Those 
messages are used for several uses such as fleet control, 
traffic control or boarding prevention. Sent messages 
contain errors, falsifications and undergo spoofing due to 
the unsecured channel of transmission, and that weakens the 
whole system and the safety of navigation. Beyond known 
errors, recent works have shown that falsification of AIS 
messages is easy, and therefore could mask or favor illegal 
actions, lead to disturbance of monitoring systems and new 
maritime risks. This paper presents the DEAIS project 
which proposes a methodological approach for modelling, 
analyzing and detecting such maritime events. 
 
Index Terms— AIS Falsification, data mining, signal 
processing 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Automatic Identification System is an electronic system 
enabling vessels to send localization messages. Those 
messages are used for several uses such as fleet control, 
traffic control or boarding prevention. Sent messages 
contain errors (unintentional), falsifications (intentional) and 
undergo spoofing (intentional) due to the unsecured channel 
of transmission, and that weakens the whole system and the 
safety of navigation. 
This work reports on the design and first results of a 
methodology for the detection of AIS falsification. The 
objectives are the determination of the false messages in 
real-time and the improvement of both the effectiveness of 
the system as a security system and the maritime situational 
awareness. 
As a first step, a risk analysis study of the Automatic 
Identification System has been done via EBIOS method. It 
led to the identification of circa 350 threat scenarios. A 
typology of anomalies has been also proposed, alongside 
with a methodology for anomaly detection.  
Intentional broadcast of false AIS information can be 
understood at both the physical and logical levels. The first 
approach focuses on signals transmitted by transponders 
while the second considers information exchanged where 
fraud and attacks can be identified by message-based data 
mining methodology to identify abnormal messages (and 
parameters). In our approach we are considering a 
combination of both analyses within a single information 
system.  
Method for the integrity assessment of messages and the 
discovery of anomalous data is particularly based on spatial 
information, which is the cornerstone of AIS messages but 
not only as AIS also broadcast many contextual and control 
information along 27 messages. Integrity assessment is done 
within one lone message, between messages sent by the 
same vessel, and between messages sent by several vessels 
and include MMSI-based cross verification in order to link 
information received by different stations.  
We also studied physical characteristics of the signal 
which are intended to be integrated in the mining process. 
We currently considered five parameters. The first 
parameter is the power of the received signal and the four 
others are time-dependent and are relative to the shape of 
the signal. While these parameters cannot fully qualify 
ship’s identity and presence, the regularity of these 
parameters can conversely help to identify inconsistent 
values. 
2. A SYSTEM WITH WEAKNESSES 
Three major cases of bad data quality can be distinguished: 
the errors (when false data in non-deliberately broadcasted), 
the falsifications (when false data is deliberately 
broadcasted) and the spoofing (when data is created or 
modified and broadcasted by an outsider) (Ray et al., 2015). 
Data contained in AIS messages can be erroneous, falsified 
or spoofed for several reasons: there is no strong verification 
of the transmission, the transmission is done using a non-
secured channel, some pieces of information might not be 
well known by the crew or the crew may want to hide some 
data from other people’s knowledge. Those operations 
modify and handicap the understanding of the maritime 
traffic.  
The errors, by nature unintentional, can be caused by 
transponder deficiency, a wrong input of manual data, an 
input of manual data of poor quality, erroneous pieces of 
information that come from external sensors, and can have 
an impact on the name of the vessel, its physical 
characteristics, the position or the destination for instance. 
Those pieces of information can then be false, incomplete, 
impossible according to the norm or impossible according to 
the physics (for instance a latitude field value shall be 
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inferior to 90°). According to (Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007), 
circa 50% of the messages contain erroneous data. 
A falsification is the fact to voluntarily degrade a 
message by the modification of a genuine value by a false 
value, or by stopping the broadcast of messages, made in 
order to mislead the outer world. Identity theft (The 
Maritime Executive, 2012), the disappearances (Windward, 
2014), the broadcast of false GNSS coordinates or the 
statement of a wrong activity (Katsilieris et al., 2013) are 
types of falsification. According to (Harati-Mokhtari et al., 
2007), about 1% of the vessels broadcast falsified data. 
The spoofing of messages is done by an external actor by 
the creation ex nihilo of false messages and their broadcast 
on the AIS frequencies (Balduzzi, 2014). Those spoofing 
activities are done in order to mislead both the outer world 
and the crews at sea, by the creation of ghost vessels, of 
false closest point of approach trigger, a false emergency 
message or even a false cape (in the case of a spoofed 
vessel). 
The whole AIS data transmission system is displayed in 
Figure 1, where (1) is GPS data transmission, (2) is AIS-
SAT transmission, (3) and (4) display VHF marine 
transmission, (5) shows digital transmission and (6) depicts 
human supervision. All the chain of AIS data transmission 
can be affected by one of these three problems.  
 
 
Figure 1 AIS data transmission 
 
As mentioned, problems with the AIS can be understood at 
the physical and logical levels. DEAIS project considered 
these two levels for the identification of falsifications. Next 
sections summarise our risk analysis (section 3) and the 
methodology proposed for signal analysis (section 4) and 
message integrity assessment (section 5).  
3. AIS EBIOS RISKS ANALYSIS 
The EBIOS method (ANSSI, 2010) has been created by the 
ANSSI (French National Agency for the Security of 
Information Systems) and is used in both the public and 
private sectors. It is an approach of risk evaluation which 
clarifies the entities of the system, their vulnerabilities, the 
inventoried threats, and contributes in the assessment of the 
right level of security (compliant with ISO norms 27001, 
27005 and 31000).  
We conducted an EBIOS analysis of the AIS in which 
we compiled all known information about the system in 
order to obtain a complete understanding of it. The 
application of the EBIOS method on the AIS led to the 
construction of several tables that enable us to consider 
several risk levels and the importance to put in place 
security measures on certain areas which have been found 
out as particularly vulnerable according to threat scenarios 
and possible threat sources. These tables describe:  
- The essential goods (e.g. dynamic AIS data) 
- The essential functions (e.g. transmit AIS data) 
- List of support goods (e.g. surveillance centre     
organisation) 
- Identified threat sources (e.g. rival vessel or ship-
owner) 
- Dread events (e.g. position determination is impossible) 
- Threats scenarios (e.g. identity data change on the 
transponder) 
 
The study led to the identification of more than 350 threat 
scenarios. Such a study influences the choice of detection 
algorithms to elaborate first. In particular, it has motivated 
the study of the AIS signal. 
4. SIGNATURE IDENTIFICATION THROUGH 
MAGNITUDE AND TEMPORAL 
CHARACTERIZATION 
At the physical level, falsification can be identified by signal 
analysis. For instance, destination masking or 
disappearances which are also a kind of falsification, as 
ships turn off their AIS transponder in order to hide some of 
their activities can be studied by exploiting radar 
information (Katsilieris et al., 2013). Another approach 
considers radiolocation of signals to confirm the existence 
of a real ship and its approximate localization (Papi et al., 
2014). 
In order to identify a ship’s signature or possible 
falsifications, pertinent features extracted from each frame 
of the input AIS signals have been studied (Ray et al., 
2016). An experimental campaign of reception of frame AIS 
was conducted in the bay of Brest. Sixteen recordings of 
five minutes each were collected corresponding to 10 000 
usable AIS frames. Each sample is also 5 minutes with a 
center frequency of 162 MHz and a bandwidth of 100 kHz. 
It allows recording simultaneously both frequencies of the 
AIS.  
Five features were measured for every AIS frame (Figure 
2). The top graph represents the temporal evolution of the 
frequency modulation of the AIS signal and the down graph 
represents its power. The first feature is level of the received 
power, which will allow estimating the broadcast power 
knowing the distance. The four others temporal parameters 
are relative to the shape of the signal and are: rise time (Fig. 
2-2), fall time (Fig. 2-4), and times before (Fig. 2-1) and 
after demodulation (Fig. 2-3). 
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Decoded frames, power of the received signal, and 
temporal characteristics of the associated signals were then 
gathered into a geographical database (cf. section 6) to 
realize a reference database of ships’ id and allow statistical 
studies.  
 
Figure 2 Analysis of a received AIS frame 
 
The study of these different parameters highlights particular 
values which will allow us to relate with ships’ identity 
signature. For example, Figure 3 proposes a representation 
of time before modulation in the form of box-plot. The X-
Axis corresponds to the MMSI number of ships, the time 
before modulation being on the Y-Axis. For each ship, the 
values of “time before modulation” are in a given interval, 
values that seem different from a ship in the other one. 
 
 
Figure 3 Box plot “Time before modulation” distribution 
for ’class A’ AIS systems 
 
While temporal characterization cannot fully qualify ship’s 
identity, the regularity of these parameters can conversely 
help to identify inconsistent values. In addition, the study 
showed that repeaters exhibit specific patterns easily 
recognizable. 
The perspective concerns the improvement of this 
methodology with the definition of additional signal 
parameters and the integration of data mining techniques 
combining signal features with static and dynamic 
information provided by AIS messages as described in the 
following section. 
5. AIS MESSAGES INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT 
At the logical level, fraud and attacks can be identified by 
message-based data mining methodology to identify 
abnormal messages and navigational behaviours (Iphar et 
al., 2015). For instance a ship navigating with a MMSI 
number which is not the real one, allocated and 
internationally recognized, can be identified by a correlation 
with official ships’ registry and confirmed by a real-time 
monitoring of AIS identities at the worldwide level. 
Considering the data within the fields of the 27 AIS 
messages, four ways to discriminate the inner integrity of 
those data can be distinguished. The first way consists of the 
control of the integrity of each field of each message taken 
individually. The second way is at the scale of one single 
message, and assesses the integrity, in this very message, of 
all the fields with respect to one another. As there are 27 
types of messages, message of the same type have the same 
fields and it is thus possible to compare them and assess 
their integrity, this makes the third way. Eventually, the 
fourth way is the comparison and integrity assessment of the 
fields of different messages. Indeed, although pieces of 
information can come from different messages, it is possible 
to assess their integrity as some fields are either the same or 
linked or comparable (i.e. MMSI-based cross verification in 
order to link information received by different stations). 
Those four ways are referred as first-order, second-order, 
third-order and fourth-order assessments, respectively. 
Depending on the type of messages assessed and the 
order of assessment, the number of item to check is fixed. 
We established a list of 669 items for the 27 messages, and 
an ad-hoc nomenclature has been established so that each 
item can have a clear unique identifier.   
An integrity coefficient is assessed by order, i.e. a 
coefficient is computed for first-order items, another one for 
second-order, and so on, depending on the type of 
assessment wanted. Then a global coefficient can be 
computed, by weighting the order-based coefficients and 
other results from other methods as desired. 
The perspective concerns the implementation of the 
methodology together with first detection algorithms. 
Amongst current developments, we are considering black 
hole detection in AIS transmission in order to identify 
possible masking. The following section introduces the 
architecture designed for the detection of AIS falsification.  
6. ARCHITECTURE FOR DATA PROCESSING 
A synoptic diagram of the proposed architecture can be 
found in the Figure 4. The signal can be received from 
various sources, the parser provides messages parameters, 
the data processing of the signal provides some signal 
parameters and two different steps of data processing. All 
this architecture is built around the database in order to fill it 
and use it for knowledge discovery. Two implementations 
are currently developed in parallel; one based on a relational 
database (postgres/postgis) and a second one based on Flink 
(Salmon et al., 2015) to cope with larger volume of data. 
The data processing box number two corresponds to a 
signal processing for the determination of aforementioned 
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characteristics. These data are stored in the database with 
the associated NMEA message and decoded AIS frame. 
The data processing box number one is in charge of on-
the-fly analysis of first-order and second-order data 
assessment, in order to have as output coefficients to store in 
the database. Similarly, the data processing box number 
three is in charge of the analysis of third-order and fourth-
order data assessment, in order to have as output coefficients 
to be stored in the database. This part of the study, unless 
the previous, needs to request historical data. 
 
Figure 4 Proposed architecture 
 
In the database itself, each new entry will lead to the 
creation of a new item (i.e. a new line), with as attributes 
shall have: a unique identifier, the time of reception, the raw 
frame, all message field values and the various coefficient 
obtained through assessments (the four orders and the signal 
parameters). 
The data processing box number four will be in charge of 
integrity assessments between AIS data and external and 
aggregated data, (e.g. cartographic information, weather 
conditions, black hole computations). Of course, the types 
of processing will vary according to the type of external 
information available, and it is not possible to have a strictly 
defined process in this part. A list of assessment items can 
be created for each new database when its specifications are 
known (i.e. its fields, their precision, their source and 
reliability), and two similar databases (i.e. on the same 
subject) are likely to have two different lists of assessment 
items as their specifications will differ. Updating of the 
external databases will, in certain cases, be necessary, as to 
ensure information is not outdated and data quality 
assessment is reliable.  
7. CONCLUSION 
This article proposes a method for analysing AIS data using 
integrity of information as a key factor, with database 
storage of information and an assessment done on the 
message itself, on the message with respect to other 
messages, on the message with respect to external databases 
and on the signal itself with its physical characteristics. Such 
an assessment is the consequence of the defects of this 
system, transmitting erroneous and possibly falsified data. 
This method is meant to be implemented and to provide 
integrity-based confidence coefficient on data that will be 
useful for the determination of erroneous and falsified data, 
leading to a risk assessment and alert triggering in a 
decision-support system and in the end provide an additional 
tool for the enhancement of maritime security. 
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ABSTRACT 
Exploiting the diversity of multiple on-board sensors is a 
promising approach to generate a reliable picture of the 
traffic situation in the vicinity of a particular vessel. This 
work focuses on multi-sensor fusion for single target 
tracking in a loosely-coupled architecture. An Interacting 
Multiple Model Multi-Sensor Probabilistic Data Association 
filter is designed to capture rapidly changing vessel 
dynamics in the presence of possible clutter measurements. 
The actual target tracking is made up of two Unscented 
Kalman filters each being conditioned on radar and AIS 
measurement updates. The benefits of the proposed method 
will be demonstrated on behalf of real-world measurements 
obtained from the Baltic Sea. 
 
Index Terms— AIS, IMM-MSPDA filter, UKF, radar 
image processing, sensor fusion, single target tracking 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The increasing challenges of the maritime traffic domain 
call for advanced solutions to guarantee safety at sea. Nearly 
80 % of the global trade traverses the seas and harbors 
worldwide (see [1]) stressing the vital economic interests in 
secure and efficient shipping. Key aspect to all mariners, 
traffic management and security authorities is a reliable and 
timely picture of the traffic situation not only in their close 
vicinity but also with respect to vessels in greater distance. 
For better identification and localization of maritime traffic 
participants the Automatic Identification System (AIS) was 
introduced by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) as an ITU-R recommendation [2] in 2004, yielding a 
mandatory standard for vessels greater than 300 GRT. AIS 
can be understood as additional sensor that supports the use 
of classical surveillance techniques for collision avoidance, 
e.g., radar, that are used aboard or in shore-based Vessel 
Traffic Service (VTS) monitoring stations. However, none 
of the available sensors, neither AIS or radar, can constantly 
provide sufficient data on their own to establish a reliable 
and accurate traffic picture at all times. While radar may 
detect vessels invisible in AIS, it is in general less accurate 
and will always be subject to external weather phenomena 
that may result in false echoes or clutter measurements. On 
the contrary, AIS yields great precision of vessel positions, 
but entirely relies on the cooperative nature of the system. 
With its open standard AIS is vulnerable to a series of 
threats, such as availability disruption, ship spoofing or AIS 
hijacking, as discussed in [3]. Apart from that, unintentional 
misuse or imperfect equipment may introduce additional 
error sources compromising the reliability of the system, as 
was also shown in a comprehensive AIS plausibility analysis 
in [4]. To encounter these shortcomings, we propose to fuse 
both, radar and AIS, to establish a more accurate and 
reliable traffic picture by exploiting the complementary 
nature of the two sensors. In the literature various 
approaches have been published to augment maritime 
surveillance or collision avoidance systems, mostly based on 
radar target fusion with additional sensors like laser in [5] or 
multiple radar systems for exploiting aspect diversity as in 
[6]. The matter of AIS and radar fusion was mainly 
addressed for anomaly detection, e.g., based on multi 
hypothesis tests in [7] or by exploiting historical traffic route 
knowledge for SAR/AIS fusion in [8]. In [9] an overview 
was given for different AIS/radar fusion techniques 
incorporating online covariance estimation. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In 
section 2 the general methodology for single target tracking 
in a radar/AIS environment will be outlined. Section 3 
demonstrates the working principle of the proposed scheme 
w.r.t. measurement data. A conclusion is given in section 4. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section the proposed methodology for fusing radar 
and AIS data for single target tracking will be presented in 
more detail. By designing an Interacting Multiple Model 
(IMM) Multi-Sensor Probabilistic Data Association 
(MSPDA) filter that is conditioned on asynchronous radar 
and AIS measurements a loosely-coupled architecture was 
chosen. 
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(a) Original radar image. (b) Image after background subtraction (c) Extracted target candidates (red cir- 
 and gray-scale conversion. cles) at time k after blob detection. 
Figure 1 Processing chain for one radar image at time k to extract the target candidates.
 
2.1. Radar image based target extraction 
 
In order to fuse radar with AIS position data, the target 
candidates need to be detected and extracted from radar 
first, to feed them to the filter as measurement updates. 
The utilized approach to extract radar target information 
is based on image processing instead of directly working 
on the radar signal level. This may introduce additional 
error sources originating from mapping the radar signal to 
image domain, but also yields the advantage of applying 
the proposed technique to most commercial radar systems 
by simply interfacing to the video output. To extract 
target candidates from the current radar image at time k, 
the following procedure is applied: 
1. Masking the image eliminating static but 
undesired features, e.g., colored heading lines, 
blob in center, radar information tables. 
2. Conversion of image from RGB to grayscale 
(weighted average from color channels). 
3. Blob detection with fixed range settings for 
convexity, circularity, inertia, size and intensity 
of expected tar-gets. 
4. Each detected target candidate per frame is 
expressed in range and bearing, relative to the 
radar’s, i.e., ship’s, position. 
The key aspect in this processing chain is certainly the 
scale-invariant blob detection to eventually detect target 
candidates. This algorithm is well described in literature 
and finds many applications in image based target 
detection and tracking such as described in [10]. For this 
work the implementation provided by the OpenCV 
framework was used
1
. Figures 1a to 1c show the different 
radar processing stages. 
 
2.2. AIS dynamic target data 
 
The typical AIS data set contains numerous static and 
dynamic parameters, that are distributed over different 
                                                 
1
 OpenCV 3.1.0: https://github.com/Itseez/opencv.git 
AIS message types and specified in the ITU-R 
recommendation [2]. The set of dynamic parameters 
always comprises the vessel position in longitude and 
latitude, course over ground (COG) and speed over 
ground (SOG), but may also contain true heading and rate 
of turn (ROT) information. The specified time intervals 
between successive messages range from 2 s to 180 s, 
depending on the dynamic state of the vessel. As was 
shown in [4] these reporting rates are violated in a 
considerable amount of cases, leading to outdated or 
simply missing AIS messages. 
 
2.3. IMM-MSPDA framework for single target 
tracking 
 
In this work, an IMM-MSPDA filter was designed for 
single target tracking in an AIS/radar environment. The 
IMM, being first proposed in [11], is generally applied to 
best capture rapidly changing motion dynamics by 
running a bank of interacting Kalman filters in parallel, 
with each filter being conditioned on a different process 
model. The final IMM state estimate as well as the re-
initialization of the Kalman filters after each iteration is 
based on a weighted combination of the individual state 
estimates, whereas the transition between the models (or 
modes) is governed by an underlying Markov process. 
The combination with a Probabilistic Data Association 
(PDA) filter yields a powerful scheme for associating 
clutter measurements to the expected target state in a 
dynamically challenging scenario. The basic steps of the 
PDA filter are comprehensively described in [12]. 
Essentially, each sensor measurement gets validated 
based on a validation region centered around the expected 
state of the target. The final state update is then based on 
the weighted sum of the residuals between validated and 
expected measurements, with the weights being computed 
from the likelihood of the measurement to origin from the 
target. In contrast to the standard PDA approach in [12] 
we apply Unscented Kalman Filtering (UKF) (see [15]) to 
compensate especially for nonlinearities in the radar 
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measurement domain. An algorithm combining both 
approaches to form an IMM-PDA filter in a multi-sensor 
environment was originally proposed in [13], outlining a 
scheme to combine synchronous measurement updates 
from 2 to 3 sensors sequentially. An extension to 
incorporate multiple sensors providing asynchronous or 
delayed measurements was published in [14]. In our 
work, the latter is adopted to the particular scenario of 
observing high rate radar measurements and low rate AIS 
updates, both running asynchronously. In contrast to the 
original algorithm, in our implementation the standard 
IMM cycle is continued on arrival of any sensor 
measurement. Otherwise, if low rate AIS messages would 
solely trigger the update of the IMM model probabilities, 
the IMM could not adopt to changing motion dynamics as 
quickly as if radar measurements were also used for 
initiating the model probability update of the IMM cycle. 
 
2.4. UKF filter design          
  
For the actual target tracking an Unscented Kalman 
filter (UKF) was designed incorporating state 
augmentation by the process noise during state prediction 
and additive correction steps for each of the sensors. 
Details on the basic idea of the unscented transform as 
well as the implementation based on state augmentation 
can be found in [15].  In our particular application the 
UKF was found to outperform the Extended Kalman filter 
(EKF) in the presence of highly nonlinear radar 
measurement updates, as was already discussed in [6] and 
[16]. In the context of vessel dynamics two dominant 
motion scenarios were identified, that are nearly straight-
path and turn maneuver based motion. For that reason, 
two process models were defined, namely the Constant 
Velocity (CV) and the Constant Turn Rate Velocity 
(CTRV), assuming the former to provide best fit to 
straight-path and the latter to turn maneuver motion 
respectively. Further details on the definition of CV and 
CTRV process models can be found in [17].     
 Within each filter hat implements one of the modes 
from above, the predicted state 𝒙𝑘|𝑘−1 and its associated 
covariance will be based on measurements of sensor s ∈ 
{radar, ais}. The corresponding measurement models are 
expressed as functions ℎ𝑠(𝒙(𝑘|𝑘−1), 𝝐𝑘
𝑠 ), with 
 
   (1) 
 
for s = ais and 
 
  (2) 
for s = radar, mapping the target position fom state to 
radar measurement domain. In that context, (𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠)  
denotes the radar reference position and (𝑥𝑘|𝑘−1, 𝑦𝑘|𝑘−1) 
the predicted position in the target’s local ENU frame 
respectively. The vector 𝝐𝑘
𝑠 ~𝑁(𝟎, 𝑹𝑠) captures the 
additive sensor measurement noise. Careful attention has 
to be paid to the interaction of models with state spaces of 
different dimensions within the IMM cycle. In this work 
the strategy from [18] is followed, which is based on state 
augmentation. In this context, the extra element from the 
CTRV state space is essentially replicated to obtain a 
combined IMM state estimate. 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
In this section the proposed algorithm for fusing AIS 
with radar in an IMM-MSPDA filter shall be evaluated 
based on a dynamically challenging measurement 
scenario. 
 
3.1. Baltic Sea experiments 
 
 
Figure 3 Nautical chart depicting the area of the 
measurement campaign at the Baltic Sea, zooming into 
the selected test trajectory. The bottom right picture 
shows the vessel to be tracked. 
For validating the proposed method a dedicated 
measurement campaign with two chartered vessels was 
conducted in October 2015. The offshore supply ship 
BALTIC TAUCHER II was conducting sea trial 
maneuvers for two successive days in the Baltic Sea (see 
Fig. 3). Its transmitted AIS messages were recorded at a 
shore-based AIS station at the Darßer Ort Lighthouse, 
Germany
2
. Additionally, this ship was equipped with a 
multi-frequency GNSS receiver that allowed for 
computation of a PPP reference trajectory in post-
processing. A second ship, the tug vessel AARON 
remained anchored in the center of the sea trial area, 
monitoring the scenery by radar at an interval of 1 Hz.
                                                 
2
 Courtesy of German Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration 
(WSV) 
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(a) Trajectory of tracked vessel based on radar 
data only, running an IMM-PDA only. 
 (b) Trajectory of tracked vessel based on AIS 
data only, running an IMM-PDA filter. 
(c) Trajectory of tracked vessel, fusing radar and 
AIS data, running an IMM-MSPDA filter. 
Figure 2 Comparison of filtered vessel trajectories from two IMM-PDA filters conditioned on either radar or AIS alone and 
an IMM-MSPDA filter fusing both sources. 
 
With this scenario the feasibility of the proposed 
method for maritime situation awareness w.r.t. to a single 
target shall be demonstrated. For the validation of the 
proposed filter, the subset highlighted in Fig. 3 was 
selected due to its two distinct turn maneuvers, covering 
1708 s or 201 valid AIS messages respectively. 
 
3.2. Evaluation 
 
For evaluation and to demonstrate the potential 
benefits of the proposed scheme, three different filters 
were tested. At first, an IMM-PDA filter was conditioned 
on plain radar target candidate data. Secondly, the AIS 
messages from the same track were used as sole input to 
this filter. Figures 2a and 2b show the filtered trajectory in 
comparison to the reference and original measurement 
updates. Thirdly, the proposed IMM-MSPDA filter was 
tested with both asynchronous sensor measurement 
updates. The trajectory obtained from this fusion process 
is shown in Fig. 2c. As can also be seen in Table 1, the 
filter being conditioned on radar image data only cannot 
compete in terms of accuracy to filtered AIS position 
data. However, while the filter running on low rate AIS 
messages is introducing a large position error during the 
second turn maneuver (at label T2 in Fig. 2b) due to 
missing AIS messages radar can still be used for tracking 
as it provides continues measurement updates. By fusing 
both sensors the filtered trajectory overpasses smoothly 
the lack of AIS messages during the turn maneuver, while 
it is mainly following AIS updates otherwise. In this 
particular case, the maximum error in the estimated target 
position was drastically reduced from nearly 236 m to 
below 56 m.  
 
In Table 1 prominent statistics for the three different 
filters are listed stressing the performance improvement 
from the proposed IMM-MSPDA filter in terms of 
maximum and RMS error. It is not surprising that the σ-
value of the error distribution, i.e., the value which 
bounds 68.27 % of the errors, is increasing for the fused 
process compared to the filtered trajectory conditioned on 
AIS data only. Due to the high rate radar measurements 
more uncertainty is inferred to the filter in times where 
AIS messages would actually suffice. 
 
Table 1 Statistics of the horizontal position error for 
the three different filters. 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this work, an IMM-MSPDA framework was utilized 
to exploit the complementary nature of radar and AIS 
sensors in a loosely-coupled data fusion architecture. The 
overall aim is to provide a more robust picture of the 
traffic situation in the vicinity of a particular vessel, 
resilient to AIS faults or anomalies. Based on real-world 
measurements the benefits of the proposed scheme could 
be visualized for cases of missing or insufficient AIS 
message updates. In future work this framework will be 
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extended for multiple target tracking including track 
initialization based on candidate extraction from radar. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Current maritime traffic monitoring systems are essentials 
for a maritime situational awareness. However, they are not 
always adapted to the identification of risky behaviours of 
ships. It is very difficult for operators responsible for 
monitoring traffic to identify which vessels are at risk 
among all the shipping traffic displayed on their screen [1, 
2, 3].We present in this paper a hybrid approach for 
analysing dangerous behaviours of ships based on AIS data. 
This approach is based on supervised and unsupervised 
analyses and it was developed in the frame of PhDs. Our 
approach is based on three complementary methodologies: 
(1) data mining for knowledge and pattern extraction for 
behaviour modelling, (2) ontological modelling of 
behaviour for an unsupervised detection and (3) geovisual 
analysis of large volume of data for a supervised detection 
of threats at sea. Three prototypes were developed to test 
our approach. 
 
Index Terms— Maritime Domain Awareness, 
Ontology, Data Mining, Geovisual Analytics 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The maritime surveillance centres (MRCC) integrate 
monitoring systems in order to have in real time a large 
vision of the traffic of ships. Data acquisition operates 
heterogeneous data like AIS data, meteorological data, 
bathymetry data, but all the data are not integrated in a 
unique interface. Moreover, the surveillance systems are in 
general not equipped with analysis support or decision 
support allowing detecting dangerous behaviours. 
Since 2007, in the frame of PhD and R&D projects, our 
research centre focus its work on the design and the 
development of maritime surveillance systems and specially 
on automatic or supervised detection of abnormal 
behaviours of ships. This hybrid approach is illustrated in 
Fig. 1. 
We can identify two kinds of behaviours:  
- Known behaviours that we can model with expert 
knowledge [4, 5]; 
- Unknown behaviours or behaviours interpretable 
with difficulties, to be characterized with automatic 
methods like data mining [6]. 
Then, the modeled behaviours can be integrated into a 
real-time system of detection of abnormal or dangerous 
behaviours. 
The hybrid approach is designed on both unsupervised 
and supervised analysis methods. We present in the 
following sections the components of the approach: 
- An unsupervised method for the analysis of the 
abnormal behaviours, based on data mining; 
- An ontological framework for the modelling of 
behaviours; this framework is used into a real-time 
detection system of abnormal behaviours, relying 
on case-based reasoning; 
- A geovisual analytics frameworks allowing 
supporting the operator in his task of behaviour 
analysis; 
- A maritime surveillance system integrating all the 
components of the methodology. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The hybrid approach for analysis of maritime 
behaviours 
 
2. A DATA MINING SUPPORT SYSTEM 
 
The unknown behaviours can be founded with data mining 
methods that can detect characteristic patterns. The patterns 
define a ship behaviour that can be modelled for further 
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analysis. In our research (PhD of Idiri), we developed a 
prototype of AIS data analysis system based on data mining 
methods [7, 8]. This system named ShipMINE (Fig. 2) is 
inspired by the system MoveMine [9] that integrates 
algorithms for the analysis of different kind of trajectories 
(animals, cyclones, etc.). 
 Different algorithms are integrated into ShipMINE for 
the detection of: 
- Zones with a lot of accidents (algorithm DBSCAN), 
- Abnormal trajectories into a group of trajectories 
(algorithm TROAD), (Fig. 3), 
- Usual trajectories of ships (algorithm TRACLUSS), 
- Parallel trajectories like trajectories of parallel 
fishing that is forbidden (algorithm CONVOY). 
 The patterns detected with ShipMINE are interpreted by 
experts of the domain. The useful patterns are then used for 
the modelling of abnormal or dangerous behaviours. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The prototype ShipMINE 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Extraction of abnormal trajectories with 
ShipMINE in [7] 
 
3. AN ONTOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Ontologies and the semantic enrichment of maritime 
trajectories are necessary in order to characterize the 
sequences of the behaviours. In the frame of the PhD of 
Vandecasteele [10, 11], we based our research on the 
extension of the ontological framework developed by Yan 
and his colleagues [12]. We decided to consider not only the 
spatio-temporal positions of the trajectory but also semantic 
trajectory units (e.g. begin, stop, moves, end). These 
semantic units can be enriched with different types of 
knowledge (e.g. spatio-temporal, geographic, domain) to 
provide end-users with high-level semantic descriptions of 
trajectories and a better understanding of the situation (step 
(a) in Fig. 4). This step allows performing further analyses 
of trajectories identifying potential alerts related to 
abnormal movement (step (b) in Fig. 4). Then, the proposed 
framework allows interpreting vessels’ activities and 
behaviours (step (c) in Fig. 4), using a case-based reasoning 
approach to compare previous behaviours defined by 
operators with the current facts. Then the semantics 
behaviours are integrated through a specific user interface 
that provides a better understanding of the situation (step (d) 
in Fig. 4). This approach was integrated into the prototype 
OntoMAP (Fig. 4).  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Conceptual architecture of the system.Raw data 
are extracted, enriched and then analyzed to identify 
potential abnormal behavior (in [11]) 
 
 
 
Figure 5  The prototype OntoMAP in [10] 
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4. A GEOVISUAL ANALYTICS SUPPORT SYSTEM 
 
The community of geovisual analytics develops a lot of 
visualizing methods for geographical information [17, 18, 
19, 20]. During the PhD of Vatin [13, 14, 15, 16], we 
developed a methodological approach of ship trajectory 
analysis based on geovisual analytics (Fig. 6). Our system 
proposes to an operator, information and visualizing method 
the most adapted to the analysis of risky situations. Our 
approach is based on (1) the modelling of the normal or 
abnormal situations to be analyzed, (2) the modelling of the 
information and the visualizing methods to be used and (3) 
the modelling of the profile of the operator and his capacity 
to handle the information and the visualizing methods. 
Because the operator of the MRCC is not accustomed to 
handling these methods, our system proposes to him, based 
on the analyses of his capacity and of the situation to be 
detected (pirate attacks, etc.), the visualizing methods the 
most adapted to the context. 
 We developed a system allowing a real-time analysis as 
well as delayed analysis of ship traffic. It can be adapted to 
every situation and every user profile. This prototype is 
integrated into our maritime surveillance system FishEYE. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 The Geovisual analytic interface in [13] 
 
5. A MARITIME SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 
 
In order to monitor data in real time and to test the 
researches introduced in previous sections, we developed a 
prototype of maritime surveillance system named FishEYE 
(Fig. 7). This system integrates heterogeneous data (ship 
localizations, meteorological and oceanic data, bathymetry, 
etc.) and different functions (analysis filters, drift models, 
etc.). Prototypes presented in the previous sections have 
been integrated as modular functions of the system. The 
design and the development of FishEYE are still in progress 
and improved continually. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 The prototype FishEYE 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The proposed approach allows analyzing identified and 
unknown behaviours thanks to supervised and unsupervised 
analysis methods. Unknown behaviours are detected with 
unsupervised methods (data mining). Similarly to known 
behaviours, the detected behaviours can be interpreted with 
a system based on supervised methods (geovisual analytics). 
Then, the behaviours can be formalized within an 
ontological framework.  
 Different prototypes were developed, integrating the 
methods chosen (data mining, geovisual analytics, case 
based reasoning). Finally the maritime surveillance system 
FishEYE was developed to integrate all methods into a 
unique interface, easier to be handled by an operator. 
 Next step of our research will focus on a 
geocollaborative support system allowing supporting 
operators to solve a problem like a huge accident or oil spill. 
This framework will be integrated into FishEYE.  
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ABSTRACT 
Analyses of long-term satellite AIS data provide infor-
mation about the activity in the High North back to July 
2010. In this paper the distribution of ships per month is 
shown, illustrating the variations in the activity and which 
flags that are present. A multiple hypothesis tracker 
(MHT) algorithm and Smart Agents are also presented; 
these are important tools for multi-sensor fusion of data 
from maritime surveillance assets and mandatory 
reporting systems enabling a comprehensive current 
maritime picture and end-user support in the detection of 
anomalous behaviour.  
Index Terms— Knowledge discovery, AIS, anomaly 
detection, data fusion 
1. INTRODUCTION
FFI carry out research to obtain the best possible 
Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) in the High 
North, and are involved in developing all aspects of the 
data collection, processing and information production 
chain. Key components in the R&D activity are fusion of 
data from a heterogeneous mix of platforms, sensors and 
information systems that facilitate anomaly detection, 
user friendly presentation and information exchange. 
2. SHIPPING INTENSITY
The Norwegian AIS satellites are instrumental in 
developing Norway’s maritime surveillance capacity. In 
addition to providing updates of ship positions in the 
Arctic every 45 – 90 minutes, the long-term data provide 
information about ship positions and activities since July 
2010. Density plots may be used to represent the normal 
situation in terms of shipping intensities that may be used 
for trend analyses as well as anomaly detection. 
Figure 1 shows the monthly shipping intensity in a 
part of the Norwegian area of interest in November 2015, 
for which the current maritime picture is shown in 
Chapter 3.2. The AIS data used are position reports from 
both Class A and Class B Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) transponders [1]. A rainbow colour scale is 
used to show the ship counts on a 1°x1° grid; from red for 
low numbers to violet for 48 ships per grid cell during the 
month, and black for 49 and higher numbers. 
Figure 1 Ship density in Nov 2015, 72-80°N, 0-45°E. 
The sum of the ship counts of all the grid cells, 
referred to as the total ship-months, is used as an 
aggregated figure for the ship activity in the area. In 
November 2015 the value was 5 200 ship-months. The 
highest value in 2015 was 6 149 ship-months in August, 
the lowest was 1 374 in January, plots are shown in [2]. 
Figure 2 Shipping intensity in Sep 2015 in polar waters. 
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Figure 2 shows the shipping intensity in the area given by 
the polar-waters definition in the Polar Code [4]. The 
highest number of ship-months in 2015 occur in 
September; 34 597 ship-months. The annual variation in 
the number of ship-months (red) as well as the number of 
ships (blue) is shown in Figure 3; 1 719 ships contributed 
to the activity in September.  
 
 
Figure 3 Variation of shipping in polar waters 2015. 
The number of ships per flag state in September is shown 
in Figure 4. Russia has the highest number of AIS-
reporting ships, 805; the USA is second with 258 ships; 
Norway third, 120; Greenland fourth, 70; and Canada 
fifth, 65. It can be noted that 84MMSI’s cannot be 
associated with a flag state. It is 55 flags states observed.  
 
Figure 4 Number of ships per flag state in Sep 2015. 
3. ANOMALY DETECTION AND DATA FUSION 
 
Anomaly detection is performed by Smart Agents 
(Chapter 3.1), and by an in-house developed target 
tracking algorithm; the Multi Hypothesis Tracker(MHT) 
using data fusion for automatic identification of ships 
detected in radar satellite images (Chapter 3.2).Several 
Smart Agents implemented to facilitate the anomaly 
detection are shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 Smart Agents flow chart. 
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3.1. Vessel of interest in the maritime picture 
Each Smart Agent is an algorithm containing anomaly 
detection logic - searching for classes of ships that should 
get special attention by the operators. This is done by e.g. 
checking data accuracy and data quality from several 
mandatory reporting systems and other information sources, 
such as the Safe Sea Net Norway, a vessel information 
lookup database and other trusted internet sources of 
information like International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) Maritime mobile Access and Retrieval System 
(MARS) database.  
The use of a service-oriented architecture (SOA) was a 
high priority and was achieved by implementing Web 
Processing Services (WPS)
8
. Through the use of a WPS-
client the end-user is able to flexibly configure a network of 
several different Smart Agents (setting up a mathematical 
Bayesian network on the server-side) and start the 
data/computer intensive analysis on demand.  Each node in 
the network is used to detect one type of anomaly (e.g. the 
validity of the reported data, mandatory reporting system 
turned off, and vessel is on a Grey/Black flag list). 
Historical data and the experience of the operator are used to 
set the probability threshold of anomaly detection for each 
node. The operators receive a more informative maritime 
picture where vessels of interest (VOI) are highlighted. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Ship detections from satellite-borne SAR. 
 
                                                 
8
 Open standard - OGC (Open Geospatial Consortium). 
 
 
Figure 7 Data from mandatory vessel reports. 
 
3.2. Automatic identification of ships in radar satellite 
images. 
 
A computerized system for identifying ships detected in 
satellite imagery has been developed by FFI. Satellite-borne 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) delivers images with a 
resolution sufficient to detect ships at sea; Figure 6 shows 
the image boundary and the detections made in a SAR 
image taken 26 Nov 2015.   
Figure 7 shows data from mandatory automatic vessel 
reports and anti-collision systems (AIS, Long Range 
Identification and Tracking (LRIT) and Vessel Monitoring 
System (VMS)). These data are associated to the SAR ship 
detections by the MHT.  
The MHT algorithm uses results from a range of earlier 
ship detections and position information when associating 
ship detections to vessel. For each hypothesis the probability 
is calculated.  The MHT tracks are shown in Figure 8, and 
the identified SAR ship detections are shown in Figure 9. 
In coastal areas, all data sources may be available, but 
for Arctic waters (far from the coast), Norwegian polar orbit 
AIS satellites, VMS and satellite SAR images are the main 
data sources. 
Vehicle IDs are received from AIS (as MMSI 
numbers), VMS (as call signs) and LRIT (as IMO numbers). 
SAR ship detections that are not identified may be false 
detections (i.e. clutter in the image) or VOIs. The ship 
identification system contributes to a more effective use of 
resources, since the attention and surveillance resources may 
now be used for the vessels that are not identified in the 
SAR image. 
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Figure 8 Association of ship detections to MHT tracks. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Identification of detected ships. 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has shown that up to 1700 ships were observed 
with SAT-AIS in the polar-waters polygon in the Polar 
Code [4]. Earlier work has shown that almost 2300 ships 
were observed north of 67°N, a majority of them in 
Norwegian waters [3].  
Detection of anomalous behaviour in a maritime 
context forms a natural part of the surveillance in the High 
North. Its main purpose is to distinguish abnormal activity 
from the normal background. It enables efficient use of 
surveillance assets, necessary for timely response to 
incidents threatening safety or security. FFI is presently 
working on further development and refinement of the MHT 
and Smart Agents to support operation of decision makers.  
More sophisticated algorithms to support decision 
support will be explored further in future work. Machine 
learning, or pattern classification, provides a suitable 
theoretical framework and a wide range of general 
algorithms that may be applied to detect anomalies in the 
maritime domain. An on-going survey of methods of 
anomaly detection published in open literature will be an 
important input for evaluating current and future activities 
within this area. Adding new types of sensors as input to the 
MHT algorithm will result in a more complete maritime 
picture, thereby enhancing the situational awareness in the 
high north. 
Ship density figures can serve as background 
information about the normal situation, basis for sailing 
plans, as well as the likelihood of observing a ship in given 
position for anomaly detection. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The information available to understand what is happening 
at sea is nowadays enabling many monitoring applications. 
Nevertheless, the size of the areas to be controlled and the 
amount of tracking data collected by a multitude of sensors 
and systems in real-time make the effective detection of 
illegal activities a challenging goal since often left to human 
operators. This work will introduce recent JRC research 
activities relevant to automatic anomaly detection and 
knowledge discovery in the maritime domain. Data mining, 
data analytics and predictive analysis examples are 
introduced using real data. In addition, this paper presents 
approaches to detect reporting messages anomalies and 
unexpected behaviours at sea. 
 
Index Terms— Maritime Surveillance, Knowledge 
Discovery, Anomaly Detection 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The overwhelming amount of information made available 
by the recent build-up of real time tracking systems can be 
used to extract knowledge and perform predictive analysis 
and automatic anomaly detection. The paper offers a list of 
research areas explored by the JRC Blue Hub team to 
improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA). Such 
activities range from Knowledge Discovery (mapping 
activities at sea including fishing and shipping, coverage 
analysis), predictive analysis (knowledge based Estimated 
Time of Arrival - ETA, long term route prediction), and data 
analytics. In addition, this paper presents approaches to 
detect reporting messages anomalies (AIS On/Off, spoofing 
and malfunctioning) and unexpected behaviours at sea (low-
likelihood event detection). 
 
2. KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 
 
The term Knowledge Discovery in this paper refers to the 
“overall process of discovering useful knowledge from 
data” [1]. In the maritime domain, Knowledge Discovery 
can be applied to map activities at sea, predict future vessel  
 
 
 
positions or to build the basis for model based anomaly 
detection. 
 
2.1. Mapping Human Activities at Sea 
 
The value of maritime Big Data has been recently 
demonstrated for better understanding maritime activities at 
sea. Historical vessel tracking data from systems such as 
Automatic Identification System (AIS)
9
 or Long Range 
Identification and Tracking (LRIT)
10
 can help in building 
context of maritime uses, especially in remote areas where 
the information is difficult to access or unavailable [2]-[5]. 
 
2.1.1. Mapping Maritime Routes 
The knowledge of maritime routes is particularly needed in 
areas where the traffic is highly regulated. Specific methods 
to extract maritime patterns have been developed and 
refined (e.g.[2], [3]). The underpinning model is based on 
waypoints detections (“entry”, “exit”, “port” areas). Such 
waypoints are then collectively connected by vessel tracks 
that shape the “normal” patterns at sea by clustering 
common trajectories as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1 Dover Strait traffic: (left) two-weeks of AIS data and (right) the 
resulting maritime traffic routes connecting previously detected  waypoints 
(green: ports, magenta: exit and cyan: entry areas). 
 
                                                 
9IMO (1998) Resolution MSC.74(69), Recommendation on Performance Standards for Universal 
Automatic Identification System (AIS), Annex 3; adopted on 12 May 1998. 
10IMO MSC.210(81), Performance Standards and Functional Requirements for the Long Range 
Identification and Tracking of Ships. Resolution adopted on 19 May 2006. 
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Figure 2 Fishing intensity by EU trawlers with length greater than 15 m 
using one-year AIS data archive. 
 
2.1.2. Mapping Fishing Activities 
By analysing the speed profile of trawlers, it is possible to 
distinguish fishing activities from movements from/to the 
fishing grounds (further information on the speed profile 
validated approach can be found in [6] and [7]). This led to 
a first map of trawlers fishing intensity was produced at EU 
scale [8]. Such map (Figure 2), highly correlated to the local 
bathymetry and biased by the AIS spatial coverage 
performance, provides contextual information that is useful 
not only to fisheries management and fisheries science, but 
also for MSA. 
 
2.2. Knowledge Based Prediction 
 
The knowledge of maritime routes can be used to improve 
the accuracy of predictive analysis as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 Prediction of a vessel track using only knowledge of previously 
observed tracks in the area (inset). 
The performance of vessel position prediction offered by the 
knowledge of routes increases with the complexity of the 
routeing systems ([9], [10] and [11]).  The accurate 
prediction of positions for periods longer than a few hours 
can be used to enhance situational awareness, to improve 
data fusion (see e.g. [9] and [10]) and to better estimate 
times of arrival in ports [11]. A progressive refinement of 
times of arrival in ports is essential in order to better plan 
port operations and efficiently allocate resources and 
facilities. 
 
2.3. Event Based Knowledge Discovery 
 
Event-based methodologies for Knowledge Discovery 
enable the analysis of maritime traffic data to detect 
maritime events and aggregate them in a georeferenced grid 
as in Figure 4. The method offers the possibility to quickly 
perform structured queries with respect to traditional 
approaches [13]. Such events include but are not limited to: 
“enter/exit a cell”, “track birth/death”, “motion start/stop”, 
“proximity between ships”, and “fishing/steaming”. 
 
 
Figure 4 Density maps per type of vessel over part of the Mediterranean 
Sea using one-month AIS data: a) tanker, b) cargo, c) passenger vessels and 
d) fishing activities. 
 
3. ANOMALY DETECTION 
 
The knowledge that is extracted using statistical or model-
based analysis can also be used to detect anomalous 
behaviours. Moreover, such knowledge can help in further 
interpreting suspicious movements by providing context 
information to data analytics. 
 
3.1. Low-Likelihood Behaviour 
 
The knowledge of maritime routes helps not only the 
understanding of maritime traffic. It also represents key 
information to detect unusual patterns or behaviours, as 
shown in Figure 5. Although not necessarily anomalies, 
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such low-likelihood activities represent a first filtered set of 
behaviours to be further investigated [12]. 
 
 
Figure 5  Local anomaly example extracted from the Dover Strait. The 
vessel deviates from the known route (red dots), approaching a port without 
stopping and finally returning to its declared route.  
 
3.2. Data Analytics 
 
Recent news
11
 reported about an anomalous vessel track in 
the Mediterranean Sea. By analysing AIS data, LRIT 
archive data (Figure 6) and remote sensing images (Figure 
7), through the Blue Hub it was demonstrated that the 
behaviour could have been a consequence of a route 
planning mistake.  
 
Figure 6 AIS data (grey circles) of the ship. The track (red dashed line) is 
estimated by interpolating the available data and using the density of 
shipping in the area (derived from historical LRIT data). 
                                                 
11 Financial Times, Europe’s ports vulnerable as ships sail without oversight: 
https://next.ft.com/content/4d71dc5e-c8ec-11e5-be0b-b7ece4e953a0  
 
Figure 7 Sentinel-1 images showing signatures compatible with the size of 
the target of interest. 
In particular, the vessel probably did not switch off its AIS: 
the North African area is characterised by low terrestrial 
AIS coverage and this is why there is a lack of information. 
AIS messages from the ship were in fact captured by 
satellites and a compatible signature is visible from remote 
sensing images. The vessel then sailed avoiding shallow 
waters (as the LRIT density of previous tracks shows) to 
cross the Sicily Channel, directed towards the Tyrrhenian 
Sea. Finally, the vessel slowed down and made a sharp turn 
towards the Port of Pozzallo. In that specific moment, by as 
seen in the voyage related data, the declared destination 
changed from “Pozzouoli” (in the Tyrrhenian Sea) to 
“Pozzallo”, highlighting a possible mistake in the planned 
route. This example shows how, after an anomaly is 
detected, the data must more deeply analyised before a true 
threat can be confirmed.  
 
3.3. Spoofing Detection 
 
The AIS standard allows the recording of the timestamp of 
the received messages at the base station.  
 
 
Figure 8 Spoofing case of a vessel located in port (top right) and 
broadcasting messages more than 100 km away from its actual position. 
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A network of base stations can provide Time Difference of 
Arrival information that enables multi-lateration of the AIS 
emissions. This can be used to successfully detect spoofing 
or malfunction of AIS that would result in security and 
safety issues (Figure 8). The methodology (demonstrated in 
[14]) has recently led to the implementation of a real-time 
AIS verification tool. 
3.4. AIS On/Off Detection 
AIS off-switching is recently becoming of interest to 
maritime operational authorities since such events could be 
linked to attempts to conceal illegal activities. Through the 
analysis of historical received signal strength it is possible to 
characterise the reception capabilities of AIS base stations 
and provide valuable knowledge to flag AIS drop-outs as 
intentional especially in areas where the signal strength is 
expected to be high [15]. 
Figure 9 Map of Received Signal Strength Indicator  (RSSI) from the Elba 
Island base station (star). The pattern is shaped by Line Of Sight 
propagation loss  and the receiving antenna pattern. Shadow areas can also 
be seen in correspondence to islands. 
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced a number of applications to improve 
the understanding of what is happening at sea beyond 
maritime surveillance. Knowledge Discovery, data analytics 
and situation prediction applied to historical vessel tracking 
data are promising tools to implement the next generation of 
anomaly detection services.   
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Operational Authorities 
Today’s ship reporting data – for the most part AIS – are used on a routine basis by maritime operational 
authorities to find situations that need attention. A common view of anomalies was identified among the 
authorities including loitering, rendezvous, location, unusual speed or change of direction. The 
transformation of available maritime data into information and the reduction of false alarms are essential 
among the main needs of the authorities. This is particularly true in view of the wide extent of 
Exclusive-Economic-Zone and Search-And-Rescue areas to be monitored. 
Operational authorities also stated the importance of further investigating suspicious events as they often 
are not linked to illegal activities. This can be done by considering all available data and by factoring 
expert knowledge in the process. 
A regulatory gap on the meaning of “monitoring” in the maritime domain is currently faced by 
operational authorities. In particular, dealing with alerts originating from areas or behaviours that are not 
explicitly included in the mandate of an authority presents issues. 
Operational authorities welcome the idea to further characterise sea areas in terms of type of use by 
mapping activities in order to provide context and a-priori information for situational awareness. 
Additional emerging needs include the capacity to detect AIS spoofing or malfunctioning and AIS On-
Off switching: both events might be indication of illegal activities and pose threats to security and 
safety. Also vessel profiling to improve risk index with respect to safety, security and Illegal Unreported 
or Unregulated fishing were listed among the most pressing needs for more effective operations at sea. 
 
Private Sector 
During the research and development (private sector) session, technical aspects related to knowledge 
discovery and anomaly detection were introduced. As an example, it is possible to recognise fishing 
vessels up to the level of fishing gear (e.g. trawling, purse seine or longline) based on their trajectory, 
provided that enough data points are available (see page 22 for additional information). 
The role of AIS was acknowledged as “revolutionary”, since it opens the doors to MSA applications that 
in the past would have been unimaginable. A similar role is seen for the future VHF Data Exchange 
System (VDES), which right now presents a window of opportunity to define new functionalities, such 
as e.g. enabling a ship to become a sort of in-situ suite of sensors (page 24 and page 40). 
The value of historical data when analysing real time streams was recognised as a future direction that 
has already started to be explored spawning many Knowledge Discovery projects (page 28).  Innovative 
uses of AIS data include the extraction of sea surface currents in real-time (page 31), remotely and 
accurately. This is an essential element for Search-And-Rescue operations. 
Finally, this session offered the opportunity to demonstrate how research can generate commercial and 
operational systems as well as innovative ideas to counter spoofing attempts (page 36). 
Maritime Knowledge Discovery and Anomaly Detection Workshop, 5-6 July 2016 
96 
 
Research Centres and Academia 
The session was opened by stating the need for a literature review in the field of anomaly detection and 
Knowledge Discovery. This is a relatively young subject where there has been a rapid increase of 
publications and it is the right time to start a survey on what is available, also to identify the most 
promising areas. 
The presentations highlighted new data streams and platforms (e.g. page 40), methods and also different 
ways to look at the subject such as the definition of sensing requirements based on the specific 
behaviours at sea to be detected (page 52). 
Ways to model complex events such as encounters at sea were presented, together with approaches to 
filter them using visual interaction with the data (pages 44 and 83). In addition, similar techniques can 
be applied to many different domains including aviation, or to the tracking of people on a football pitch. 
Data-driven approaches were discussed to detect and characterise port areas taking into account the new 
trend of limiting human intervention in appropriately setting the parameters of the implemented solution 
(page 48). 
During the session the process of designing use cases to ensure the security and control of fishing 
activities was introduced (page 57). In addition, the estimation of destination, time of arrival and the 
detection of inconsistencies are promising research areas (pages 62 and 91). 
Remote Sensing and radar also play a key role in anomaly detection since delivering independent 
information that complements self-reporting systems (pages 66 and 87). The fusion of such data is also 
fundamental to obtain a more reliable maritime picture (page 78) and therefore more effective anomaly 
detection. 
It is now recognised that the errors in the AIS information cannot be ignored. There is an increase also 
of intentional AIS manipulation, both kinematics and voyage related data. This can be tackled by 
message analysis (page 74) or by means of radiolocation techniques (page 91). The need to better 
quantify AIS performance and reliability was underscored (page 52). 
A preliminary work also demonstrated how vessel reporting data can be processed to point to suspicious 
behaviours of migrants smuggling vessels and what type of features can be used to identify potential 
“ghost ships” in the Mediterranean Sea (page 69).  
Finally, recent results over the Arctic region show how contextual information on human activities at sea 
can be quantitatively extracted also in remote and seasonally variable regions using vessel tracking data 
(page 87). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Operational authorities stressed the need to involve the users as early as possible in the design, 
implementation and quality assessment of anomaly detection and knowledge discovery tools. This is 
driven not only by the need to align the development objectives to tackle real issues, but also by a strong 
technology push. Indeed, often users have not enough insight of what becomes feasible in such a fast 
evolving research and innovation field: a continuous dialogue between authorities, industry and research 
would be extremely beneficial to the three communities. 
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